Renton Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Com'n

Decision Date05 April 1984
Docket NumberA,No. 49720-6,AFL-CI,49720-6
Citation680 P.2d 40,101 Wn.2d 435
Parties, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2089, 17 Ed. Law Rep. 413 RENTON EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Respondent, v. The PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondent, Washington Federation of Teachers,ppellant.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Fuller & Fuller, Herbert H. Fuller, Jay S. Fuller, Olympia, for appellant.

Durning, Webster & Lonnquist, Judith Lonnquist, Symone B. Scales, Seattle, for Renton Educ. Assn.

Ken Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Richard Heath, Donald F. Cofer, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, for PERC.

Washington Education Ass'n, Faith Hanna, Federal Way, amicus curiae for respondent Renton Educ. Assn.

DORE, Justice.

This action involves direct review of a trial court decision overruling an order of Washington State Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) which had held that certified employees of Renton Vocational-Technical Institute were entitled to severance and a representation election for the purpose of forming a collective bargaining unit separate from other certified employees of Renton School District.

We reverse the trial court and reinstate the findings and order of PERC.

Issue

The basic issue concerns interpretation of the bargaining unit determination provisions of the Educational Employment Relations Act, RCW 41.59. We are called on to determine whether RCW 41.59.080 permits severance of vocational-technical employees from a district-wide bargaining unit when there has been alleged previous representation of such employees by the bargaining unit.

I

Renton Education Association (REA) and Washington Federation of Teachers are employee organizations within the meaning of RCW 41.59.020(1), and Renton School District is an employer within the meaning of RCW 41.59.020(5). Renton School District heretofore has recognized REA as bargaining representative of virtually all its certified educational employees, including the vocational-technical employees of Renton Vocational-Technical Institute.

Prior to 1976, representation by REA was conducted pursuant to the meet-and-confer statute, RCW 28A.72. The meet-and-confer statute did not require school districts to enter into collective bargaining agreements, but merely required that the school districts meet, confer and negotiate with representatives of employee organizations prior to adoption of the school district policies. Due to the all-encompassing nature of RCW 28A.72.030, all certified employees in the school district were lumped together in one bargaining unit. No provision was made in this particular statute for separate bargaining units for either principals or vocational-technical personnel. Thus, vocational-technical employees were, essentially, not permitted to decide whether or not they wished to be represented by this bargaining unit. The vocational-technical employees were simply blanketed into the wall-to-wall bargaining unit permitted by RCW 28A.72.030. There has never been an election by the district-wide employees pursuant to RCW 28A.72.030 to determine whether REA was the appropriate bargaining representative of the unit.

In 1975, the Legislature enacted RCW 41.59, an amendatory act, also known as the Educational Employment Relations Act. This act became effective January 1, 1976 and repealed the prior meet-and-confer statute, RCW 28A.72. Shortly thereafter, on April 21, 1976, a petition was filed with PERC for investigation of a question concerning representation of employees of Renton Vocational Technical Institute. This initial petition was dismissed for insufficiency of showing of interest, but remained pending on appeal until a date following the filing of the petition giving rise to the instant action. This petition was filed with PERC on June 7, 1977 by Washington Federation of Teachers seeking a severance and representation election among employees of Renton Vocational-Technical Institute to determine if Washington Federation of Teachers could be certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the aforementioned employees.

The particular subsection of RCW 41.59 which sets forth the criteria for the determination of a bargaining unit is RCW 41.59.080, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

The commission, upon proper application for certification as an exclusive bargaining representative or upon petition for change of unit definition by the employer or any employee organization within the time limits specified in RCW 41.59.070(3), and after hearing upon reasonable notice, shall determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining. In determining, modifying or combining the bargaining unit, the commission shall consider the duties, skills, and working conditions of the educational employees; the history of collective bargaining; the extent of organization among the educational employees; and the desire of the educational employees; except that:

(1) A unit including nonsupervisory educational employees shall not be considered appropriate unless it includes all such nonsupervisory educational employees of the employer; and

* * *

(6) A unit that includes only employees in vocational-technical institutes or occupational skill centers may be considered to constitute an appropriate bargaining unit if the history of bargaining in any such school district so justifies.

