Trees v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local 503

• Decision Date: 09 November 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 6:21-cv-468-MK
• Parties: Staci TREES, Plaintiff, v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 503; Oregon Department of Administrative Services ; and Katy Coba, in her official capacity as Director of the Oregon Department of Administrative Services, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

570 F.Supp.3d 954

Staci TREES, Plaintiff,

v.SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 503; Oregon Department of Administrative Services ; and Katy Coba, in her official capacity as Director of the Oregon Department of Administrative Services, Defendants.

Case No. 6:21-cv-468-MK

United States District Court, D. Oregon.

Signed November 9, 2021

Rebekah C. Millard, James G. Abernathy, and Shella Alcabes, Freedom Foundation, PO Box 552, Olympia, WA 98507. Of Attorneys for Plaintiff Staci Trees.

Scott A. Kronland, Stacey M. Leyton, and Zoe Palitz, Altshuler Berzon llp, 177 Post Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, CA 94108; and James S. Coon, Thomas, Coon, Newton & Frost, 820 SW Second Avenue, Suite 200, Portland, OR 97204. Of Attorneys for Defendant Service Employees International Union Local 503.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General; and Sadie Forzley, Assistant Attorney General, Oregon Department of Justice, 100 SW Market Street, Portland, OR 97201. Of Attorneys for Defendants Oregon Department of Administrative Services and Katy Coba.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

In this lawsuit, a public employee is suing the union she joined in October 2009 and from which she resigned in December 2020, while remaining a state employee. The employee also is suing the Oregon Department of Administrative Services (DAS), the state agency that processes her paychecks and, through February 2021, deducted her union dues and remitted them to the union. The employee additionally is suing the Director of DAS in the Director's official capacity. Against all defendants, the employee asserts federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Against the union, the employee also asserts a federal racketeering claim and state claims of fraud and racketeering. The key factual dispute is the employee's allegation that the union "forged" her signature in 2016 on a new union membership agreement solicited by a union organizer during a campaign asking members to reaffirm their union membership. The union denies any forgery.

After the employee commenced this lawsuit, the union filed an unfair labor practices (ULP) complaint against the employee with the Oregon Employment Relations Board (ERB), a different state agency.¹ In its ULP complaint, the union alleges that, by filing her state claims in this federal lawsuit, rather than with the ERB, the employee violated state law. An ERB Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) has begun, but not yet concluded, state proceedings. The key factual dispute in the ERB proceeding is whether the employee and the union entered into a valid agreement in March 2016. The employee wants that question to be decided in federal court, rather than by the ERB, to avoid the potential application of issue preclusion. Thus, the employee seeks a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the ERB and its ALJ—who are not parties in this lawsuit. The employee requests that this Court enjoin the ERB from conducting any further activities in connection with the union's ULP complaint "until this Court shall have the opportunity to determine the appropriate forum for proceeding with this dispute." ECF 48, at 2. For the reasons explained below, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion for TRO.

STANDARDS

In deciding whether to grant a motion for TRO, courts look to substantially the same factors that apply to a court's decision on whether to issue a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co. , 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction generally must show that: (1) he or she is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he or she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his or her favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's earlier rule that a mere "possibility" of irreparable harm, rather than its likelihood, was sometimes sufficient to justify a preliminary injunction).

The Supreme Court's decision in Winter , however, did not disturb the Ninth Circuit's alternative "serious questions" test. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell , 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2011). Under this test, " ‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met." Id. at 1132. Thus, a preliminary injunction may be granted "if there is a likelihood of irreparable injury to plaintiff; there are serious questions going to the merits; the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the plaintiff; and the injunction is in the public interest." M.R. v. Dreyfus , 697 F.3d 706, 725 (9th Cir. 2012).

In addition, a TRO is necessarily of a shorter and more limited duration than a preliminary injunction.² Thus, the application of the relevant factors may differ, depending on whether the court is considering a TRO or a preliminary injunction.³ Indeed, the two factors most likely to be affected by whether the motion at issue is for a TRO or a preliminary injunction are the balancing of the equities among the parties and the public interest. Finally, "[d]ue to the urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction at a point when there has been limited factual development, the rules of evidence do not apply strictly to preliminary injunction proceedings." Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc. , 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) ; see also Johnson v. Couturier , 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009).

BACKGROUND⁴

Plaintiff Staci Trees (Trees) is a public employee in Oregon. Since 2009, she has worked for the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). Defendant Service Employees International Union Local 503 (SEIU) is the exclusive representative of Plaintiff's bargaining unit. Defendant DAS is the state agency that processes and pays wages to state employees. Defendant Katy Coba (Coba) is the Director of DAS. SEIU and DAS are parties to a collective bargaining agreement, under which DAS deducts SEIU membership dues from the wages of union members and then remits those dues to SEIU. On a monthly basis, SEIU sends DAS a membership file that contains instructions for adding, maintaining, or ending dues deductions for represented employees, and DAS follows these instructions.

In October 2009, Trees signed a union membership agreement that authorized the deduction of SEIU union dues from her wages. Compl., ¶¶ 12-13; see also Compl. Ex. A. On June 27, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018), holding that, when applied to public-sector workers, "fair share" agreements violate an employee's First Amendment rights to freedom of association and freedom of speech.⁵ Plaintiff states that in July 2018, she informed SEIU that she no longer wanted to be a union member and no longer wanted union dues deducted from her monthly paycheck. She contends that SEIU never responded to this alleged communication.

Plaintiff also alleges that in December 2020 she again informed SEIU that she no longer wanted to be a union member and no longer wanted union dues deducted from her pay. In response to this communication, SEIU told Plaintiff that she was contractually obligated to pay union dues through the end of the current annual period, which was February 28, 2021. SEIU stated that this requirement was contained in a union membership agreement that Plaintiff signed on an iPad in March 2016. Compl., Ex. C. Plaintiff contends that she did not complete or sign the 2016 agreement.⁶ Compl., ¶¶ 27-29.

Whether Plaintiff signed the March 2016 dues authorization presents a factual dispute, albeit one that the Court need not resolve at this time. SEIU contends that its records show that Plaintiff signed the disputed agreement membership application and dues authorization on March 22, 2016 "via iPad" during "a general membership drive that SEIU conducted in 2016," when its "organizers visited bargaining unit workers’ homes to sign up new union members and to ask existing members to sign new union membership agreements reaffirming their union membership. According to SEIU 503's membership records, a union organizer visited Plaintiff's home on the evening of March 22, 2016, and Plaintiff signed a new membership and dues agreement on an iPad. " Decl. of Becky Johnson, ¶¶ 4-5 (ECF 29) (emphasis added). The Court does not make any findings at this time regarding the merits of this factual dispute because its resolution at this time does not affect the outcome of the pending motion.

According to DAS, it receives a membership file from SEIU on a monthly basis, which includes SEIU's instructions on adding, maintaining, or ending dues deductions for represented employees. After each monthly file is received, DAS distributes the file to state agencies for processing. The agencies then withhold union dues for employees based on that information. Decl. of Nettie Pye, ¶ 3 (ECF 27).

ODOT deducted union dues from Plaintiff's monthly paychecks from November 1, 2009 through February 28, 2021. Id. ¶ 4. SEIU instructed DAS, through the membership file, to cease deducting union dues from Plaintiff's paychecks effective March 1, 2021 because she was no longer a union member. Union dues are not currently being deducted from Plaintiff's paychecks, and union dues will not be deducted again from Plaintiff's paychecks in connection with her employment with ODOT unless she rejoins SEIU and expressly authorizes dues withholding to...