Renick v. Brooke

• Decision Date: 18 December 1916
• Docket Number: No. 12050.,12050.
• Citation: 190 S.W. 641
• Parties: RENICK v. BROOKE et al.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

190 S.W. 641

RENICK v. BROOKE et al.

No. 12050.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

December 18, 1916.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Harris Robinson, Judge.

"Not to be officially published."

Action by John H. Renick against A. O. Brooke and another. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant Lexington Motor Company appeals. Affirmed.

W. W. Garnhart and C. M. Ingraham, both of Kansas City, for appellant. Cook & Gossett, of Kansas City, for respondent.

JOHNSON, J.

Plaintiff began this suit in September, 1913, to recover damages for false and fraudulent representations he alleges defendants made to him respecting an automobile they delivered to him pursuant to the terms of a written contract of purchase and sale the parties entered into in February, 1911. Defendant Brooke failed to answer, and judgment by default was rendered against him. Defendant Lexington Motorcar Company answered. A trial of the issues resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $1,000, and the Lexington Company appealed.

The record and briefs are voluminous, but the material facts of the case are simple and may be briefly stated. The appealing defendant is the manufacturer of the "Lexington" automobile; its chief place of business being in Indiana. Brooke was the proprietor of a garage, and dealt in automobiles in Kansas City; the Lexington being the only car he sold as such dealer. Plaintiff claims defendants held Brooke out as the agent of the Lexington Company, and that, as such agent, Brooke sold a new car to him of a described model and type, for the price of $1,700; that afterward defendants delivered a secondhand car which they had repaired and repainted and falsely represented it to be a new car. Plaintiff relied upon this representation, accepted the proffered car, and did not discover the falsity of the representation until shortly before bringing this suit.

Defendants deny the agency of Brooke, and insist that he sold and delivered to plaintiff a repaired and repainted secondhand car which belonged to him. Brooke conducted his business in Kansas City under the name of the A. O. Brooke Automobile Company. By the terms of his contract with the Lexington Company he was given the exclusive sale of that company's cars in Kansas City and extensive contiguous territory, and his relation to that company was attempted to be defined as that of a vendee, a retail dealer, in the cars manufactured by the company. But there is much in the contract, and still more in the course of dealing between the parties indicative of the relationship of principal and agent. In advertising matter sent by the company to Brooke for distribution and in numerous letters written to him by officers of the company he is described as the "agent" and the "Western distributor" of the Lexington cars, and other terms were used and transactions conducted peculiar to such relationship. Orders for cars sold by Brooke were written on blanks furnished by the company, and in the present instance plaintiff signed an order written on such blank which purported to be an "agent's order" taken by "Agent A. O. Brooke." This order said nothing about a secondhand car, and in form and terms it appeared to be an order for a new car to be filled at the factory in Indiana and shipped "f. o. b. Kansas City."

Without going into further details, we find abundant evidence supporting a state of facts which would constitute Brooke the agent of the company, not only to sell, but also to deliver and collect...