Reliable Elec. Co. v. Clinton Campbell Contractor, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 September 1969
• Docket Number: No. 1,CA-CIV,1
• Parties: RELIABLE ELECTRIC CO., a corporation, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. CLINTON CAMPBELL CONTRACTOR, INC., dba Phoenix Brick Yard, Appellee and Cross-Appellant. 684.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 98

459 P.2d 98

10 Ariz.App. 371

RELIABLE ELECTRIC CO., a corporation, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. CLINTON CAMPBELL CONTRACTOR, INC., dba Phoenix Brick Yard, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CIV 684.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

Sept. 29, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 1969.

McKesson, Renaud, Cook, Miller & Cordova, by J. Gordon Cook, Phoenix, for appellant and cross-appellee.

Fennemore, Craig, vonAmmon, McClennen & Udall, by Calvin H. Udall, Phoenix, for appellee and cross-appellant.

HAIRE, Judge.

Plaintiff filed this action to recover damages alleged to have been incurred when, due to an electrical malfunction, the dome on its brick kiln was spontaneously hoisted or raised beyond the normal limits, thereby shearing the lifting cables, and thus allowing the dome of the kiln to crash down, substantially demolishing the dome and the remainder of the kiln. The defendant-electrical company had designed and installed the electrical system involved pursuant to an oral agreement with plaintiff.

This case was tried to the court sitting without a jury, and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. The trial court made and entered thirty separate findings of fact and found the defendant liable on four separate bases, any one of which, if valid, would adequately support the judgment entered. These four bases of liability were set out in the conclusions of law made by the trial court and are generally as follows:

1. That defendant breached its implied warranty to plaintiff that the design and installation of the kiln electrical system would be done in a reasonably prudent, skillful and workmanlike manner, and that plaintiff relief on the skill and experience of defendant to design and install this system.

2. That defendant breached its implied warranty that the components of the electrical system sold and installed by defendant were reasonably fit or adequate for the purpose of performing the function for which they were intended by the parties, and that plaintiff relied on that warranty.

3. That defendant was negligent in the design and installation of the system in failing to use reasonable care and in the violation of provisions of the National Electric Code adopted as a part of the Code of the City of Phoenix.

4. That the facts and circumstances found by the court render applicable the doctrine of strict liability in tort.

Most of the controversy on appeal relates to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the trial court. The trial was lengthy, with both parties presenting testimony from expert and lay witnesses. We have read the entire transcript and find substantial evidence to support each fact found by the trial court. We were aided in this regard by the detailed analysis and citations to the transcript set forth in the plaintiff-appellee's brief.

There were many conflicts in the evidence and in some instances there was substantial evidence to support the contentions made by the defendant. However, Rule 52(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., provides that:

'Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.'

A finding of fact cannot be 'clearly erroneous' if there is substantial evidence to support it, even though there also might be substantial conflicting evidence. The resolution of any conflicts in the evidence is for the trier of fact. Bohmfalk v. Vaughan, 89 Ariz. 33, 357 P.2d 617 (1960).

It is uncontradicted that the spontaneous raising of the kiln dome resulted from an electrical short circuit caused by the presence of rainwater in an exposed switchbox installed by the defendant. The trial court, considering conflicting evidence, found that the defendant had inserted a metal conduit into the top of the switchbox in such a way that rainwater could and did pass into the switchbox and accumulate on the conductors, wires, terminals, insulators and other components, through a hole in the switchbox made by defendant; that the installation in the foregoing manner was contrary to the requirements of good electrical construction practice of electrical contractors, was not done in a reasonable or prudent manner, and violated the standards of good workmanship or good practice applicable to electrical contractors in Phoenix, Arizona; that the plaintiff was unaware of the defect in workmanship and had relied upon the defendant to properly install the electrical system. In making these factual determinations, the trial court considered evidence offered by expert and lay witnesses for both plaintiff and defendant, and since there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding, we are not disposed to argue the evidence or attempt to determine what conclusion we might have reached if we had been the trier of fact.

Even in the absence of a specific contractual provision, the law implies a requirement that a contractor who undertakes to design and install an electrical system must do so in a good workmanlike manner and in a manner befitting a skilled contractor. Cameron v. Sisson, 74 Ariz. 226, 246 P.2d 189 (1952). Kuitems v. Covell, 104 Cal.App.2d 482, 231 P.2d 552 (1951). The defendant apparently does not quarrel with this legal principle, since it states in its reply brief, '* * * (W)hether the law be that of implied sales warranty or implied construction warranty, the duty is the same, which is to perform in a workmanlike manner, under the circumstances, and provide materials which are fit for the intended use.' Once the defendant admits the validity of the above stated legal principle, it is difficult to ascertain the exact legal basis of defendant's contention that the trial court must be reversed, since the trial court found that defendant had breached this implied construction warranty, and this finding was based upon substantial evidence.

Defendant does contend that a power limit switch was suggested by defendant to prevent a spontaneous raising which might be caused by lightning or a power surge, but that this suggestion was rejected by plaintiff, who stated that the circuit breaker cutoff switch would always be turned to the 'off' position when not in actual operation, and that therefore the power limit switch would be unnecessary. Again, the evidence is in conflict, but if we assume the truth of defendant's version of the facts as stated above, how does this aid defendant? The electrical malfunction which actually occurred with the resulting spontaneous raising was not caused by lightning or a power surge, but rather by defendant's faulty workmanship. By analogy, could it be reasonably argued that because an owner rejected a contractor's suggestion that a sprinkler system be installed in a building being constructed, the contractor would be excused from liability if defective electrical wiring installed by the contractor caused the building to burn down? By rejecting the power limit switch plaintiff was not assuming the risk that defendant would defectively install other components of the system.

Without question, the injuries to plaintiff's shuttle kiln were the direct result of and were in fact caused by defendant's faulty workmanship. However, defendant contends that in order for plaintiff to recover, it must be shown that defendant should have foreseen or recognized that the electrical short circuit caused by defendant's faulty workmanship could have spontaneously started the hoist motor.

Whether defendant's contention be taken as referring to proximate cause as an element of a cause of action in negligence, or to the question of damages, we believe that the rule of foreseeability for which defendant argues is much too restrictive. The proper inquiry is whether defendant contemplated that the breach of warranty of workmanship might result in damage to the kiln and whether such damage was a natural and direct result of the breach. 77 C.J.S. Sales §§ 374, 381 (1952). Here defendant admittedly knew that an electrical short circuit court cause spontaneous operation of the hoist motor. ¹ The evidence also establishes that defendant knew that the presence of water in the switchbox could cause an electrical short circuit.

In an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to those damages which arise naturally from the breach itself, or which may reasonably be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the contract. Jacob v. Miner, 67 Ariz. 109, 191 P.2d 734 (1948); Cole v. Atkins, 69 Ariz. 81, 209 P.5d 859 (1949); Thunderbird Metallurgical, Inc. v. Arizona Testing Laboratories, 5 Ariz.App. 48, 423 P.2d 124 (1967).

We are of the opinion that under the circumstances of this case, the damages to plaintiff...