Reisbeck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.
| Decision Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | DA 21-0594 |
| Citation | 2022 MT 219 N |
| Parties | KIRK B. REISBECK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Submitted on Briefs: September 21, 2022.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. ADV-2017-696 Honorable Mike Menahan, Presiding Judge.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant: Dennis P. Conner, Gregory G. Pinski, James R Conner, Conner, Marr &Pinski, PLLP, Great Falls, Montana.
For Appellee: Nicholas J. Pagnotta, Williams Law Firm, P.C. Missoula, Montana Christopher C. Voigt, Crowley Fleck, PLLP Billings, Montana.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by unpublished opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Kirk Reisbeck appeals a Lewis and Clark County jury's special verdict in favor of his insurance company, Farmers Insurance Exchange. Following a car accident, Reisbeck sued Farmers for unpaid underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits and violations of Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), § 33-18-201(4) and (6), MCA. The jury determined that Reisbeck was not injured in the accident and did not reach the issue of Farmers's liability under the UTPA. Reisbeck seeks a new trial, arguing that the District Court erred when it: (1) excluded Farmers's claims file from evidence; (2) denied Reisbeck's motion to bifurcate the trial; (3) denied Reisbeck's motion to excuse a prospective juror who stated he would require a higher burden of proof; and (4) denied Reisbeck's motion for a mistrial based on a question the trial judge posed to the jury. Reisbeck contends that the cumulative effect of these errors prejudiced his right to a fair trial. We affirm.
¶3 In September 2009, Darrell King rear-ended Reisbeck's vehicle in Helena, Montana. Reisbeck sued King, who had an automobile insurance policy with liability limits of $50,000. A jury found King liable for the accident and awarded Reisbeck $10,000 in damages. Before the District Court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, King and Reisbeck settled for King's policy limits, and Reisbeck dismissed his lawsuit against King.
¶4 Before the liability case went to trial, Reisbeck filed his complaint against Farmers in this case to recover UIM benefits under his own policy, alleging that King's policy limits were inadequate to make Reisbeck whole for his injuries. Farmers moved for summary judgment after Reisbeck's settlement with King, which the District Court granted. Our Opinion in Reisbeck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2020 MT 171, 400 Mont. 345, 467 P.3d 557, details our reversal of the summary judgment order and our remand for further proceedings.
¶5 On remand, the lawsuit went to trial. Reisbeck alleged two claims against Farmers. The first was a breach of contract claim for unpaid UIM benefits. The second was a bad faith claim for violations of the UTPA, alleging that Farmers failed to conduct a reasonable investigation and neglected to attempt a fair settlement. Section 33-18-201(4), (6), MCA. The jury returned an 8-4 special verdict that the September 2009 accident did not cause injury to Reisbeck; following the verdict form's instructions, the jury did not deliberate Farmers's liability for the UTPA violations.
¶6 All issues Reisbeck raises are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Seltzer v. Morton, 2007 MT 62, ¶ 65, 336 Mont. 225, 154 P.3d 561 (admission of evidence); Eklund v. Trost, 2006 MT 333, ¶ 48, 335 Mont. 112, 151 P.3d 870 (bifurcation of trial); Reff-Conlin's Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 2002 MT 60, ¶ 16, 309 Mont. 142, 45 P.3d 863 (challenge to a potential juror for cause); Harding v. Deiss, 2000 MT 169, ¶ 19, 300 Mont. 312, 3 P.3d 1286 (); Estate of Frazier v. Miller, 2021 MT 85, ¶ 12, 404 Mont.1, 484 P.3d 912 (trial administration).
¶7 The District Court refused Reisbeck's pretrial request to compel Farmers to produce its full, unredacted claims file, permitting Farmers to withhold or redact privileged material. The court also granted Farmers's motion to preclude evidence of King's policy limits and Reisbeck's premiums, ruling that it was sufficient for the jury to know "that King's insurer paid its policy limit and that Reisbeck paid premiums to Farmers." During trial, the District Court also denied Reisbeck's request to admit a redacted version of the entire claims file.
