Reinstadler v. Reeves

• Citation: 33 F. 308
• Parties: REINSTADLER v. REEVES et al.
• Decision Date: 30 December 1887
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

33 F. 308

REINSTADLER v. REEVES et al.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

December 30, 1887

George H. Knight, for complainant.

Parkinson & Parkinson, for defendants.

THAYER J, (orally.)

The suit of Henry Reinstadler v. Marshall T. Reeves and others is an action to restrain the infringement of certain letters patent. The bill was filed on the fourth day of last October and the subpoena was regularly issued and duly served in this district on the fifth and sixth days of October.

The bill shows that the complainant in the case is a resident of the state of Missouri, and that the defendants are all residents and inhabitants of the state of Indiana. On the November rule-day, the defendants, by their solicitors, entered a formal appearance. On the succeeding rule-day in December, they appeared and filed a demurrer, based upon the ground that, under the act of March 3, 1887, they are not amenable to suit in this jurisdiction in cases of this kind, because they are not inhabitants of the district.

The first section of the act to determine the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, approved on March 3 1875, contains this clause:

'And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving such process or commencing such proceeding.'

And that clause is nothing more than a repetition of the same clause contained in the judiciary act of 1789. The corresponding clause contained in the first section of the amendatory act, March 3, 1887, is in the following language:

'And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but, where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suits shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant.'

As this is a case where the jurisdiction does not depend upon the fact that the parties are citizens of different states, but depends upon the subject-matter of the suit as arising under the patent laws of the United States, the defendants contend that, as the law now stands, they cannot be sued on this cause of action in any other district than that whereof they are inhabitants. And they further claim that, under the act of 1887, jurisdiction of this suit has been withdrawn from the court, so that even though the defendants chose to submit themselves to its jurisdiction, the court would be without power to hear the case.

Counsel for complainant apparently concedes that under the act of March 3, 1887, a bill to restrain the infringement of a patent should be brought 'in the district whereof the defendant is an inhabitant,' and such seems to be the effect of the amendment in question. Two propositions are advanced, however, in opposition to the demurrer, and they are as follows:

First. That the provision in the act of March 3, 1887, to the effect that 'No civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant,'-- is merely the grant of a privilege to the defendant to be sued exclusively in the district of which he is an inhabitant, which privilege he may waive if he likes, but that it does not operate to deprive the court absolutely of jurisdiction. In this respect, it is claimed that the same construction should be placed on the clause that has uniformly been placed on the corresponding provision contained in the judiciary act of 1789 and in the act of March 3, 1875. Harrison v.

Rowan Pet. C.C. 489; Logan v. Patrick, 5 Cranch, 288; Lovejoy v....