Remine and Meade v. Whited

• Citation: 180 Va. 1
• Decision Date: 09 September 1942
• Docket Number: Record No. 2563.,Record No. 2562.
• Parties: J. C. REMINE AND L. B. MEADE v. JENNIE B. WHITED.
• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Page 1

180 Va. 1

J. C. REMINE AND L. B. MEADE v. JENNIE B. WHITED.

Record No. 2562.

Record No. 2563.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Staunton.

September 9, 1942.

Present, Holt, Hudgins, Gregory, Eggleston and Spratley, JJ.

1. AUTOMOBILES — Collision — Continuing and Concurrent Negligence. — When two automobiles, approaching each other at right angles on level ground, traveling slowly and under perfect control in daylight with visibility good, in plain sight of each other and with no intervening traffic, collide, the case is a typical one of continuing and concurring negligence.

2. AUTOMOBILES — Intersection — Right of Way — Driver Entering Arterial Street before Driver Thereon — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to recover for injuries sustained in a collision of two automobiles at an intersection, it was contended that the driver of the car which struck that in which plaintiff was riding, being on an arterial street, had the right of way. The driver of the car on the arterial street was going twenty miles an hour. The driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding had started from a stop, at a "stop" sign at the entrance of the arterial street, and yet he had practically crossed the arterial street before he was struck. Subsection (a) of section 2154(123) of the Code of 1936 provides that when two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right.

Held: That it was fairly clear that the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff was riding had entered the arterial street before the other driver reached the intersection.

3. AUTOMOBILES — Right of Way — Duty to Keep Lookout. — One entitled to priority under the law is nevertheless required to keep a lookout for cars approaching from his left; and, if he fails in this respect, he may be charged with negligence.

4. AUTOMOBILES — Right of Way — To Be Exercised with Prudence. — The statutory right of way is one to be exercised with prudence and with due regard for the rights of others.

5. AUTOMOBILES — Intersection — Collision — Gross Negligence — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile collision at an intersection, both of the streets, at or about the point of intersection, were straight and comparatively level. The driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding had stopped at a "stop" sign at the intersection where, according to his evidence, he looked down the intersecting street and saw nothing, started across it and was struck. Plaintiff, who was sitting on the right-hand side of the car in the rear seat saw the other car when it was about two hundred and fifty feet from the intersection.

Held: That the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding should have seen the other car and, in the light of the situation, his negligence was gross.

6. AUTOMOBILES — Intersection — Collision — Negligence of Driver on Arterial Street — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile collision at an intersection, both of the streets, at or about the point of intersection, were straight and comparatively level. The car which struck that in which plaintiff was riding was traveling along an arterial street. The driver testified that when about one hundred and fifty feet from the intersection he looked across the intersecting street and saw nothing. Afterwards he did not look again but looked straight ahead and never saw the car in which plaintiff was riding until it was five or six feet away.

Held: That it was plain that the driver of the car on the arterial street approached the intersection without looking and was negligent upon his own statement of what he did.

7. AUTOMOBILES — Contributory Negligence — Passenger — Where Driver Stopped Prior to Collision — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile collision at an intersection, it was contended that plaintiff, a passenger in one of the automobiles, was guilty of contributory negligence because she saw the approaching car when it was two hundred feet from the intersection and said nothing. Both cars were traveling at a moderate rate of speed and the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding stopped just before entering the intersection.

Held: That there was no merit in the contention. Plaintiff had every reason to believe that the driver of the car in which she was riding saw the approaching car and there was no occasion for her to do anything.

8. AUTOMOBILES — Contributory Negligence — Passenger — Failure to Warn Driver of Dangerous Situation. — When a passenger has observed a dangerous situation of which the driver is apparently unconscious, it is his duty, if he is so situated that he can readily do so, to call the driver's attention to it; and if he fails to do so and is injured as a result of such failure, he is guilty of negligence.

