Reinhard v. State
| Decision Date | 06 November 1907 |
| Parties | REINHARD v. STATE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Kerr County; R. H. Burney, Judge.
Joe Reinhard was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.
W. C. Linden, Lee Wallace, and Jno. R. Storms, for appellant. F. J. McCord, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree; life sentence being awarded.
When the case was called for trial, motion was made to quash the special venire. This is found in the record, and the assignment of error based upon it being overruled. Bill of exception was not reserved, and, as presented, it cannot therefore be considered.
Challenge for cause was interposed to some of the jurors, which being overruled they were peremptorily excused. Error is assigned because appellant was forced to exhaust some of his peremptory challenges upon said jurors, and thereafter jurors were forced upon him which were objectionable. The bill of exceptions does not show any real objection to the jurors who sat in the case, but that phase of the question is unnecessary to be discussed, because the bill of exceptions, as explained by the court, justified the court in overruling causes for challenge.
The state introduced Herman Schultze, justice of the peace, who testified that he wrote a letter to the father of appellant in regard to a proposed settlement between defendant and his family and the family of the deceased, Earnestine Kutzer, which was then pending in regard to a report that said Earnestine Kutzer was pregnant by defendant, the substance of which letter was that the witness would not permit the settlement to be made, and, if the matter was not settled at once, the witness would have to report the same to the courts, and that he also said to appellant's father that he was as deep in the trouble as was the defendant, and that on the 26th, or the following day, he reached the home of defendant and his father, and discussed the matter with them, and that he then told defendant that he could not, as an officer, permit the proposed settlement to be made, and he referred to what had been told him by Mr. Kutzer, father of the girl, to the effect that an abortion was to be committed upon the girl; that appellant and his father stated they thought the matter had been settled that morning and the girl was to go away; that witness insisted that defendant should go with him to Kutzer and arrange to marry the girl, or make some settlement of the matter satisfactory to Kutzer; that appellant's father told appellant that perhaps he had better go with the witness, and had better marry the girl; that appellant consented to go, and that witness knew from the conversation that appellant had read the letter written by him to appellant's father the previous day; that he thought he had signed the letter officially. The substance of this letter, without going farther into it, was to the effect that Earnestine Kutzer, the deceased, was pregnant, and that appellant was the author of her disgrace, and the justice of the peace was trying to induce him to marry the girl, and would not permit his procuring an abortion. Appellant went with the justice of the peace to the residence of Kutzer, where, after talking the matter over, the justice of the peace 'phoned to Kerrville to secure a license to marry them. The bill does not show that appellant agreed to this, though he did not disagree. A short time afterward, and while at the residence of Kutzer, appellant went in the room where the girl was, and after talking with her awhile shot her to death, and then tried to kill himself by shooting. It is contended that appellant was under duress at the time, and all of this testimony was inadmissible. It will be noted that at the time of the occurrence, if under arrest at all, he was held for a different offense, to wit, seduction; there having been no charges preferred however. Under this state of case, we are of opinion that appellant was not under arrest, and, as before stated, if so, it was for seduction, and not this homicide. This testimony was therefore introducible, even though he was under arrest. See Mathis v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 549, 47 S. W. 464. We believe this was admissible upon another ground; that is, touching his insanity, as that was the real defense upon which appellant relied in the case. See Burt v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 439, 40 S. W. 1000, 43 S. W. 344, 39 L. R. A. 305, 330, and Cannon v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 467, 56 S. W. 351.
Error is assigned in regard to the introduction of the testimony of Dr. Jones, on the ground that the statements of appellant were not voluntary. It was in the nature of a confession; and, the party not being under arrest, it was clearly admissible. However, appellant does not brief this assignment. There is also an assignment upon the ruling of the court admitting the evidence of appellant's father, John Reinhard, and in refusing to permit him to prove by his father, John Reinhard, and his uncle, Jacob, that they had known the family of defendant on the paternal and maternal sides in the ascending line, as well as collateral kin, and that no member of said families had been charged with crime, nor had committed any offense up to the time of the trial of this defendant. No authorities are cited in support of this proposition, nor any tangible reason given, it occurs to us, why this testimony was admissible. We do not understand exactly what bearing or how this would relate to the question of insanity, nor do we think it necessary to discuss it.
While Mrs. Reinhard, mother of defendant, was being cross-examined, she was asked if it was not a fact that immediately upon her arrival at the side of her son, appellant, at the home of...
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