¶8 Reisbeck argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it refused to admit the claims file into evidence. Reisbeck relies on Lorang v. Fortis Insurance Co., holding that juries must be allowed to consider the insurer's own records when determining its liability under the UTPA. 2008 MT 252, ¶¶ 86, 89, 345 Mont. 12, 192 P.3d 186 (referring to § 33-18-201(4), (6), MCA). Farmers responds that its claims file was inadmissible and properly excluded or, alternatively, that any error of admission was harmless because the jury never reached the issue of Farmers's liability under the UTPA.
¶9 We give great deference to jury verdicts in civil cases; our review of them, accordingly, is limited in scope. Seltzer, ¶ 94. We "must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights." M. R. Civ. P. 61. Reversal of a jury's verdict "cannot be predicated upon an error in admission of evidence, where the evidence in question was not of such character to have affected the result." In re A.N., 2000 MT 35, ¶55, 298 Mont. 237, 995 P.2d 427 (quoting Lauman v. Lee, 192 Mont. 84, 90, 626 P.2d 830, 834 (1981)).
¶10 For example, in Wenger v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., we concluded that the trial court's admission of a plaintiff's entire medical history, though error, did not warrant reversal. 2021 MT 37, ¶¶ 28-29, 34, 403 Mont. 210, 483 P.3d 480. The jury found that the defendant was not negligent, and it thus never reached the issues of causation or damages, rendering the admission of the plaintiff's medical history harmless. Wenger, ¶ 29. Similarly, in Howlett v. Chiropractic Center, P.C., we held that any error in allowing the defendant to introduce alternate causes of injury was harmless because the jury found that the defendant was not negligent and thus never reached the issue of causation. 2020 MT 74, ¶ 32, 399 Mont. 401, 460 P.3d 942; see also Harris v. Hanson, 2009 MT 13, ¶¶ 40-42, 349 Mont. 29, 201 P.3d 151 ().
¶11 In this case, the jury found that Reisbeck was not injured by the car accident and thus never reached the issue whether Farmers violated the UTPA. The first question on the special verdict form asked whether the car accident injured Reisbeck. The form instructed that if the jury's answer was "yes," it should proceed to the second and third questions regarding Reisbeck's damages (to calculate his UIM benefits) and his UTPA claim, respectively. But if the jury answered "no"-that Reisbeck was not injured in the accident-then the foreperson was simply to sign and date the form and return it to the bailiff. The jury marked "no" on the first question and returned the form.
¶12 Reisbeck wanted the claims file admitted into evidence to establish his UTPA bad faith investigation and settlement claims and to cross-examine and impeach Farmers's witnesses regarding those same claims. Reisbeck and Farmers both submitted proposed special verdict forms that used the same wording, directing the jury to conclude its deliberations if it found that Reisbeck was not injured. The jury never reached the UTPA issue after answering "no" to the first question.
¶13 "It is well established that 'acquiescence in error takes away the right of objecting to it.'" Horn v. Bull River Country Store Props., 2012 MT 245, ¶ 25, 366 Mont. 491, 288 P.3d 218 (quoting In re A.A., 2005 MT 119, ¶ 26, 327 Mont. 127, 112 P.3d 993). Reisbeck expressed concern in the final pretrial conference that Farmers framed its case around the notion that Reisbeck did not have an injury, but his own proposed verdict form used the same threshold wording for the first question. As the jury went no further than that first question directed, we conclude that any error under Lorang in the exclusion of the claims file did not affect Reisbeck's "substantial rights," was harmless, and is properly disregarded on appeal. M. R. Civ. P. 61.
¶14 Reisbeck briefly argues that the claims file was relevant not only to proving his UTPA claim, but also to proving his injury and thus his UIM claim. Reisbeck points out that the claims file included medical reports and diagnostic medical tests evidencing his brain injury from the collision that would have supported a finding of injury by the jury. To prove his injury, Reisbeck could have introduced the medical reports and tests independently and with proper foundation. By his bifurcation argument, addressed below, Reisbeck tacitly acknowledges that the claims file was not relevant to his UIM claim. "District courts are vested with broad discretion in controlling the admission of evidence at trial." Seltzer, ¶ 65. Reisbeck fails to establish why the judge's decision to exclude the claims file for purposes of establishing injury was an abuse of discretion.
¶15 When the District Court denied admission of the claims file before...
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