Renfrow v. State.*
| Decision Date | 10 June 1929 |
| Docket Number | 28053 |
| Citation | 154 Miss. 523,122 So. 750 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | RENFROW v. STATE.* |
1. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS. Indictment charging receiving stolen
goods held sufficient without alleging unlawful intent (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 1038).
Indictment charging defendant with receiving stolen property held sufficient under Hemingway's Code 1927, section 1038 (Code 1906, section 1259), relating to receiving stolen goods, without allegation of specific unlawful intent with which defendant received property, since words "on any consideration" negatives idea that property must have been received with any specific intent.
2. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS. Proof that property was stolen from car
of railroad, named in indictment as owner, held sufficient proof of ownership in prosecution for receiving stolen goods. In prosecution for receiving stolen goods, testimony of one stealing property that he stole property from car of railroad company, named in indictment as owner, held sufficient proof of ownership of property; it being immaterial whether property was in possession of railroad company as owner or as bailee for another.
3. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS. In prosecution for receiving stolen goods, value of property need not be specifically proven. In prosecution for receiving stolen goods, it was not necessary that value of property be specifically proven.
4. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS. In prosecution for receiving stolen goods, jury could infer from description of property consisting of cigarettes and cloth that it was of some value.
In prosecution for receiving stolen goods, jury had right to infer from description of property consisting of two cases of cigarettes and several bolts of cloth that it was of some value.
5. CRIMINAL LAW. Instruction that admission made orally should be considered with caution held properly refused as charge on weight of evidence (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 591).
In prosecution for receiving stolen goods, instruction that admission made orally should be considered by jury with much caution owing to person speaking not clearly expressing his intentions, or person spoken to not having clearly understood speaker, held properly refused as charge on weight of evidence, under Hemingway's Code 1927, section 591 (Code 1906, section 793).
6. CRIMINAL LAW. Defendant cannot complain that instruction defining crime omitted statement that defendant must have had specific intent, where instruction requested by defendant defined crime without such statement.
In prosecution for receiving stolen goods, defendant cannot complain that instruction defining crime did not state that goods must have been received with specific unlawful intent where instruction requested by defendant defined crime as did state's instruction without including therein necessity for property to have been received by defendant with specific unlawful intent.
APPEAL from circuit court of Alcorn county.
HON. C P. LONG, Judge.
Alonzo Renfrow was convicted of receiving stolen property, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Affirmed.
Orma R. Smith, of Corinth, for appellant.
In an indictment for receiving stolen property the property must be described with the same particularity as is required in an indictment for larceny.
Wells v. State, 90 Miss. 516, 43 So. 610.
The ownership must be proven as laid in the indictment in cases of larceny, and analogous thereto such would be the case in the crime of receiving stolen property.
McDowell v. State, 68. Miss. 359, 85 So. 508; Matthews v. State, 90 So. 52; Elias Unger v. State, 42 Miss. 642; McAlpin v. State, 123 Miss. 525, 86 So. 338; 34 Cyc. 523.
In the absence of any evidence for the state as to the value of the property there can be no conviction of the defendant.
Elias Unger v. State, 42 Miss. 642.
Before the crime of receiving stolen property can be committed there must be an intent, a fraudulent one, to deprive the owner of property of the possession of same and not having the intent to return it to the owner.
17 Ruling Case Law, sec. 88; 2 Wharton's Criminal Law (11 Ed.), sec. 1227, page 1444; Clisby v. State, 86 So. 140; Karackalas v. State, 89 So. 833; Jourdan v. State, 87 So. 433; Woods v. State, 66 Miss. 358, 6 So. 206; Jones v. State, 48 So. 407, 95 Miss. 121; Jones v. State, 120 So. 199.
J. A. Lauderdale, Assistant Attorney-General, of Jackson, for the state.
Where there is no demurrer to an indictment in the lower court, it cannot be attacked for the first time in the supreme court.
In an indictment under sec. 1038, Hemingway's Code of 1927, for receiving stolen property, it is not necessary to charge that the defendant unlawfully and feloniously received the goods that were recently stolen and carried away, with the intent to deprive the true owner of the possession of the same.
Sec. 916, Bishop's Directors & Forms (2 Ed.), 18 R. C. L., sec. 95, page 88.
Even though an instruction be erroneous, if the instruction given for both sides when taken together correctly announce the law such error is cured.
Upton v. State, 143 Miss. 1; Cummins v. State, 144 Miss. 634.
Argued orally by Orma R. Smith, for appellant, and by J. A. Lauderdale, Assistant Attorney-General, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a conviction for receiving stolen property. The indictment alleges the unlawful and felonious receipt of the property by the appellant, but does not allege that it was received by him with intent to deprive the owner thereof, or for any other specific unlawful intent. No objection was made to the indictment in the court below, but an objection thereto is made in this court on the ground that it should have alleged the specific unlawful intent with which the appellant received the property. We will leave out of view the failure of the appellant to object to the indictment in the court below.
Section 1259, Code of 1906 (Hemingway's 1927 Code, section 1038), provides that, "if a person buy or receive in any manner or on any consideration personal property of any value, feloniously taken away from another, knowing the same to have been so taken, he shall be guilty of receiving stolen goods, and, on conviction, shall be punished," etc. The words "on any consideration" negative the idea that the property must have been received with any specific intent; consequently it is not necessary to so allege...
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