Remlinger v. Leb. Cnty.
| Decision Date | 04 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:18-cv-00984 |
| Parties | ATHENA REMLINGER, Plaintiff, v. LEBANON COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a prisoner civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the plaintiff's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff, Athena Remlinger, is represented by counsel. Remlinger was an inmate at Lebanon County Correctional Facility (“LCCF”) from April 2017 through January 2018, but she was not incarcerated when this action commenced.
This civil action arises out of events concerning Remlinger's high-risk pregnancy while incarcerated at LCCF. First, the plaintiff claims that the defendants endangered the health of Remlinger and her son by inducing labor approximately two weeks before her due date for non-medical reasons. Second she claims that the defendants placed her in shackles during her pregnancy, during labor, and during her postpartum recovery. Third, she alleges that the defendants placed her in solitary confinement for extended periods while pregnant. In addition, the plaintiff has asserted a state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. For relief, the plaintiff seeks an award of compensatory and punitive damages from the defendants.
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff seeks partial summary judgment with respect to her shackling claims against defendants Gettle, Schwartz, and Hocker, her shackling-based municipal liability claims against the County, and her shackling-based supervisory liability claims against Warden Karnes. (Doc. 98.) The defendants, having sorted themselves into three separate groups, seek summary judgment with respect to all of the plaintiff's claims. (Doc. 91; Doc. 94; Doc. 102.) All four motions are fully briefed and ripe for decision. (Doc 90; Doc. 93; Doc. 96; Doc. 97; Doc. 99; Doc. 100; Doc. 101; Doc. 103; Doc. 104; Doc. 110; Doc. 111; Doc. 112; Doc. 113; Doc. 114; Doc. 115; Doc. 116; Doc. 117; Doc. 118; Doc. 119; Doc. 122; Doc. 123; Doc. 124.)
Remlinger was incarcerated at LCCF as a pretrial detainee from April 2017 through January 2018. She learned that she was pregnant shortly after she was received into custody at LCCF. Her pregnancy was deemed “high risk” for several reasons, including a prior gastric bypass and a history of heroin addiction necessitating the use of methadone.
Remlinger was housed in solitary confinement conditions on two separate occasions while pregnant. First, she was placed into segregation upon her arrival at LCCF because she was detoxing from heroin. After thirty days, Remlinger was moved to the general population. Later, in June 2017, Remlinger was placed into medical isolation, ostensibly due to concerns regarding her food intake and the nutritional health of both Remlinger and her unborn child. After several weeks, she was transferred back to general population after her medical providers indicated that she had gained the appropriate amount of weight and her nutritional health was back to normal.
On April 26, 2017, Remlinger experienced bleeding, and paramedics were called to LCCF to transport her to an outside hospital. One of the defendants, a correctional sergeant, shackled one of Remlinger's ankles to the stretcher before the paramedics and escorting non-party correctional officers transported Remlinger to the hospital.
On October 17, 2017, two of the defendant correctional officers transported Remlinger to an outside hospital for induction of labor. During transportation, Remlinger was not shackled. Initially, Remlinger was not shackled at the hospital either. Instead, she was guarded by the two correctional officers who had transported her there. After 60 to 90 minutes, however, one of the two correctional officers was called back to the prison due to short-staffing. The officer who stayed at the hospital with Remlinger was instructed by a supervising correctional sergeant to use shackles on Remlinger in the absence of a second correctional officer to assist in guarding the inmate.
Remlinger has testified that she remained shackled for the most part through her labor, until a physician requested that the shackles be removed because they were interfering with medical treatment. When medical providers had difficulty locating her baby's heartbeat, Remlinger was moved to an operating room, and medical staff performed an emergency cesarean section.
When Remlinger awoke from the anesthesia administered in connection with her emergency cesarean section, she found that she had already been shackled to the bed once again, and now she was handcuffed to it as well. Over the next few days of postpartum recovery, Remlinger has testified that she remained shackled almost constantly. Every eight hours, the guard supervising Remlinger was replaced by another guard. Several of those guards-but not all-are also defendants in this action. While some of the guards have testified that shackles were not used at all during their shifts, some of them have admitted to sporadic use of shackles during the postpartum period.
Following her release from jail, and represented by counsel, the plaintiff commenced this action by filing a four-count complaint asserting § 1983 substantive due process claims against Lebanon County, operator of LCCF, and several individual defendants who worked there. In Count I of the currently operative amended complaint, Remlinger seeks to hold the County and Warden Karnes liable for the decision to induce labor for non-medical reasons. In Count II, Remlinger seeks to hold the County, Warden Karnes, and eight individual correctional officers liable for shackling her during transport to a hospital for treatment of pregnancy-related medical distress, and later during labor and postpartum recovery. In Count III, Remlinger seeks to hold the County liable for her placement in solitary confinement for extended periods while pregnant.[1] In Count IV, Remlinger brings state-law intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against the individual defendants, arising out of her shackling during labor and postpartum recovery.[2]
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non- moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true.” Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).
The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first determine if the moving party has made a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331.
Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). “An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). “Although evidence may be considered in a form which is inadmissible at trial, the content of the evidence must be capable of admission at trial.” Bender v. Norfolk S. Corp., 994 F.Supp.2d 593, 599 (M.D. Pa. 2014); see also Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 387 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999) ().
“The rule is no different where there are cross-motions for summary judgment.” Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008).
Cross-motions are no more than a claim by each side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such inherently contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist.
Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968). Thus, “when presented with cross motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider the...
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