Reisman v. Regents of Wayne State University

• Decision Date: 16 April 1991
• Docket Number: 111557,Docket Nos. 111538
• Citation: 470 N.W.2d 678,188 Mich.App. 526
• Parties: , 64 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 920, 125 Lab.Cas. P 57,404, 68 Ed. Law Rep. 516 Betty L. REISMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. REGENTS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee. Betty L. REISMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. REGENTS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 678

470 N.W.2d 678

188 Mich.App. 526, 64 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 920,

125 Lab.Cas. P 57,404, 68 Ed. Law Rep. 516

Betty L. REISMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. REGENTS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee.

Betty L. REISMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. REGENTS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellant,

Cross-Appellee.

Docket Nos. 111538, 111557.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 8, 1990, at Lansing.

Decided April 16, 1991, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication June 21, 1991.

Fried & Levitt, P.C. by Gary E. Levitt, Birmingham, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Wayne State University Office of the General Counsel by Daniel J. Bernard, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Detroit, for the defendant-appellee.

Before: MARILYN J. KELLY, P.J., and HOOD and DOCTOROFF, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

These are appeals as of right from two cases that were conducted simultaneously before the same judge. The appeals were consolidated. In Docket No. 111538, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Claims alleging breach of an employment contract. This claim was heard by a Wayne Circuit Court judge sitting as the Court of Claims. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's ruling of no cause of action, arguing that the court erred in ruling that plaintiff failed to prove that she was discharged without cause. We affirm.

In Docket No. 111557, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Wayne Circuit Court, alleging reverse race discrimination. This claim was heard by a jury, which returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor in the amount of $1,582,000, plus interest and attorney fees. The trial court subsequently granted remittitur, reducing the damage award by $200,000. Defendant appeals, raising several issues. Defendant argues that the uncertainty of tenure is fatal to plaintiff's claim for future wages and benefits; that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence, in instructing the jury regarding the effect of defendant's affirmative action policy, and in failing to grant defendant's motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and that a new trial is required because of jury misconduct and inconsistent verdicts. Plaintiff cross appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting remittitur. We find dispositive defendant's argument that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the effect of defendant's affirmative action policy. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

On July 12, 1979, the university offered Gordon Smith, a black male, a position as an assistant professor in the area of guidance and counseling of the Division of Theoretical and Behavioral Foundations of the College of Education, for a two-year term. On July 23, 1979, the university offered plaintiff, a white female, the position of associate professor in the guidance and counseling area of the same division for a two-year term. Both plaintiff and Smith accepted the offers and began teaching in the fall semester of 1979. Both contracts were renewed twice more, both times for one-year terms. In November 1982, at the beginning of her fourth year with the university, plaintiff applied for tenure. On November 24, 1982, the university informed plaintiff that her contract would not be renewed and that her employment would end on August 31, 1983. Smith's contract was renewed for another one-year term. In May 1983, plaintiff was notified that her application for tenure was denied.

In Docket No. 111538, plaintiff appeals from the judgment of no cause of action entered by the Court of Claims in regard to plaintiff's breach of contract claim.

In an opinion issued on March 24, 1988, the Court of Claims concluded that in 1979 and 1981 the parties entered into legally enforceable contracts of employment which provided that plaintiff could be terminated only for just cause, that plaintiff had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the dean of the College of Education made all the alleged statements concerning "life time" employment, that defendant did not breach the employment contract by nonrenewal of plaintiff's contract of employment for the 1983-84 school year, and that plaintiff had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she was terminated without just cause.

Plaintiff asserts that the Court of Claims correctly found that a Toussaint ¹ contract existed, but that the court erred in ruling that she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her employment was terminated without just cause. Defendant argues that Toussaint does not apply to the contract at issue, but, nevertheless, that the judgment of no cause of action was correct.

