Reitz v. Knight

• Decision Date: 26 August 1991
• Docket Number: No. 25929-6-I,25929-6-I
• Citation: 62 Wn.App. 575,814 P.2d 1212
• Parties: Dan REITZ and Elinor Reitz, husband and wife, Respondents, v. Darel Wayne KNIGHT, a single person, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 575

62 Wn.App. 575

814 P.2d 1212

Dan REITZ and Elinor Reitz, husband and wife, Respondents, v. Darel Wayne KNIGHT, a single person, Appellant.

No. 25929-6-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 1.

Aug. 26, 1991.

Howard K. Todd, Seattle, for appellants

William N. Snell, Jonson & Jonson, Seattle, for respondents.

Hwa-Tsun Feng, Seattle, for defendants.

AGID, Judge.

Darel Knight appeals a judgment entered in a boundary dispute between him and his neighbor, Dan Reitz. He contends that the trial court used improper procedures to determine the boundary, failed to consider his adverse possession claim, and improperly admitted documentary evidence. He also contends that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

In 1976, Knight purchased a house situated on two Lake Washington waterfront lots. Reitz purchased the house and two lots directly north of Knight's property in late 1979 or early 1980. From 1980 until 1986, Reitz rented this house to others; he and his wife began living there in August 1986.

Shortly after Reitz moved into his Lake Washington house, he and Knight became embroiled in a property line dispute. In late 1986, Knight hired Sprout Engineers, Inc., ("Sprout") to survey the property and establish the boundary line between his and Reitz's property. Sprout discovered two significant facts: (1) the 1904 plat map for Block A of C. D. Hillman's Lake Washington Garden of Eden plat, the block containing Knight's and Reitz's lots, did not specify a width for Block A's southernmost lot, lot 36; and (2) the actual length of Block A exceeded that indicated on the plat map by 20 to 40 feet, depending upon the width assigned to lot 36.

Based upon lot size patterns in other blocks of the Garden of Eden plat, Sprout assigned lot 36 a width of 42 feet. This left 28 feet of excess land within Block A. Sprout apportioned this excess proportionately among the 36 lots, and concluded that the Knight-Reitz boundary line fell 4 feet north of Knight's foundation.

Reitz did not like the results of the Sprout survey. Under the Sprout apportionment, Reitz' northern property line lay under his neighbor's foundation. Reitz realized that this was not feasible, and concluded that his northern boundary would have to be defined by the placement of his neighbor's home. The net result of this was to reduce the total footage of Reitz' two lots from the 70 feet indicated on the plat map to 67.6 feet. ¹

Reitz then retained Meriwether Leachman & Associates, Inc., (Meriwether) to perform another survey. Meriwether assigned a 35-foot width to the undimensioned lot 36. He then attempted to apportion the remaining excess property among the 36 lots of Block A. Meriwether concluded that apportionment was not a proper way to establish boundary lines because the newly established lines encroached into existing improvements. Meriwether apparently then set Reitz' northern boundary at the chimney of his neighbor to the north. Measuring southward from this line, Meriwether concluded that in order for Reitz' property width to meet its platted width of 70 feet, the disputed property line must lie one inch north of Knight's chimney.

Reitz filed a complaint to quiet title and for determination of the disputed property boundary in accordance with the Meriwether survey. He named Knight, Knight's ex-wife, and the bank holding a deed of trust on Knight's property as defendants. In his answer, Knight counterclaimed for a boundary determination in accordance with the Sprout survey, for an equitable boundary determination under RCW 58.04.020, or for adverse possession of At trial, Knight moved for dismissal pursuant to his claim that Reitz failed to join necessary parties. The trial judge denied his motion. The trial judge also rejected Knight's adverse possession claim, saying in the midst of Reitz' closing argument: "I don't think this is an adverse possession case, period." The judge ruled in Reitz' favor, holding that the Meriwether survey should determine the Knight-Reitz property line. Knight moved for reconsideration, focusing particularly on the trial court's rejection of his adverse possession claim. The trial court denied Knight's motion, and this appeal followed.

                the 2.4 foot wide disputed strip.   Knight also asserted that Reitz' complaint should be dismissed for failure to join necessary parties
                

SURVEYING PROCEDURES

The trial court concluded that the Meriwether survey was preferable to the Sprout survey because it did not apportion the block's extra footage and therefore did not affect other property lines within Block A. Knight contends that this was error and that apportionment is the only proper means of determining property lines when, as here, plat measurements are inaccurate.

