Remington v. General Motors Corporation, 1406.
Decision Date | 19 January 1955 |
Docket Number | No. 1406.,1406. |
Citation | 127 F. Supp. 672 |
Parties | Waunetta M. REMINGTON, Executrix of the Estate of Dorus L. Remington, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and J. M. Schwartz, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Karr & Wumkes, Flint, Mich., F. Norman Higgs, Bay City, Mich., for plaintiff.
Devine & McAra, Flint, Mich., for defendants.
Plaintiff is the executrix of the estate of Dorus L. Remington and brings suit against General Motors, a Delaware corporation and J. M. Schwartz, a doctor, who, like the plaintiff is a Michigan citizen. Action is under the Michigan Death Act, M.S.A. § 27.711, Comp.Laws 1948, § 691.581.
Decedent was employed by defendant, General Motors, at Flint, Michigan and on November 1, 1952, sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Defendant Schwartz, a licensed physician, also in the employ of defendant corporation, was assigned to and attended decedent and plaintiff claims that said Schwartz did negligently and unskillfully treat him, causing his death on November 6, 1954. Plaintiff does not claim that General Motors knew or had any reason to believe that defendant doctor was incompetent as alleged.
Defendants now move to dismiss on the ground that this court has no jurisdiction, the controversy being exclusively a matter for the Workmen's Compensation Commission of the State of Michigan. They ask for summary judgment.
A different facet of the law applies to each defendant.
This action must be dismissed for the simple reason that there is no diversity of citizenship between defendant Schwartz and the plaintiff. Both are citizens of Michigan. Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Barkhausen, 7 Cir., 170 F.2d 481; Ackerman v. Hook, 3 Cir., 183 F.2d 11; Foster v. Carlin, 4 Cir., 200 F.2d 943; Warfield v. Marks, 5 Cir., 190 F.2d 178; Ockerman v. Wise, 6 Cir., 202 F.2d 144.
If it should be contended that Dr. Schwartz is a "necessary party" defendant, then the above cases also apply and the action would have to be discontinued forthwith as against both defendants. But we conclude that the doctor is not a necessary party and therefore the question of whether the action may be maintained against General Motors alone is still before us.
In the case of Oleszek v. Ford Motor Co., 217 Mich. 318, 186 N.W. 719, 721, this identical question was before the Supreme Court of Michigan. Plaintiff had been injured by a fall while cleaning an oily floor and it was claimed that due to the negligence of the attending physician he lost his leg. Like in the case at bar the physician was what is often termed a "captive physician" to indicate that he was likewise a full-time employee of the same company and not a general practitioner. As in the case at bar also, action was brought against both the physician and Ford Motor Company and the court held that any aggravation through the negligence of the physician would render the company liable for compensation and therefore it was a matter strictly within the Workmen's Compensation Law of Michigan. The court said:
(Italics ours.)
Plaintiff can receive but little comfort from the words "directly traceable thereto" above used, for there are other important decisions holding the same way without using those words, one in particular, Dershowitz v. Ford Motor Company, 327 Mich. 386, 41 N.W.2d 900. See also Byrne v. Clark Equipment Co., 302 Mich. 167, 4 N.W.2d 509.
But the one gleam of hope for plaintiff in this action lies in this court accepting the reasoning of Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal.2d 781, 249 P.2d 8, where plaintiff working for defendant, a doctor, suffered an injury in the course of his employment, and as a result the doctor employer cared for him, but did so negligently. Action was brought against the doctor and the court held that the doctor in administering to his own employee was acting as a doctor, not as an employer.
The same reasoning would be particularly applicable in this case because in Michigan under the Workmen's Compensation Law furnishing medical aid is a mandatory part of the employer's obligation to the employee. M.S.A. § 17.154, Comp.Laws 1948, § 412.4. Every employer (under the act) must give medical services to one injured while in his employ.
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