Renteral v. JNB Transp.

Decision Date04 May 2023
Docket Number23-cv-2191-TC-TJJ
PartiesALEJANDRO MORALES RENTERAL, Plaintiff, v. JNB TRANSPORT, LLC, BLUE FREIGHT LOGISTICS, INC., AND LUIS ORLANDO GUTIERREZ-GUEVARA Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Kansas
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Teresa J. James U.S. Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Alejandro Morales Renteral's verified Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 3). The Court conducted the hearing by Zoom video conference on May 3, 2023. Plaintiff appeared through counsel Jeffrey A. Wilson and Patrick A. Turner. Attorney Kevin McMaster also participated in the hearing but chose not to enter an appearance.[1]

Plaintiff requests an order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b) prohibiting Defendants; their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and other persons who are in active concert or participation with Defendants from destroying or deleting certain information, documents tangible items, and data. Plaintiff also requests an order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b) that requires those same persons to take affirmative steps to immediately request that all third parties with which Defendants contract, including especially Samsara Inc. and Omnitracs, LLC, not to destroy or delete certain information, documents, tangible items, and data. Plaintiff requests that this order remain in effect until such time as counsel enter appearances for the Defendants and a preliminary injunction hearing may be held. Based upon the findings and conclusions below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65, as expressly limited herein.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff's verified Complaint (ECF No. 1), Motion for Temporary Injunction (ECF No. 3) and the exhibits attached thereto. In this negligence action, Plaintiff alleges that on April 4, 2023, he was Westbound on U.S. Highway 54 in Sedgwick County, Kansas approaching the intersection with S. 135th Street. As he approached, the traffic signal in front of him was red and he began slowing down to stop for the light. As he was either almost at a complete stop or at a complete stop, Defendant Luis Orlando Gutierrez-Guevara, who was operating a tractor-trailer Westbound on U.S. Highway 54, slammed into the back of Plaintiff's trailer at highway speed. At the time of the collision, Gutierrez-Guevara was operating the tractor-trailer owned by JNB Transport, LLC (JNB) but being operated under the motor carrier authority of Blue Freight Logistics, Inc. (Blue Freight). Plaintiff further alleges that dashcam footage and electronic data obtained from Gutierrez-Guevara's tractor shows he was distracted by an electronic device to his right and he never hit the brakes-impacting Plaintiff at 61 miles per hour.

Plaintiff sent a “Demand for Preservation of Evidence” to JNB and the adjuster handling the claim asserted against JNB on April 12, 2023. Plaintiff sent a substantially similar letter to Defendant Blue Freight and the same adjuster on April 25, 2023. Those letters demanded preservation of documents and tangible items, including electronic devices in Defendants' truck at the time of the collision and documents and data associated with them. Those letters also demanded preservation of communications, text messages and e-mail correspondence related to the crash and Gutierrez-Guevara.

An adjuster for Defendants' insurer agreed to preserve the requested items. But, McMaster, retained at the time to represent Gutierrez-Guevara and JNB, sent a letter to “supersede” the adjuster's purported agreement to preserve on April 21, 2023. McMaster took issue with the scope and burden of Plaintiff's letter to JNB and complained that it would be costly to comply and that Plaintiff's letter “discloses no information to support that your requests are within any reasonable bounds of the scope of discovery.” McMaster also stated that Defendants “only have an obligation to preserve and not destroy material other than in its normal course of business.” McMaster also stated Plaintiff would need to contact any third parties to request preservation. Plaintiff's counsel responded the same day and requested that McMaster identify which portions of Plaintiff's letter would be too costly or burdensome to comply with. Plaintiff's counsel also requested the identity of the third parties so that he could contact them. In the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Plaintiff's counsel represents that he orally requested the identity of all third parties and for McMaster to identify which documents or items would be too burdensome to preserve. Plaintiff contends that prior to the hearing, McMaster had not provided the identity of any third parties other than those that were discovered by examination of the tractor, and has not identified which documents would be too burdensome to preserve, why it would be burdensome, or any cost associated with such a burden.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Motions for temporary restraining orders are evaluated under the same standard as a preliminary injunction. Sac & Fox Nation of Mo. v. LaFaver, 905 F.Supp. 904, 907 (D. Kan. 1995). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the [movant] is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To make this showing Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm a preliminary injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009). Courts are cautioned against granting mandatory preliminary injunctions-those requiring affirmative action by the nonmoving party-as they are “an unusual form of relief and one that must not be granted without heightened consideration” of the four factors. RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009).

Generally, notice to the adverse party is required before a court may issue a preliminary injunction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(1). However, a court may issue a TRO without notice to the adverse party or its attorney if:

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and
(B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).

III. ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, Plaintiff's counsel submitted an affidavit (ECF No. 3-12) with the motion that swore to the accuracy of the facts presented. The affidavit also set forth efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. Further, as noted, supra, McMaster did appear at the hearing and represent Defendants' interests. The Court therefore finds the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1) have been met.

The Court also addresses preliminarily the persons to be bound by the Temporary Restraining Order to be entered herein. Plaintiff's motion includes broad requests that non-party entities Samsara, Omnitracs, LLC, and any other non-party provider used by Defendants, be ordered to preserve all data related to electronic devices in Gutierrez-Guevara's truck or otherwise related to him and his fellow team driver's hours of service, trips, telematics, and driving history. The Court denies this request as it has no authority to enjoin these entities, who are not parties to this case or otherwise bound by the Court's order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(2). See Trees v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Loc. 503, 570 F.Supp.3d 954, 962 (D. Or. 2021) (the only persons bound by an injunction or TRO are those identified in Rule 65(d)(2)). Plaintiff acknowledged at the May 3, 2023 hearing that the non-party entities are not “in active concert or participation with” Defendants, nor are they “officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys” of Defendants. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(2)(B)-(C). These non-party entities therefore could not be bound by any order issued by the Court under Rule 65.

Finally, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that the non-parties have any data within Defendants' possession, custody or control, or which Defendants would have the legal right to demand. See F.D.I.C. v. McCaffree, 289 F.R.D. 331, 339 (D. Kan. 2012) ([D]ocuments are deemed to be within the possession, custody, or control if the party has actual possession, custody, or control or has the legal right to obtain the documents on demand.”). Moreover, in its email response to Plaintiff's preservation demand letter, Samsara stated its customers own their own data, and Samsara is unlikely to possess any material beyond whatever the customer itself possesses or is able to access. (ECF No. 3-8). Accordingly, the Court's denies Plaintiff's request to order the non-party entities to preserve data concerning Defendant Gutierrez-Guevara or the truck he was driving on the day of the collision.

Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's request that the Court grant injunctive relief with respect to any non-parties to this case.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

To meet this element, Plaintiff need only establish a “prima facie case showing a reasonable probability” of prevailing on the merits. Automated Mktg. Sys., Inc. v Martin, 467 F.2d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1972). The showing required for the element is lowered when the prejudice or harm to the defendant posed by granting the injunction is minimal while the...

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