Reiser, Inc. v. Roberts Real Estate
| Decision Date | 14 March 2002 |
| Citation | 739 N.Y.S.2d 753,292 A.D.2d 726 |
| Parties | REISER, INC., Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>ROBERTS REAL ESTATE, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Plaintiff, a real estate development corporation and owner of a subdivision known as Stone Ends East in the Town of Brunswick, Rensselaer County, entered into a listing agreement (hereinafter the subdivision listing agreement) with defendant, a real estate brokerage corporation, for defendant to market and sell six building lots in the subdivision with houses to be constructed thereon by plaintiff. By a separate listing agreement (hereinafter the residence listing agreement), defendant also agreed to act as plaintiff's broker in the sale of the residence of plaintiff's principals, Henry Reiser and Elizabeth Reiser. Both listing agreements were exclusive, extended for a term of one year and provided for a broker's commission to be paid to defendant and any cooperating broker.
It is undisputed that defendant procured purchasers for the Reiser residence and two of the six subdivision lots. In each case, plaintiff entered into a contract of sale which specifically acknowledged that defendant brought about the sale. All three transactions culminated in the transfer of title. Plaintiff did not pay defendant the commissions contemplated by the listing agreements but, instead, commenced the instant action claiming misrepresentation, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and seeking, respectively, rescission, damages and forfeiture of commissions. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract and moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and claiming entitlement, as a matter of law, to payment of the commissions. Supreme Court denied defendant's motion and defendant now appeals.
Plaintiff's first cause of action seeks rescission of the listing agreements based on defendant's alleged false representations and promises, arguably stating a claim for fraud in the inducement. In the complaint, however, plaintiff inappropriately characterizes defendant's alleged breach of the listing agreements as a ground for rescission. Nevertheless, defendant moved for summary judgment and not dismissal based on claims addressed to the sufficiency of the complaint and, thus, even if plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action, defendant is not entitled to summary judgment if plaintiff's submissions provide evidentiary facts making out a cause of action (see, Mega Group v Halton, 290 AD2d 673, 675; Canonico v Hayes, 127 AD2d 911, 913). Notably, defendant failed to address fraud in the inducement in its moving papers.
Here, plaintiff claims that defendant made promises during the course of negotiating the listing agreements which it did not intend to keep. Promises made, if any, with respect to the manner in which defendant agreed to perform under the listing agreements cannot form the basis of a claim for fraud in the inducement inasmuch as promises to perform in the future pursuant to a contract merely duplicate claims for breach of contract (see, New York Univ. v Continental Ins. Co., 87 NY2d 308, 318; Orix Credit Alliance v Hable Co., 256 AD2d 114, 115). However, plaintiff also alleges that defendant represented that the agent in charge of marketing plaintiff's subdivision had prior experience marketing a neighboring subdivision when, in fact, a different agent was responsible for the success of the competing subdivision. This alleged misrepresentation of a present fact, which plaintiff claims induced it to enter into the listing agreements, is sufficient to raise a question of fact precluding summary judgment on the issue of whether the subdivision listing agreement should be rescinded as a result of defendant's fraudulent inducement (see, Deerfield Communications Corp. v Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 68 NY2d 954, 956). We note, however, that the alleged misrepresentation pertains only to the subdivision listing agreement. As plaintiff has failed to state any facts supporting a claim for rescission of the residence listing agreement, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the first cause of action with respect to that agreement.
Plaintiff's second cause of action asserts that defendant breached both listing agreements and we conclude that defendant should be awarded summary judgment on this claim. In unambiguous terms, both written listing agreements establish defendant's entitlement to a commission upon the sale of a listed property during the contractual period. Each agreement specifically grants to defendant "full discretion to determine the appropriate marketing approach" for the listed property. Plaintiff does not allege that defendant breached any of the aforesaid written terms of the listing agreements but, instead, argues that defendant failed to keep myriad promises extraneous to the agreements, principally concerning the manner in which defendant promised to market the property. "It is well settled that `extrinsic and parol evidence is not admissible to create an ambiguity in a written agreement which is complete and clear and unambiguous upon its face'" (W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 163, quoting Intercontinental Planning v Daystorm, Inc., 24 NY2d 372, 379). Thus, in the face of the clear terms of the listing agreements, plaintiff's claims of breach based on extrinsic evidence cannot survive (see, Bast Hatfield v General Elec. Co., 229 AD2d 892, 894; Ambrose Mar-Elia Co. v Dinstein, 151 AD2d 416, 419, lv denied 74 NY2d 615).
Turning to defendant's counterclaim, defendant has established its entitlement to commissions under the terms of the listing agreements by introducing uncontroverted evidence that the Reiser residence and two of the six listed subdivision lots were sold as a result of defendant's efforts while the listing agreements were in effect. Summary judgment should be granted, therefore, on defendant's counterclaim for breach of the residential listing agreement (see, Balfour v Passarelli, 245 AD2d 720, 721; Hess v Kruse, 131 AD2d 545, 546). However, inasmuch as plaintiff's cause of action for fraud in the inducement could undermine defendant's entitlement to relief under the subdivision listing agreement, it would be premature to grant defendant's counterclaim for breach of contract with respect to the sales of the subdivision lots (see, Eurotech Dev. v Adirondack Pennysaver, 224 AD2d 738, 739).
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