Reinstatement of Eston, Matter of

• Decision Date: 07 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 93610,93610
• Parties: In the Matter of the Petition for REINSTATEMENT OF Leonard R. ESTON. GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR, Appellant, v. Leonard R. ESTON, Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 755

487 N.W.2d 755

440 Mich. 1205

In the Matter of the Petition for REINSTATEMENT OF Leonard R. ESTON GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR, Appellant, v. Leonard R. ESTON, Appellee.

No. 93610.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Aug. 7, 1992.

ORDER

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(F)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the decision of the Attorney Discipline Board and we REINSTATE the decision of the hearing panel. The power to regulate and discipline members of the bar rests ultimately with this Court pursuant to constitutional mandate. Grievance Administrator v. August, 438 Mich. 296, 304-305, 475 N.W.2d 256 (1991). We agree with the hearing panel that the petitioner did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he met all of the conditions set forth in MCR 9.123. Specifically, as noted by the hearing panel, the petitioner failed to prove that:

(1) his conduct since the order of discipline has been exemplary and above reproach (2) he has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed on members of the bar, and will conduct himself in conformity with those standards; and

(3) he can safely be recommended to the public, the courts, and the legal profession as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them, and to otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence, and in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and an officer of the court.

LEVIN, J., dissents and states as follows:

I would deny or grant leave to appeal. I adhere to the view that peremptory reversal should be reserved for cases in which the law is settled and no factual assessment is required. ¹ In the instant case, as indicated in the peremptory order, factual and legal assessment is required. Peremptory disposition is not appropriate.

Further, this Court's peremptory disposition does not comply with the requirements of Const.1963, art. 6, Sec. 6, which requires that "[d]ecisions of the supreme court, including all decisions on prerogative writs, shall be in writing and shall contain a concise statement of the facts and reasons for each decision...."

The order of peremptory reversal of the Court of Appeals does not contain an adequate statement of facts or reasons for decision.

The reports, decisions and orders of hearing panels and the Attorney Discipline Board are not published in a form readily available to the profession or the public; a person interested in learning the factual and legal predicate for a decision of a hearing panel or of the board would thus need to seek to obtain copies from the board.

The statement in this Court's order that Eston "failed to prove" that his conduct has been exemplary and above reproach, that he has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed on members of the bar and will conduct himself in conformity therewith, and that he can be safely recommended as a person fit to be consulted by and to represent others, to act in matters of trust and confidence, and in general aid in the administration of justice, provides little guidance to Eston, the public, the profession, hearing panels, and the Attorney Discipline Board concerning the reasons for this Court's decision reversing the Attorney Discipline Board.

1 People v. Wright, 439 Mich. 910, 910-911, 479 N.W.2d 631 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Roek v. Chippewa Valley Bd. of Ed., 430 Mich. 314, 322, 422 N.W.2d 680 (1988) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Grames v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 434 Mich. 867, 868-875, 451 N.W.2d 304 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v. Little, 434 Mich. 752, 769-770, 456 N.W.2d 237 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v. Wrenn, 434 Mich. 885, 885-886, 452 N.W.2d 469 (1...