Renneke v. Kautzky, 88SA441

Decision Date20 November 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88SA441,88SA441
Citation782 P.2d 343
PartiesFrederick Eldred RENNEKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W.L. KAUTZKY, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Frederick Renneke, pro se.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., and Marleen Langfield, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant-appellee.

Justice KIRSHBAUM delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Appellant, Frederick Eldred Renneke, appearing pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the trial court seeking release from the custody of the Department of Corrections (the Department). He asserted that, pursuant to section 16-11-310, 8A C.R.S. (1986), he was entitled to release on January 28, 1988. The trial court denied the petition, holding that appellant's continued incarceration was authorized pursuant to section 17-22.5-303(3) and (6), 8A C.R.S. (1986). Appellant has appealed that decision. We affirm.

I

The record reveals that appellant committed the offense of assault in the second degree, in violation of section 18-3-203, 8B C.R.S. (1986), on August 15, 1985; that upon conviction he was initially sentenced to serve a four-year sentence in a community corrections program, commencing September 3, 1986; that appellant had been incarcerated for 385 days prior to the imposition of sentence; and that appellant was terminated from the community corrections program after serving 162 days therein. An amended mittimus issued after appellant was terminated from the community corrections program contained the following pertinent language:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED OR RECOMMENDED: ORDER: [APPELLANT] TO BE GIVEN CREDIT OF 385 DAYS['] PRESENTENCE CONFINEMENT AND 385 DAYS['] GOOD TIME AND 162 DAYS['] CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED AT COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS.

The mittimus also indicated the fact that appellant's sentence was for "4 YEARS PLUS A PERIOD OF PAROLE."

Appellant was delivered to the custody of the Department. The Department then prepared a time computation report reflecting that, assuming appellant actually received all good time and earned time credit he was eligible to receive, appellant would be entitled to absolute release from custody on January 28, 1988. In arriving at this conclusion, the Department granted credit to appellant for 547 days of presentence confinement and 547 days of good time credited against his presentence confinement.

Appellant asserts that he was entitled to unconditional release from custody on his maximum control date, January 28, 1988, pursuant to the provisions of section 16-11-310, 8A C.R.S. (1986). That statute then stated as follows: 1

Release from incarceration. Except as provided in section 7 of article IV of the state constitution relating to the power of the governor to grant reprieves and pardons, an incarcerated person shall be unconditionally released and discharged upon the expiration of his sentence, less the deductions authorized in article 22.5 of title 17, C.R.S.

§ 16-11-310, 8A C.R.S. (1986). Appellant relies on our decision in Price v. Mills, 728 P.2d 715 (Colo.1986), to support his assertion.

The offense for which appellant was convicted occurred subsequent to July 1, 1985. The calculation of good time with regard to sentences imposed for such offenses is governed by the provisions of section 17-22.5-301(3), which section states in pertinent part as follows:

Good time....

(3) Each person sentenced for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1985, shall be subject to all the provisions of this part 3; except that the good time authorized by this section shall not vest and may be withheld or deducted by the department. The department of corrections shall report annually to the general assembly the number of good time days authorized per inmate, the number of good time days withheld or deducted per inmate, and the average length of stay per inmate during each calendar year. The report shall be submitted to the general assembly prior to each March 31 for the preceding calendar year.

§ 17-22.5-301(3), 8A C.R.S. (1986). The calculation of earned time credits with regard to sentences imposed for such offenses is governed by section 17-22.5-302, which provides as follows:

Earned time. (1) In addition to the good time authorized in section 17-22.5-301, earned time, not to exceed thirty days for every six months of incarceration, may be deducted from the inmate's sentence upon a demonstration to the department by the inmate that he has made substantial and consistent progress.... (4) For each inmate sentenced for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1985, the department shall review the performance record of the inmate and may grant, withhold, withdraw, or restore, consistent with the provisions of this section, an earned time deduction from the sentence imposed....

§ 17-22.5-302(1), (4), 8A C.R.S. (1986). By the adoption of these statutes, the General Assembly has granted the Department discretion to withhold or deduct good time credits and to withhold, withdraw or restore earned time credits authorized to be awarded to inmates. As a result, the Department possesses broad administrative flexibility to determine the actual date upon which an inmate may become eligible for parole. This approach requires individual consideration of the progress each inmate makes while subject to the custody of the Department. The General Assembly has also directed the Department to work closely with the parole board to determine parole eligibility dates of inmates, as reflected by the following pertinent provisions of section 17-22.5-303(6), 8A C.R.S. (1986):

Parole....

(6) Any person sentenced for a ... felony committed on or after July 1, 1985, shall be eligible for parole after he has served the sentence imposed less any time authorized for good time earned pursuant to section 17-22.5-301 and for earned time pursuant to section 17-22.5-302. Upon an application for parole, the state board of parole, working in conjunction with the department and using the guidelines established pursuant to section 17-22.5-303.5, shall determine whether or not to grant parole and, if granted, the length of the period of parole, which may be for a period of up to five years. If an application for parole is refused by the state board of parole, the state board shall reconsider within one year thereafter the granting of parole to such person and shall continue the reconsideration each year thereafter until such person is granted parole or until he is discharged pursuant to law.

§ 17-22.5-303(6), 8A C.R.S. (1986). This statute also places broad discretion in the Department as well as the parole board to...

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17 cases
  • Templeman v. Gunter
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • February 2, 1994
    ...Colo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 17-22.5-302(1) ("[E]arned time ... may be deducted from the inmate's sentence...."); see also Renneke v. Kautzky, 782 P.2d 343, 344-45 (Colo.1989) (en banc) (explaining that under current statutory scheme, expressed in section 17-22.5-302(4), that the DOC has broad discr......
  • Esquibel v. Raemisch
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Colorado
    • February 8, 2016
    ...(Colo. 1990); Thiret v. Kautzky, 792 P.2d 801, 805 (Colo. 1990); Bynum v. Kautzky, 784 P.2d 735, 738-39 (Colo. 1989); Renneke v. Kautzky, 782 P.2d 343, 345 (Colo. 1989)). Besides this case, at least four other essentially identical cases have been filed in the District of Colorado subsequen......
  • Thiret v. Kautzky
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • May 29, 1990
    ...C.R.S. (1986) (Parole Board had discretion to deny person parole even though credits accrued make person parole eligible); Renneke v. Kautzky, 782 P.2d 343, 346 (1989) (same). Thus, in Colorado, with respect to the statutory scheme governing parole, we have three general classes of persons ......
  • Verrier v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • July 31, 2003
    ...is consistent with other appellate opinions that have considered the DOC's authority over earned time deductions. Renneke v. Kautzky, 782 P.2d 343 (Colo.1989)(General Assembly granted DOC discretion to withhold, withdraw, or restore earned time credits); People v. Frank, 30 P.3d 664, 666 (C......
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