Reliance Ins. Co. v. Commission On Human Rights and Opportunities

• Decision Date: 01 March 1977
• Parties: RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 1104

374 A.2d 1104

172 Conn. 485

RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 10, 1976.

Decided March 1, 1977.

Richard J. Lynch, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were, on the brief, Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., and Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant (defendant).

J. Read Murphy, Hartford, with whom was Russell N. Fairbanks, Jr., Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

BOGDANSKI, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal by the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas which set aside a hearing examiner's decision that the plaintiff had unlawfully discriminated against the complainant, a black person, in its hiring practice. The commission claims that the court erred (1) in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to find an act of discrimination, and (2) in substituting its judgment for that of the hearing examiner.

The following facts were found by the hearing examiner: On January 16, 1974, the Reliance Insurance Company, through Stephen Swanston, its local claims manager, placed an advertisement in the New Haven Register for a claims service representative. ¹ The position advertised involved telephone contact almost exclusively with the general public, principally with policyholders and persons having property or personal injury claims against policyholders, as well as with witnesses, doctors and attorneys. The complainant, Miss Brooker, responded to this advertisement by telephoning Swanston. After the telephone conversation, Swanston invited her to a personal interview. At the time she was granted the interview, Swanston did not know her race. The initial telephone responses to the advertisement were utilized to screen out about one-half of all applicants. The rest were invited to an interview to determine skill in communication and persuasiveness especially over the telephone. Miss Brooker's interview lasted fifteen to twenty minutes. After that interview, Swanston decided not to give her application further consideration in the absence of any "exceptionally promising information" that she could insert into an employment application with a personal letter stating why she wanted the position. At that time, Swanston, the only one who interviewed applicants, had selected three of the eventual four finalists. Three other members of racial minorities applied for the position, none of whom was among the four finalists. At that time, no members of racial minorities were employed at the claims office of the respondent. Miss Brooker's qualifications for the position were not less than those of the four finalists based on a comparison of the written applications. One of the four finalists did not appear to satisfy the requirement of a college degree. The prior experience of Miss Brooker in the insurance industry was not given even limited value by Swanston. The prior experience of another applicant applying to fill a different vacancy for the same position in the same office at about the same time was given value by Swanston. The speech of Miss Brooker did not reveal an accent which would have reduced her ability to communicate by phone or in person. Had there been an objectionable accent, Swanston would have detected it from the telephone conversation. Miss Brooker's overweight does not prevent her from performing the activities required by the position.

The hearing examiner then concluded that "from the evidence presented in this case, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and the compelling inferences arising therefrom, it follows that the rejection of the Complainant . . . was in violation of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 31-126 as amended." Section 31-126(a) provides in part that it shall be an unfair employment practice "(f) or an employer, . . . because of the . . . color . . . of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ . . . such individual."

Racial discrimination is an intangible and for the most part can be established only through inference. It is not a packaged item which carries a label describing its contents, which may be exposed to public view. It is essentially subjective, with its roots and symptoms buried within the recesses of heart and mind. One who indulges in discrimination does not usually shout it from the housetops. All too frequently persons publicly announce abhorrence of racial prejudice while privately practicing it. In this type of proceeding, therefore, greater latitude is accorded the tribunal to draw inferences from words and deeds than in cases where overt acts need be established. International Brotherhood v. Commission on Civil Rights, 18 Conn.Sup. 125, 130, aff'd, 140 Conn. 537, 102 A.2d 366; F. W. Woolworth Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 121 F.2d 658, 660 (2d Cir.).

The trial court concluded that the latitude taken by the examiner in drawing his inference of racial prejudice went too far, and that without disturbing any of his findings of fact it was evident that his ultimate determination of qualification for this job required something more than simple analysis of an application; it required a personal evaluation of the applicant through interview.

We agree. The examiner relied solely upon a comparison of Miss Brooker's application with those of the other finalists in reaching his conclusion that she was not less qualified than the other applicants. He did not, however,...