Reisch-Elvin v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 03 June 2005 |
Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 2:05cv237.,CIV.A. 2:05cv237. |
Citation | 372 F.Supp.2d 827 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Parties | Jean REISCH-ELVIN, Plaintiff, v. PROVIDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
Leonard D. Levine, Virginia Beach, VA, for Plaintiff.
Eric W. Schwartz, Troutman Sanders LLP, Virginia Beach, VA, for Defendant.
Presently before the Court is Defendant Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company's Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
Plaintiff Jean Reisch-Elvin participated in an employee welfare benefit plan through her employer, Sentara Healthcare. Under this plan, Plaintiff obtained a life insurance policy issued by Defendant Provident, and Plaintiff's husband was a named insured under this policy. The policy provided Plaintiff with a death benefit of $10,682.00 in the event her husband died of natural causes; it provided an additional death benefit of $10,682.00 in the event her husband died of an accident. Pl.'s Mot. for J. ¶ 3.
On December 28, 2002, Plaintiff Jean Reisch-Elvin's husband died in a car accident. On September 8, 2004, Defendant Provident paid Plaintiff the death benefit of $10,682 but refused to pay the additional accidental death benefit of another $10,682. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff exhausted her administrative appeals with Defendant Provident on January 24, 2005. Id. ¶ 8. On March 30, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach alleging that Defendant Provident violated the terms of her life insurance policy when it denied her the accidental death benefit. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Provident denied the additional accidental death benefit because it has alleged that Plaintiff's husband died from an accident that occurred while he was driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. ¶ 5, 6. Plaintiff states:
The accidental death benefit provisions of the subject insurance policy contains no exceptions for loss resulting from the insured's being drunk, or under the influence of alcohol, as required by Virginia code § 38.2-3508(11) Provision 11.
Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff requests $10,682, attorney's fees, and costs for "bad faith." Id. ¶ 9.
Defendant Provident filed a Notice of Removal and a Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005, asserting that this Court has federal question jurisdiction in this case because Plaintiff's claim arises out of an employee welfare benefit plan, which is governed by ERISA. Defendant also filed a Motion to Dismiss, maintaining that Plaintiff's claim is based solely on state law and that ERISA preempts state law claims. Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 4. On May 10, 2005, in her "Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss," Plaintiff acknowledges that ERISA's purpose "is to protect employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries and to subject such plans to a national uniform law." Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 2. Plaintiff also states that her "action is based upon the contract and is not derived from any state law." Id. Defendant did not file a Reply to Plaintiff's Response. The matter is now ripe for judicial determination.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to move the court to dismiss an action if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The function of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). When considering a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court is generally limited to a review of the pleadings filed in the case. Exhibits attached to the pleadings are considered a part of the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should only be granted in "very limited circumstances." Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325 (4th Cir.1989). Dismissal is appropriate, however, if it appears that the plaintiff is not "entitled to relief under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged." Harrison v. United States Postal Serv., 840 F.2d 1149, 1152 (4th Cir.1988) ( ); Davis v. Hudgins, 896 F.Supp. 561, 566 (E.D.Va.1995) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 489 (4th Cir.1991). When reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must construe the factual allegations "in the light most favorable to plaintiff." Schatz, 943 F.2d at 489 (quotation omitted); Davis, 896 F.Supp. at 566 ). Thus the plaintiff's "failure" to specifically "identify the provision permitting recovery is not fatal." De Sole v. United States, 947 F.2d 1169, 1177 (4th Cir.1991).
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has explained, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), all state laws "relating to" an employee welfare benefit plan are preempted by ERISA. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Pettit, 164 F.3d 857, 861 (4th Cir.1998). ERISA defines state law to include "any laws, decisions, rules, regulations or other State action having the effect of law, of any State." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1). A breach of contract claim arising out of an ERISA plan is clearly within ERISA's preemptive scope, and such a claim is nothing more than a claim for benefits which is provided for under Section 502 of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)1; see also Ackerman v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 254 F.Supp.2d 792, 815 (S.D.Ohio 2003); Delong v. Teacher's Ins. and Annuity Ass'n, 2000 WL 426193, *2 (E.D.Pa.2000). Unsurprisingly, actions to recover benefits "are the most frequent ERISA suits." ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 2d. § 8.03.
Plaintiff concedes in her Response to Defendant Provident's Motion to Dismiss that ERISA governs this case, pointing to ERISA's purpose and reformulating her action as "based upon the contract and is not derived from any state law." Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 2. Defendant Provident, however, maintains that this Court should grant its motion to dismiss because Plaintiff has sought "recovery of damages based on state law causes of action." Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 3. In essence, Defendant argues that, because Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment seeks recovery based solely on a state law cause of action, such a claim is preempted by ERISA and thus should be dismissed. Defendant Provident points to two unpublished opinions to support this position.
This Court DENIES Defendant Provident's Motion to Dismiss. It is well-established that motions to dismiss are to be construed in the plaintiff's favor and "failure specifically to identify the provision permitting recovery is not fatal." De Sole, 947 F.2d at 1177. More specifically, in the ERISA context, various courts have repeatedly concluded that, if the claim is completely preempted by ERISA, a "complaint states an ERISA claim without expressly pointing to the ERISA" statute when a plaintiff seeks to recover ERISA-governed benefits. Vickery v. United Medical Resources, Inc., 43 F.3d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1994) ( ); see also Crull v. GEM Ins. Co., 58 F.3d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir.1995) ( ); Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir.1992) ( ); Carland v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir.1991) ( ); Ackerman, 254 F.Supp.2d at 815 ( ); Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 152 F.Supp.2d 755, 758 (E.D.Pa.2001) ( ); Delong, 2000 WL 426193 at *4 ( ).
Indeed, as several courts have observed, a defendant cannot have it "both ways" by advocating first for removal because ERISA governs the claim and then arguing that an ERISA claim has not been stated, requiring it to be dismissed because it is preempted by ERISA. Vickery, 43 F.3d at 1210 (Hansen, J. concurring). As the United States Supreme Court has held, an ERISA defense is removable because the statute "completely preempts" state law despite the "well-pleaded" complaint rule which generally disallows removal when a federal defense is made to a state cause of action....
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