Repka v. American Nat. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 April 1945
• Docket Number: No. A-387.,A-387.
• Citation: 186 S.W.2d 977
• Parties: REPKA et al. v. AMERICAN NAT. INS. CO.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

186 S.W.2d 977

REPKA et al. v. AMERICAN NAT. INS. CO.

No. A-387.

Supreme Court of Texas.

April 11, 1945.

Rehearing Denied May 9, 1945.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Fifth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by the American National Insurance Company against Edd Repka and others for an injunction to restrain defendants from prosecuting two separate suits filed by them in the county court against plaintiff. To review a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, 184 S.W.2d 157, reversing and remanding with instructions to issue the writ a judgment of the district court dissolving a temporary restraining order and refusing further injunctive relief, Edd Repka and others bring error.

Judgments of both district court and of Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and cause remanded to district court.

John A. Ford, Harvey Ford, and Wade, Ford & Duke, all of Dallas, for plaintiffs in error.

W. B. Handley, of Dallas, for defendant in error.

FOLLEY, Commissioner.

This is an injunction suit instituted by the respondent, American National Insurance Company, in the district court of Dallas County, against the petitioner, Edd Repka, and his attorneys, to enjoin the prosecution by petitioner of two separate suits against respondent involving identical questions of law and fact pending in one of the county courts of Dallas County. Upon the presentation of respondent's verified petition the district court issued a temporary restraining order and rule to show cause why a temporary injunction should not issue. The petitioner, by motion to dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction of the court to grant the writ, and upon the hearing for temporary injunction the trial court sustained petitioner's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The court dissolved the restraining order and refused further injunctive relief. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed such judgment and remanded the cause with instructions for the trial court to issue the writ. 184 S.W.2d 157.

From the pleadings it appears that the respondent issued two life insurance policies upon the life of Edd J. Repka, one in the sum of $312 and one for $152, each providing for double indemnity for accidental death. The first was issued May 13, 1940, and the second August 19, 1940. The petitioner, Edd Repka, father of the insured, was named beneficiary in both policies. Each policy contained a provision that if death occurred by suicide, whether sane or insane, within two years from the date of the policy the liability of the company should be limited to the return of the premiums. The insured died of gunshot wounds on August 17, 1941, before the expiration of two years from the date of either policy.

Thereupon, petitioner filed suit against respondent on both policies in one suit in the district court of Dallas County for the full face value of both policies, including double indemnity and statutory penalties and attorney's fees, aggregating $1,389.86. He alleged that the insured died from gunshot wounds either accidentally self-inflicted or at the hands of persons unknown. Respondent answered that the death was suicidal and denied liability except for the amount of the premiums in the sum of $19 which was tendered and paid into court. That suit, which was prosecuted in forma pauperis, was tried twice in the district court, resulting in a mistrial in each instance because the jury could not agree on a verdict. After the discharge of the jury in the second trial petitioner took a voluntary nonsuit. At that time the court costs had accrued in the sum of $80.10 of which amount respondent had paid $55, leaving $25.10 unpaid.

Thereafter petitioner filed two separate suits in the county court of Dallas County seeking judgment upon one of the policies for $811.44 and upon the other for $422.24, and thus the jurisdiction of the county court would not permit the joinder of the two suits. Such action precipitated the filing of the instant suit in the district court wherein respondent sought to enjoin petitioner and his attorneys from prosecuting the separate suits in the county court upon the theory of avoiding a multiplicity of suits and preventing vexatious litigation. It affirmatively appears from the judgment of the trial court that the court's action in refusing injunctive relief was upon the theory that the district court was without jurisdiction to grant it. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the district court not only had authority to grant the writ but that respondent was entitled to it and ordered that the same should be issued.

It is first necessary for us to determine whether the district court was authorized to grant the writ before passing upon the question as to whether it should be issued.

It is firmly established that equity will assume jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing a multiplicity of suits, the general principle being that the necessity of a multiplicity of suits in itself constitutes the inadequacy of the remedy at law which confers equitable jurisdiction. 21 C.J. 72, Sec. 48. However, in the application of this principle there is so great a diversity of opinion in the decisions that it is difficult to formulate a uniform rule of guidance in the matter. It has been said that each case "if not directly brought within the principle of some preceding case must be decided on its own merits, in the exercise of sound legal discretion, the factors to be considered being the real and substantial convenience of all parties, the adequacy of the legal remedy, the situation of the different parties, the points to be contested, and the result which would follow if jurisdiction should be assumed or denied, and particularly the constitutional right of a party to trial by jury." 30 C.J.S. Equity, § 42, p. 366.

A very exhaustive treatment of this subject may be found in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., Vol. 1, Secs. 244 to 275, where four conditions are announced and generally discussed in which a multitude of suits can arise and thus furnish a source or occasion for equity jurisdiction in their prevention. One of these conditions, which is material here, is where a single defendant has brought a number of simultaneous actions at law against the plaintiff, all depending upon similar facts and circumstances, and involving the same legal questions, so that a decision of one would virtually be a decision of all others. In discussing this class or example the text in section 254, page 429 states: "A court of equity may then interfere and restrain the prosecution of these actions, so that the determination of all the matters at issue between the two parties may be brought within the scope of one judicial proceeding and one decree, and a mutiplicity of suits may thereby be prevented. It must be admitted that this exercise of the equitable jurisdiction is somewhat extraordinary, since the rights and interests involved are wholly legal, and the substantial relief given by the court is also purely legal. It may be assumed, therefore, that a court of equity will not exercise jurisdiction on this particular ground, unless its interference is clearly necessary to promote the ends of justice, and to shield the plaintiff from a litigation which is evidently vexatious. It should be carefully observed that a court of equity does not interfere in this class of cases to restrain absolutely and completely any and all trial and decision of the questions presented by the pending actions at law; it only intervenes to prevent the repeated or numerous trials, and to bring the whole within the scope and effect of one judicial investigation and decision. It should also be observed that if the pending actions at law are of such a nature or for such a purpose, that, according to the settled rules of the legal procedure, they may all be consolidated into one, and all tried together by an order of the court in which they or some of them are pending, then a court of equity will not interfere; since the legal remedy of the plaintiff is complete, certain, and adequate, there is no necessity for his invoking the aid of the equitable jurisdiction."

In 19 Amer.Jur. 95, Sec. 82, as to the elements to be considered in invoking this equitable jurisdiction, it is said: "Factors which have been considered to be determinative of the question as to the court's jurisdiction include the following: The right of trial by jury; expense of the litigation; time of the court in settling the issues; delay and hardship incidental to the multiplicity of suits; the proceedings...