Renfro v. State
| Decision Date | 13 October 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 54566,No. 2,54566,2 |
| Citation | 445 S.W.2d 278 |
| Parties | Melvin Dew RENFRO, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
J. Arnot Hill, Kansas City, for appellant.
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Gene E. Voigts, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
BARRETT, Commissioner.
In June 1965 Melvin Dew Renfro was tried and found guilty of murder in the second degree in killing Barbara Mae Warrene. A jury fixed his punishment at 35 years' imprisonment. In the trial of his case and on appeal he was represented by, as this court said, 'able defense counsel'--the same lawyer who new represents him on this appeal in this proceeding to vacate the judgment under Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R. The opinion of this court on his direct appeal is set forth in State v. Renfro, Mo., 408 S.W.2d 57 and upon this appeal the full transcript has again been read and considered. On June 3, 1968, Renfro filed, pursuant to amended rule 27.26, a motion to vacate the original judgment and sentence. The motion is unnecessarily verbose, abstruse and evasive and need be noticed here only to say that several of the claims of the motion were raised and fully considered on his direct appeal; for example, his attack upon the veracity of one of the state's witnesses, Gail Harvey, and the assignment that the state was improperly permitted to cross-examine and impeach her. Also it may be noted in passing that his defense of accidental killing was submitted and found against him and the transcript of the record on the direct appeal supports and justifies the jury's verdict of murder in the second degree.
In this proceeding Renfro claims that a statement he gave to police the day he shot and killed Barbara was involuntary and that its admission in evidence, in the language of his counsel, was 'in violation of due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.' Even though the statement was introduced in evidence 'by his counsel, and even though his counsel was a lawyer of many years' experience in the trial of criminal cases' it is asserted that the statement was so manifestly prejudicial, 'that he did not receive the effective assistance from counsel as guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment' and, therefore, the trial court of its own initiative should have intervened and excluded the statement or statements--the fact is that it is a written statement, and finally in this connection counsel say 'We have found no decision which we can cite in support of this assignment of error.' The state has briefed and argued every facet of this nebulous and unique assignment of error but tempting as it may be to examine the claims in detail it is not necessary to do so.
Upon this 27.26 proceeding the court again gave Renfro a full hearing, he testified at length to every phase of his former trial including To indicate, incidentally, his high intelligence: In addition to Renfro's testimony, the court had before it (and it was the same judge in both instances) the full transcript of the original trial. But as indicated, there was a full hearing on this 27.26 motion and the court made a lengthy and careful finding of fact. The court pointed out that Renfro's statement to the police was first mentioned in the state's cross-examination of him--the statement was being used 'for the purpose of impeachment.' Defendant's counsel objected to the prosecutor's Defendant's counsel, as the court found, made no other objection to the introduction...
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Renfro v. Swenson
...408 S.W.2d 57. A subsequent trial court denial of petitioner's Rule 27.26 motion was affirmed in Renfro v. State (Sup.Ct.Mo., Div. 2, 1969), 445 S.W.2d 278. Petitioner alleged in paragraph 10 of this Court's standard habeas corpus petition form (a) Petitioner's conviction rests upon an alle......