Rensing v. Indiana State University Bd. of Trustees

• Decision Date: 09 February 1983
• Docket Number: No. 283S45,283S45
• Citation: 444 N.E.2d 1170
• Parties: 9 Ed. Law Rep. 338 Fred W. RENSING, Appellant, v. INDIANA STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 1170

444 N.E.2d 1170

9 Ed. Law Rep. 338

Fred W. RENSING, Appellant, v. INDIANA STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Appellee.

No. 283S45.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 9, 1983.

James L. Crawford, Sacopulos, Crawford & Johnson, Terre Haute, for appellant.

James E. Sullivan, Cox, Zwerner, Gambill & Sullivan, Terre Haute, for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

This case is before this Court upon the petition to transfer of defendant-appellee, Indiana State University Board of Trustees (Trustees). The plaintiff-appellant, Fred W. Rensing, was a varsity football player at Indiana State University who suffered an injury on April 24, 1976, during the team's spring football practice which left him a quadriplegic. Rensing filed a claim with the Industrial Board of Indiana (Industrial Board) seeking recovery under workmen's compensation for permanent total disability as well as medical and hospital expenses incurred due to the injury. The Industrial Board rejected his claim finding that an employer-employee relationship did not exist between Rensing and the Trustees and, therefore, he was not entitled to benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Ind.Code Sec. 22-3-1-1 et seq. (Burns 1974). The Court of Appeals, Fourth District, reversed the decision of the Industrial Board on the basis that Rensing was an "employee" for pay within the meaning of the statute and his employment by the Trustees was also within the coverage of the statute. Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees, (1982) Ind.App., 437 N.E.2d 78 (Young, J., dissenting).

We now grant transfer and reverse. The opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals are hereby vacated, and plaintiff's petition to transfer is granted. The decision of the Full Industrial Board is reinstated.

The facts established before the Industrial Board were summarized by the Court of Appeals:

"The undisputed testimony reveals the Trustees, through their agent Thomas Harp (the University's Head Football Coach), on February 4, 1974 offered Rensing a scholarship or 'educational grant' to play football at the University. In essence, the financial aid agreement, which was renewable each year for a total of four years provided that in return for Rensing's active participation in football competition he would receive free tuition, room, board, laboratory fees, a book allowance, tutoring and a limited number of football tickets per game for family and friends. The 'agreement' provided, inter alia, the aid would continue even if Rensing suffered an injury during supervised play which would make it inadvisable, in the opinion of the doctor-director of the student health service, 'to continue to participate,' although in that event the University would require other assistance to the extent of his ability.

"The trustees extended this scholarship to Rensing for the 1974-75 academic year in the form of a 'Tender of Financial Assistance.' Rensing accepted the Trustees' first tender and signed it (as did his parents) on April 29, 1974. At the end of Rensing's first academic year the Trustees extended a second 'Tender of Financial Assistance' for the 1975-76 academic year, which tender was substantially the same as the first and provided the same financial assistance to Rensing for his continued participation in the University's football program. Rensing and his father signed this second tender on June 24, 1975. It is not contested the monetary value of this assistance to Rensing for the 1975-76 academic year was $2,374, and that the 'scholarship' was in effect when Rensing's injuries occurred.

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"Rensing testified he suffered a knee injury during his first year (1974-75) of competition which prevented him from actively participating in the football program, during which time he continued to receive his scholarship as well as free treatment for his knee injury. The only requirement imposed by the Trustees (through Coach Harp) upon Rensing was attendance at his classes and reporting daily to the football stadium for free whirlpool and ultrasonic treatments for his injured knee.

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"As noted above, the financial aid agreement provided that in the event of an injury of such severity that it prevented continued athletic participation, 'Indiana State University will ask you to assist in the conduct of the athletic program within the limits of your physical capabilities' in order to continue receiving aid. The sole assistance actually asked of Rensing was to entertain prospective football recruits when they visited the University's Terre Haute campus.

"During the 1975 football season, Rensing participated on the University's football team. In the spring of 1976 he partook in the team's annual three week spring practice when, on April 24, he was injured while he tackled a teammate during a punting drill.

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"The specific injury suffered by Rensing was a fractured dislocation of the cervical spine at the level of 4-5 vertebrae. Rensing's initial treatment consisted of traction and eventually a spinal fusion. During this period he developed pneumonia for which he had to have a tracheostomy. Eventually, Rensing was transferred to the Rehabilitation Department of the Barnes Hospital complex in St. Louis. According to Rensing's doctor at Barnes Hospital, one Franz U. Steinberg, Rensing's paralysis was caused by the April 24, 1976 football injury leaving him 95-100% disabled." Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees, supra, at pp. 80-82 (footnotes omitted).

Rensing's appeal to the Industrial Board was originally heard by a Hearing Member who found that Rensing had "failed to sustain his burden in establishing the necessary relationship of employer and employee within the meaning of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act," and rejected his claim. Id. at p. 83. The Full Industrial Board adopted the Hearing Member's findings and decision; then this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

In this petition to transfer, the Trustees argue that there was no contract of hire in this case and that a student who accepts an athletic "grant-in-aid" from the University does not become an "employee" of the University within the definition of "employee" under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Ind.Code Sec. 22-3-6-1(b), (Burns Supp.1982). On the other hand, Rensing maintains that his agreement to play football in return for financial assistance did amount to a contract of employment.

We first note that Rensing is appealing from a negative judgment. In our review of that judgment, we will not weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses and, where there is a conflict in the evidence, this Court will only consider the evidence which tends to support the Board's award and which is most favorable to the appellee. We will not disturb the Board's finding unless the evidence is undisputed and leads inescapably to a contrary result. Perez v. United States Steel Corp., (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 212; Penn-Dixie Steel Corp. v. Savage, (1979) Ind.App., 390 N.E.2d 203; Robinson v. Twigg Industries, Inc., (1972) 154 Ind.App. 339, 289 N.E.2d 733.

Here, the facts concerning the injury are undisputed. The contested issue is whether the requisite employer-employee relationship existed between Rensing and the Trustees so as to bring him under the coverage of our Workmen's Compensation Act. Both the Industrial Board and the Court of Appeals correctly noted that the workmen's compensation laws are to be liberally construed. Prater v. Indiana Briquetting Corp., (1969) 253 Ind. 83, 251 N.E.2d 810. With this proposition as a starting point, the specific facts of this case must be analyzed to determine whether Rensing and the Trustees come within the definitions of "employee" and "employer" found in the statute, and specifically whether there did exist a contract of employment. Ind.Code Sec. 22-3-6-1, supra, defines the terms "employee" and "employer" as follows:

"(a) 'Employer' includes the state and any political subdivision, any municipal corporation within the state, any individual, firm, association or corporation or the receiver or trustee of the same, or the legal representatives of a deceased person, using the services of another for pay."

"(b) The term 'employee' means every person, including a minor, in the service of another, under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied, except one whose employment is both casual and not in the usual course of the trade, business, occupation or profession of the employer."

The Court of Appeals found that there was enough evidence in the instant case to support a finding that a contract of employment did exist here. We disagree.

It is clear that while a determination of the existence of an employee-employer relationship is a complex matter involving many factors, the primary consideration is that there was an intent that a contract of employment, either express or implied, did exist. In other words, there must be a mutual belief that an employer-employee relationship did exist. Fox v. Contract Beverage Packers, Inc., (1980) Ind.App., 398 N.E.2d 709, Gibbs v. Miller, (1972) 152 Ind.App. 326, 283 N.E.2d 592. It is evident from the documents which formed the agreement in this case that there was no intent to enter into an employee-employer relationship at the time the parties entered into the agreement.

In this case, the National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) constitution and bylaws were incorporated by reference into the agreements. ¹ A fundamental policy of the NCAA, which is stated in its constitution, is that intercollegiate sports are viewed as part of the educational system and are clearly distinguished from the professional sports...