9. VERDICT — Correction — Power of Court. — The court has the power to put a manifestly irregular or defective verdict in such form as to make it conform to the intention of the jury, and carry their findings into effect, where the intention can be ascertained with certainty, from statements of the jurors themselves or any other clear and satisfactory evidence appearing in the record or the minutes of the trial.

10. VERDICT — Correction — Duty of Trial Court. — It is the duty of the trial courts to require the verdicts of juries to be put in approved form in order to effectuate their true intent and meaning.

11. AUTOMOBILES — Verdict — Correction by Court — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action by a passenger in an automobile to recover for injuries sustained in a collision at an intersection, plaintiff sought to recover damages from both drivers. The jury first returned a verdict against one defendant for $5,000 and against the other defendant for $5,000. On ascertaining that they intended to find both defendants liable in the sum of ten thousand dollars, the court suggested that the jury go back and find such a verdict. The next verdict returned was for $5,000 against each defendant and the court again inquired if the jury intended to find for plaintiff against both defendants and assess her damages at the sum of ten thousand dollars, to which the jury answered in the affirmative. In final form the verdict, as written by the court, was against both defendants in the sum of $10,000. Upon inquiry from the court whether that was their verdict, the jury answered in the affirmative.

Held: That the court did what it should have done.

12. AUTOMOBILES — Damages — Excessiveness — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile collision at an intersection, plaintiff, a passenger in one of the automobiles, was badly hurt and recovered a verdict of ten thousand dollars, which defendants contended was excessive.

Held: That the verdict was not excessive.

13. DAMAGES — Excessive Damages — Setting Aside Verdict. — Within wide limits, it is for the jury to say what is just compensation, and their verdict cannot be set aside unless it be one that shocks the conscience.

Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Russell county. Hon. Ezra T. Carter, judge presiding.

The opinion states the case.

S. B. Campbell, S. B. Campbell, Jr., and George P. Young, for the plaintiff in error, Remine.

Joseph S. Gillespie and R. O. Crockett, for the plaintiff in error, Meade.

M. M. Long and Burns & Lively, for the defendant in error.

HOLT, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident at about three-thirty in the afternoon of February 27, 1941.

The accident occurred in the town of Abingdon at the intersection of Valley street and Court street. Valley street runs east and west and Court street north and south. Valley street is an arterial street, is intersected by Court street at right angles and has a "Stop" sign on either side of this intersection. The paved portion of Valley street is 38 feet wide though the street itself, including sidewalks, grass plot, etc., is 68 feet wide. Court street, north of Valley street, is 50 feet wide with 23 feet of paved surface. Both of these streets, at and above the point of intersection, are straight and comparatively level.

J. C. Remine, alone in a Dodge sedan, was traveling east at a moderate rate of speed on his right-hand side of Valley street. L. B. Meade also drove a closed car and was going south on Court street, north of Valley street. His speed was moderate and with him rode Mrs. Jennie B. Whited, Mrs. Margaret Mauch, Mrs. Mary Whited, Mrs. Zeola Ball, Mrs. L. B. Meade and a grandchild of Mrs. Jennie B. Whited.

Plaintiff, Mrs. Jennie B. Whited, in a motion for judgment sought to recover damages from both Remine and Meade. She did prevail and was sustained in her contention both by the jury and by the court. These defendants, against both of whom judgment has gone, appealed to this court for relief and each was awarded a writ of error and supersedeas.

Remine was familiar with the streets of Abingdon. He said that it was snowing at the time of the accident and that his windshield was covered with snow except where the wiper had cleared it away. When about 150 feet from the intersection, he looked across to Court street and saw nothing. Afterwards he did not look again but looked straight ahead and never saw the Meade car until it was five or six feet away. He further said that he could at any time have stopped his car within 20 or 25 feet. After the collision both Remine and Meade got out of their cars, and Meade said to Remine: "I didn't see you until you hit me — until after you hit me."

L. B. Meade, who was driving his own car, was not familiar with the streets of Abingdon. He, too, said that he was traveling at a moderate rate of speed, and he...