Extensive hearings were held before an examiner of PERC. Witnesses called by Washington Federation of Teachers testified that the vocational-technical employees were dissatisfied and disillusioned with REA's representation; and that their interests were being sacrificed for those of the K-12 teachers, who greatly outnumbered the vocational-technical employees. Witnesses called by REA testified that although the interests of the vocational-technical employees were sacrificed in the 1976-77 negotiations and settlement, there remained an active and viable relationship between the vocational-technical employees and REA. Following these hearings, on March 1, 1978, the executive director of PERC, in Decision 379-EDUC, dismissed Washington Federation of Teachers' petition. 1 On appeal to the full commission, the executive director's decision was reversed on June 9, 1978 by PERC in Decision 379-A-EDUC. PERC agreed with most of the executive director's analysis and findings but overturned his decision on the grounds that a prior bargaining history was not controlling where no election under the meet-and-confer statute had established REA as the bargaining agent for the vocational-technical employees. PERC subsequently ordered a severance and representation election.

Subsequent to the decision of PERC, respondent, REA, filed a petition for review in King County Superior Court of the decision of PERC. That petition, which sought to stay the PERC decision, was dismissed by the court. On appeal, this dismissal was sustained by the Court of Appeals. Renton Educ. Ass'n v. Wash. Pub. Empl. Relations Comm'n, 24 Wash.App. 476, 603 P.2d 1271 (1979), review denied, 93 Wash.2d 1025 (1980).

Thereafter, the PERC-directed election was held and Washington Federation of Teachers was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative.

REA again petitioned the Superior Court. Although the trial court found that the record supported the decision of PERC, the court held that PERC incorrectly interpreted RCW 41.59.080 and overturned the order of PERC. The trial court reasoned that RCW 41.59.080(6) did not contemplate the severance of nonsupervisory certificated vocational-technical employees from the overall unit of nonsupervisory certificated employees unless there was no history of bargaining.

This court has stayed operation of the trial court's decision pending this appeal.

II

The review procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act must be adhered to in the instant case. This court's review, like that of the superior court, is under RCW 34.04.130(6) which provides:

The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or

(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or

(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or

(d) affected by other error of law; or

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as submitted and the public policy contained in the act of the legislature authorizing the decision or order; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious.

Our review of the administrative decision is limited to the record of the administrative tribunal itself, not to that of the Superior Court. Franklin Cy. Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 97 Wash.2d 317, 323-24, 646 P.2d 113 (1982). An administrative decision will be upheld on factual determinations under the clearly erroneous standard of RCW 34.04.130(6)(e) unless the court's review of the entire record leaves it with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. When reviewing questions of law under the error of law standard of RCW 34.04.130(6)(d), an appellate court may substitute its determination for that of the agency, although the agency's determination is entitled to substantial weight. Franklin Cy., at 324-26, 646 P.2d 113. In an appeal of an administrative decision involving a mixed question of law and fact, the court does not try the facts de novo but it determines the law independently of the agency's decision and applies it to facts as found by the agency. Franklin Cy., at 329-30, 646 P.2d 113.

Following these guidelines, this court must determine the appropriate construction...

To continue reading

Request your trial
35 cases
  • City of Fed. Way v. Town & Country Real Estate Llc
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • May 10, 2011
    ...] the law independently of the agency's decision and appl[y] it to facts as found by the agency.” Renton Educ. Ass'n v. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 101 Wash.2d 435, 441, 680 P.2d 40 (1984).A. Finding of Fact 16 ¶ 38 The hearing examiner's Finding of Fact 16 states: Testimony by Federal Way......
  • Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • May 14, 1992
    ...agency's interpretation of laws when the agency is uniquely qualified to interpret those laws. See Renton Educ. Ass'n v. Public Empl. Relations Comm'n, 101 Wash.2d 435, 680 P.2d 40 (1984). As a result, appeal from an administrative decision is less likely to correct errors in the prior deci......
  • Mercer Island Sch. Dist. v. Office of the Superintendent of Pub. Instruction
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • April 13, 2015
    ...to facts as found by the agency.’ ” City of Seattle, 160 Wash.App. at 388, 249 P.3d 650 (quoting Renton Educ. Ass'n v. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 101 Wash.2d 435, 441, 680 P.2d 40 (1984) ). In reviewing questions of law, we may substitute our own determination for that of the agency. City......
  • International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local Union 1052 v. Public Employment Relations Com'n
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • August 24, 1989
    ...good faith. REVIEW AND REMAND We stated the standards governing review of cases such as this in Renton Educ. Ass'n v. Public Empl. Relations Comm'n, 101 Wash.2d 435, 440, 680 P.2d 40 (1984): The review procedures of the administrative procedure act must be adhered to in the instant case. Th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT