Reitano v. City of Haverhill

• Decision Date: 26 May 1941
• Citation: 309 Mass. 118,34 N.E.2d 665
• Parties: ANTONIO REITANO v. CITY OF HAVERHILL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

309 Mass. 118

34 N.E.2d 665

ANTONIO REITANO v. CITY OF HAVERHILL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

May 26, 1941

April 9, 1941.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., LUMMUS, QUA DOLAN, & COX, JJ.

Municipal Corporations, Liability for tort, Officers and agents. Public Officer. School and School Committee. Haverhill.

The school committee of Haverhill, in keeping the "Haverhill stadium" in repair as required by St. 1929, c. 168, were public officers, and the city was not liable for injury negligently caused by a foreman in the city's department of public property while engaged in such repair work for the committee.

TORT. Writ in the Superior Court dated August 23, 1938. The action was tried before Beaudreau, J.

A. H. Salisbury 2d, (R.

A. A. Comparone with him,) for the plaintiff.

W. C. McDonald City Solicitor, (W.

S. Soroka with him,) for the defendant.

DOLAN, J. This is an action of tort to recover compensation for personal injuries, sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the alleged negligence of the "defendant or the person in its service entrusted by it with the duty of superintending the work" upon which the plaintiff was assisting when he was injured. At the close of the evidence the defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict, which the judge allowed subject to the plaintiff's exception. In directing the jury to bring in a verdict for the defendant the judge stated, in substance, that he was doing so solely because, as matter of law, a municipality is exempt from liability for negligence, "if there is any negligence in a case of this kind." The case comes before us on the plaintiff's exceptions to the granting of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and to the exclusion of certain evidence offered to show negligence on the part of the defendant.

The evidence would warrant the jury in finding the following facts: On November 3, 1937, the plaintiff was, and for some time prior thereto had been, receiving relief from the defendant. He was a "`relief worker,' so called," receiving $3 a week, in return for which he performed such work for the defendant as it might direct, at the rate of fifty cents an hour. On the morning of November 3 he reported for work and, under the direction of one Ferretti, a foreman in the defendant's department of public property, accompanied him and "two other persons" to the Haverhill stadium to aid in the repair of one of the stadium gates. The plaintiff and the two "other persons" were expected to obey such orders as Ferretti might give in directing the work. While following Ferretti's orders in assisting in the work the plaintiff was injured. It is unnecessary to recite the details of the accident, since we assume in favor of the plaintiff, for the purposes of the case, that the jury could find that at the time the accident occurred he was in the exercise of due care and that his injuries were caused by the negligence of Ferretti while exercising superintendence. (See Ryalls v. Mechanics' Mills, 150 Mass. 190 , 196.) The plaintiff concedes properly that he was not then an employee of the defendant within the meaning of the workmen's compensation act, the provisions of which applicable to cities had been accepted by the defendant. See Scordis's Case, 305 Mass. 94 .

Special St. 1918, c. 56, provided for a commission to be known as the "Haverhill Stadium and Athletic Field Commission," to consist of five members, including the mayor and the president of the school committee ex officiis, and three others, each of whom was to be elected annually for a fixed term. The commission was authorized to acquire in the name of the city the land that prior to the enactment of the statute had been leased by the city to the Haverhill High School Athletic Field Association, and the structures thereon, and to hold, manage, control, lease or let the same for the purposes of high school and other athletics and other public events. The statute also provided that the revenue derived from leasing or letting the land should be devoted, first, to the upkeep and maintenance of the land and structures, second, to the payment of interest charges and the retirement of the bonds (authorized to be issued by the statute for the purpose of acquiring the "structures"), and, third, to the enlargement and improvement of the grounds and the development and encouragement of school athletics.

Statute 1929, c 168, provides as follows: "The school committee of the city of Haverhill shall have sole management and control of the Haverhill stadium and athletic field, so called, including the land and structures thereon, located in said city and to be used for purposes of school and other athletics and public events at which an admission fee may or may not be charged. Said school committee may lease or let said stadium and athletic field for any of the aforesaid purposes upon such terms and conditions as it may determine. All revenue received by said school committee from said stadium and athletic field shall be paid into the treasury of said city. Acting on behalf of said city, said school committee shall collect all money due...