As a general rule, if it is discovered that a tract contains more or less land than the area assigned to it in the original plan, any excess or deficiency should be apportioned among all of the subdivided tracts or lots in proportion to their areas. W. Robilard & L. Bouman, Law of Surveying and Boundaries § 12.01 (5th ed.1987); 11 C.J.S. Boundaries § 124 (1938); 12 Am.Jur.2d Boundaries § 63 (1964); Annot., Rights as Between Grantees in Severalty of Lots or Parts of the Same Tract, Where Actual Measurements Vary From Those Given in the Deeds or Indicated on the Map or Plat, 97 A.L.R. 1227 (1935); accord, Hansen v. Lindstrom, 168 Wash. 130, 140-41, 11 P.2d 232 (1932). As with any rule, however, this general rule is subject to Under the "rule of possession", an apportionment of an excess or deficiency of land will not be made when to do so would disturb long established occupational lines or would otherwise be impractical or inequitable. Pompano Beach v. Beatty, 177 So.2d 261, 263 (Fla.App.1965); Allen v. Mount Morris, 32 Mich.App. 633, 189 N.W.2d 120, 121-22 (1971); Alston v. Clinton, 73 N.M. 341, 388 P.2d 64, 68 (1963); Van Deven v. Harvey, 9 Wis.2d 124, 100 N.W.2d 587, 590-91 (1960). In this situation, the location of the boundary line in dispute is determined by apportioning the excess or deficiency between the parties actually involved in the boundary dispute, Alston, 388 P.2d at 68; Van Deven, 100 N.W.2d at 591-92; or by resort to basic common law doctrines for determining boundaries, namely, adverse possession, parol agreement, estoppel in pais, location by a common grantor, and/or mutual recognition and acquiescence. Van Deven, 100 N.W.2d at 591; Washington State Bar Ass'n, Real Property Deskbook § 63.5 (2d ed.1986).

                exceptions.   One such exception, which the trial court relied on here, is the "rule of possession". 2
                

Here, there is ample evidence in the record indicating that resort to apportionment in the instant case would have disturbed existing occupation lines in Block A. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled that apportionment was not the proper means to resolve the boundary dispute between Reitz and Knight. We therefore uphold that part of the trial court's ruling rejecting the Sprout survey. ³

ADVERSE POSSESSION

Knight next challenges the trial court's rejection of his adverse possession claim. He contends that the court did not properly consider the claim, that its finding entered on that claim is not supported by the evidence, and that it erred in concluding that he had failed to prove adverse possession. We agree with these contentions. ⁴

First, the trial court should not have decided Knight's adverse possession claim until it decided where the disputed property line was located. Until the line was established, there was no way the court could determine whether Knight had exercised possession of any property that the court concluded actually belonged to Reitz. The fact that the parties previously may not have known the true boundary is irrelevant. For purposes of an adverse possession claim, the nature of possession is determined by the manner in which the parties treated the land, not by their subjective belief regarding their true interests in the land. Chaplin v. Sanders, 100 Wash.2d 853, 861, 676 P.2d 431 (1984) (overruling cases which held that one could not adversely possess property when the true owner of the property was unknown).

Second, the trial court's finding concerning lack of evidence of adverse possession is not supported by the record. Although a trial court's findings must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence, e.g., Staaf v. Bilder, 68 Wash.2d 800, 803, 415 P.2d 650 (1966), here no evidence supports most of the court's finding on Knight's adverse possession claim, and in fact the evidence is directly contrary to many of its assertions. The court found:

Defendant Darel Wayne Knight's counterclaim of adverse possession to a strip of land south of the northern boundary line shown on the Sprout Survey was based on the location of a few plants under the eaves of Mr. Knight's residence. The plants were not located or maintained in such a manner as to establish a discernible boundary line or indicate physical occupation. The plants were not exclusively maintained by Mr. Knight and were not located in the disputed boundary area for a period of ten years. No corroborating evidence was presented to support the counterclaims.

The finding's first sentence enjoys no evidentiary support, as Knight's counterclaim was based on more than "a few plants under the eaves". On more than one occasion, Knight offered evidence that since 1958, the eaves of his house have extended seven inches over the boundary line established by Meriwether. In his motion for reconsideration, Knight specifically argued that an encroachment such as that made by the eaves of his house is a means of acquiring title by adverse possession. See El Cerrito, Inc. v. Ryndak, 60 Wash.2d 847, 853-54, 376 P.2d 528 (1962); Erickson v. Murlin, 39 Wash. 43, 80 P. 853 (1905). Such encroachment almost necessarily is exclusive, actual and uninterrupted,...