Rentz v. Rentz, A16A0767

• Decision Date: 26 October 2016
• Docket Number: A16A0767,A16A0859
• Parties: RENTZ et al. v. RENTZ et al. Rentz Family Farms v. Rentz et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

339 Ga.App. 66
793 S.E.2d 112

RENTZ et al.
v.
RENTZ et al.

Rentz Family Farms
v.
Rentz et al.

A16A0767
A16A0859

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

October 26, 2016

793 S.E.2d 114

George P. Donaldson III, Misty Garrett Haskins, Albany, for Appellant in A16A0767.

Gregory Davis Smith, Ben Kirbo, Bainbridge, Allen H. Olson, for Appellee in A16A0767.

Gregory Davis Smith, Allen H. Olson, for Appellant in A16A0859.

George P. Donaldson III, Albany, Ben Kirbo, Bainbridge, for Appellee in A16A0859.

Miller, Presiding Judge.

339 Ga.App. 66

These appeals involve the complicated interaction between the Decatur County Probate and Superior Courts in connection with the distribution of several parcels of real property in Marvin Rentz's estate under the terms of his will. The probate court entered an order compelling liquidation of the estate's assets, including the real property, and requiring distribution of the proceeds. The executor filed two separate declaratory judgment petitions in the superior court to ascertain if the probate court had jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title to the real property and to order a sale of that property. The executor also sought a temporary restraining order to stop the sale.

The superior court determined that (1) the probate court had jurisdiction to order the sale, and (2) the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue an injunction or to address the issues raised in the declaratory judgment petitions. These appeals followed. After a thorough review of the record, we vacate the superior court's order and remand these cases to the superior court for further proceedings.

339 Ga.App. 67

When Marvin Rentz ("Marvin") died on March 12, 2012, he left a will that devised his extensive property to his four sons, and he named one of his sons, Dennis Rentz ("Dennis"), as executor of his will. The terms of Marvin's will directed that

all of my just debts be paid by my Executor, hereinafter named, as soon after my demise as is practicable. I do not, however, require my Executor to immediately liquidate the assets of my estate in order to pay my just debts. It is my anticipation that my Executor may choose, for a limited time, to continue the operation of my businesses as part of my Executor's effort to properly administer my estate.

In addition to being the executor of the estate, and a beneficiary under the will, Dennis was the head of a partnership he owned along with his son. This partnership, known as the Rentz Family Farm ("the partnership"), operated a farm on several parcels of Marvin's land through a lease entered into with Marvin prior to Marvin's death. Under the terms of the lease, the partnership was

793 S.E.2d 115

required to pay the outstanding debts and taxes on the property in lieu of rental payments. Notably, a month before his death, Marvin executed an extension on the lease to run through at least 2020.

In December 2014, Marvin's other sons ("the beneficiaries") filed a petition in the probate court for an accounting and settlement of Marvin's estate, seeking to force Dennis to sell the property, pay off the debts, and distribute the proceeds, which they expected would total about $5,000,000. On August 18 and 19, 2015, while the petition for sale was pending in the probate court, Dennis filed two petitions for declaratory judgment in superior court. He filed one petition on behalf of the estate and the other on behalf of the partnership, seeking to determine if the probate court had jurisdiction to order the sale. Dennis noted the conflicting responsibilities and duties he faced as both executor of the estate and head of the partnership.

On September 8, despite the declaratory-judgment actions pending in the superior court, the probate court issued an "interim order" granting the beneficiaries' petition for an accounting and settlement, and ordering the sale of the estate property. The probate court found that the estate could sell the property "free and clear" of the partnership's lease, in part because it found there would be no consideration for the lease once the debts and taxes were paid from the proceeds of the sale.

In ordering the sale of the property, the probate court further found that Dennis's obligation to the estate beneficiaries took precedence over any personal rights, and to the extent he favored any other

339 Ga.App. 68

position, he would be in breach of his fiduciary duties. The probate court found that Dennis was estopped from promoting the partnership's interests,¹ and it noted that because Dennis had already sold some of the leased property to himself despite the lease, he could not argue against the sale of other parcels.

On behalf of the partnership, and while the two declaratory judgment petitions remained pending, Dennis filed for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") in the superior court to stop the sale of the estate property. Dennis also requested a TRO from the superior court in his capacity as the executor of the estate. In two separate orders issued on October 22, the superior court denied Dennis's TRO requests, finding that the partnership had elected not to participate in the proceedings in the probate court and thus was not entitled to a restraining order. The superior court further found that the probate court had jurisdiction to order the disposition of the estate's property.

Additionally, the superior court found that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested TROs. Although the superior court noted that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the probate court, it declined to intervene once the probate court exercised its jurisdiction. The superior court also explained that the requests for TROs were an impermissible collateral attack on the probate court's valid order. Absent from the superior court's order, however, was any final ruling on the pending declaratory judgment actions.

Thereafter, Dennis moved the superior court for a final judgment or for a certificate of immediate review in the declaratory judgment actions, noting that the superior court had not entered a final ruling in those cases. On November 3, the superior court issued its final judgment in both cases, stating that it lacked jurisdiction over the issues presented in the declaratory judgment petitions.²

After the superior court denied the petitions for declaratory judgment, Dennis and the partnership requested, and the superior court granted, an injunction halting the sale

793 S.E.2d 116

of the property, pending the resolution of these cases on appeal.³

339 Ga.App. 69

1. Before we consider the merits of these two appeals, we must address the threshold issue of our jurisdiction. This Court, rather than the Supreme Court of Georgia, has jurisdiction over these appeals because the parties raise questions of subject matter jurisdiction and the claims relating to equity, title to land, and interpretation of Marvin's will are merely ancillary to the jurisdictional issues at this juncture. See Johns v. Morgan , 281 Ga. 51, 52 n.2, 635 S.E.2d 753 (2006) (in an estate case, equitable relief was merely ancillary to legal issues).

(a) The beneficiaries have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal in Case No. A16A0767 on numerous grounds, including lack of jurisdiction. There can be no dispute that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the superior court's orders denying the petitions for declaratory judgment are final orders subject to direct appeal. OCGA §§ 5–6–34 (a) (1), 9–4–2 (a). Moreover, the grounds the beneficiaries raise in the motion to dismiss lack merit.⁴

First, the beneficiaries argue that there was no...