Rent-A-Car Co. v. Belford

• Decision Date: 23 January 1932
• Citation: 45 S.W.2d 49,163 Tenn. 590
• Parties: RENT-A-CAR CO. et al. v. BELFORD.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

45 S.W.2d 49

163 Tenn. 590

RENT-A-CAR CO. et al. v. BELFORD.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

January 23, 1932

Error to Circuit Court, Shelby County; M. R. Patterson, Judge.

Action by De Witt Belford against the Rent-A-Car Company and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.

Judgment affirmed as to defendant named and reversed, and case dismissed as to the other defendant.

Canada Williams & Russell, of Memphis, for plaintiffs in error.

A. B Pittman, Jr., of Memphis, for defendant in error.

SWIGGART J.

The facts material to the issue presented by the appeal in error were stipulated in the circuit court.

The plaintiff, Belford, suffered personal injuries when struck by an automobile owned by the Rent-A-Car Company. The automobile was being driven at a rate of speed in excess of twenty miles an hour by a driver to whom the automobile had been rented by the owner, so as to create in plaintiff a lien on the automobile, under Pub. Acts 1929, c. 87, re-enacted by Pub Acts 1931, c. 82. After the accident, but before suit was brought, the automobile was sold by the Rent-A-Car Company to the Hull-Dobbs-Price Company for $165.20, and the assumption by the purchaser of unpaid purchase-money notes, secured by the lien of a conditional vendor. Attachment of the automobile was levied while in the possession of the purchaser, and the purchaser was made a party defendant.

The stipulation does not impeach the good faith of either the seller or the purchaser, and the case was submitted to the circuit court on the theory that the Hull-Dobbs-Price Company was a purchaser in good faith and without notice of the accident or lien claim of the plaintiff. It was stipulated that the value of the Rent-A-Car Company's equity in the automobile, $165.20 was the limit of the plaintiff's lien claim, and that payment of that amount by either defendant would satisfy a judgment sustaining the lien.

The judgment of the circuit court of Shelby county recites its opinion that "a bona fide purchaser of an automobile under the circumstances set forth in the stipulation does not have a right superior to the lien of the party injured as a result of the automobile accident, though the suit for the attachment of the car is not brought until after the sale to the bona fide purchaser."

Judgment was thereupon rendered against both defendants for the stipulated value of the owner's equity in the automobile, and from this judgment both defendants have appealed in error.

The motion for a new trial in the circuit court questioned only the ruling hereinabove quoted from the judgment, as a basis for rendering judgment against both defendants. The assignments of error here are thus limited.

We quote the language of the statute declaring the lien claimed by plaintiff: "Whenever any suit for damages is brought in any court of competent jurisdiction for injuries to person or property caused by the running of any motor vehicle in excess of 20 miles per hour, there shall be a lien upon such motor vehicle for the satisfaction of such recovery, as the court may award, whether, at the time of the injury, such motor vehicle was driven by the owner thereof, or by his chauffeur, agent, employee, servant, or any other person using same by loan or hire." Pub. Acts 1931, c. 82, § 2.

The lien in issue was first introduced into the law of this state by Acts 1905, c. 173, § 5, in language substantially like that employed in the act of 1931. Construing the act of 1905 in Keller v. Federal Bob Brannon Truck Co., 151 Tenn. 427, 440, 441, 269 S.W. 914, 918, it was said:

"In such case, if the jury finds that the statute has been willfully violated, it may ascertain and fix the amount of the damages which the plaintiff has sustained, and the plaintiff is entitled to have such damages declared a lien upon the offending automobile for their sole satisfaction. An attachment is not necessary to create the lien. This is given by the statute. The office of an attachment is merely to seize the property and place it in the custody of the law. 2 R. C. L. 856."

The nature of the lien was considered at some length in Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 188 S.W. 54, 56, L. R. A. 1916F, 935, wherein it was held that the lien created by the act of 1905 was not superior to the rights of the conditional vendor of the automobile. It was there held that the statute does not undertake to provide for a proceeding in rem, against the automobile as the res, and that a personal action against the owner is necessary for the adjudication of the lien and the subjection of the property to its satisfaction. The court observed: "It might with no inconsiderable reason be urged that the only right under the police power was one to regulate by way of punishment the owner in possession and dominion and control for an unlawful use of that which was designed for a legitimate use." Referring to the consistent legislative policy of the state to protect liens for purchase money, a presumption was indulged that it was not intended to create a lien which would by inference prejudice the antecedent lien of a vendor. The court concluded: "We therefore are of opinion that only the interest of the vendee, as the owner of the automobile, was liable to be attached and subjected. *** The spirit of the provision is to subject that which is owned by him who has it in his own power to select the agency by which the machine is propelled or to be propelled. *** The statute does not operate a forfeiture or subjection of the interest of one who has it not in his power to protect his interest by any exercise of discretion as to the movements of the machine, or as to who shall move it."

Plaintiff's contention that suit and attachment are not essential, as conditions precedent, to the coming into existence of the lien, but that by operation of the statute the lien attached to the automobile and was fixed at the time of the accident and injury, seems to be sustained by Keller v. Federal, etc., Truck Co., supra. But the question remains whether such a lien is superior to the rights of a bona fide purchaser without notice, acquired prior to the...