Where a trial court reaches the correct result for the wrong reason, the result will not be disturbed on appeal. Wilson v. Acacia Park Cemetery Ass'n, 162 Mich.App 638, 642, 413 N.W.2d 79 (1987); Dutka v. Sinai Hosp of Detroit, 143 Mich.App. 170, 176, 371 N.W.2d 901 (1985). For several reasons, the judgment of no cause of action was correct. First, the contract theories articulated in Toussaint do not apply when the conduct of the parties is governed by a collective bargaining contract. Sankar v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 160 Mich.App. 470, 478-479, 409 N.W.2d 213 (1987). In the instant case, a collective bargaining agreement was in force at all times. Indeed, plaintiff availed herself of the grievance and arbitration procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.

Second, an employee who is discharged for reasons of budget cutbacks or economic necessity does not have grounds for a wrongful discharge claim, even if the employment contract expressly provides that the employee is subject to termination only for just cause. Bhogaonker v. Metropolitan Hosp, 164 Mich.App. 563, 417 N.W.2d 501 (1987); Friske v. Jasinski Builders, Inc., 156 Mich.App. 468, 402 N.W.2d 42 (1986). Plaintiff concedes that in 1981 and 1982 defendant was experiencing a budget crisis which required work force reductions. In addition, the evidence overwhelmingly supports a finding that the decision not to renew plaintiff's contract was motivated by economic necessity.

Third, plaintiff's contracts with defendant were for a definite term. The collective bargaining agreement, the supplement to the agreement negotiated in 1982, the university's "statutes," and the letters of offer and acceptance establish that the express terms of the contract created employment for the stated duration. In fact, the letters offering plaintiff one-year renewals for 1981-82 and 1982-83 specifically stated, "Please note that this appointment carries no presumption of reappointment beyond the stated time period." Plaintiff accepted the reappointments by signing the letters. The university permitted plaintiff to serve out the term of her last contract as expressly provided and, thus, did not breach the contract. The dismissal of plaintiff's breach of contract action is affirmed.

In Docket No. 111557, defendant appeals from the verdict in plaintiff's favor on her race-discrimination claim. We first address defendant's argument that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the effect of defendant's affirmative action policy.

Plaintiff asserts that defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Defendant did not state its objections to the instruction immediately after the trial court finished instructing the jury. However, defendant did object to the instruction during the discussion of jury instructions that took place before the trial court instructed the jury and also raised the issue in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Thus, the trial court had the opportunity to consider the issue. In our view, this issue was sufficiently preserved for review. In addition, when a defect in an instruction to which no objection was made pertains to a basic and controlling issue in a case, this Court may address the error in order to avoid manifest injustice. Gallaway v. Chrysler Corp, 105 Mich.App. 1, 6-7, 306 N.W.2d 368 (1981). Plaintiff's theory in this case was that the decision not to renew her contract was based on defendant's affirmative action policy. Plaintiff argued that the policy was invalid because it had not been approved by the Civil Rights Commission and, therefore, that any consideration of race by defendant was a violation of the law. Thus, the effect of the affirmative action policy was a basic and controlling issue in this case.

If a jury charge is erroneous or inadequate, reversal is required only where failure to reverse would be inconsistent with substantial justice. MCR 2.613(A); Willoughby v. Lehrbass, 150 Mich.App. 319, 336, 388 N.W.2d 688 (1986).

The trial court charged the jury as follows:

I instruct you that if you find that race or color was at least one of the reasons that made a difference in determining that Betty Reisman's contract was to be non-renewed, defendant cannot avoid liability to plaintiff by claiming that the defendant's acts were done pursuant to an affirmative action plan.

The challenged instruction was based upon the interpretation of Sec. 210 of the Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. Sec. 37.2210; M.S.A. Sec. 3.548(210), by the Court in J F Cavanaugh & Co. v. Detroit, 126 Mich.App. 627, 337 N.W.2d 605 (1983).

Section 210 provides:

A person subject to this article may adopt and carry out a plan to eliminate present effects of past discriminatory practices or assure equal opportunity with respect to religion, race, color, national origin, or sex if the plan is filed with the commission under rules of the commission and the commission approves the plan.

In Cavanaugh, the City of Detroit passed an ordinance requiring all city contractors to take affirmative action to achieve reasonable representation of minority groups and women on their work force. Although primarily a preemption case, this Court also affirmed the trial court's ruling that the ordinance was invalid because it conflicted...