Reppucci v. Nadeau
Decision Date | 22 September 2020 |
Docket Number | Docket: Yor-19-40 |
Citation | 238 A.3d 994 |
Parties | Wendy REPPUCCI v. James P. NADEAU et al. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Karen E. Wolfram, Esq. (orally), Fairfield & Associates, P.A., Kennebunk, for appellants James P. Nadeau and Nadeau Law Offices, PLLC
Gene R. Libby, Esq., and Keith P. Richard, Esq. (orally), Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellee Wendy Reppucci
Panel: MEAD, GORMAN,* JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ., and HJELM, A.R.J.**
[¶1] James P. Nadeau and Nadeau Law Offices, PLLC (Nadeau), appeal from a judgment entered by the Superior Court (York County, O'Neil, J. ), following a jury trial, awarding Wendy Reppucci $91,172, plus costs and interest, on her complaint for legal malpractice arising from Nadeau's representation of Reppucci in a divorce action. Nadeau contends that, concerning some of Reppucci's claims for damages, the court erred in instructing the jury on Reppucci's burden to prove proximate cause using language that we first discussed in Niehoff v. Shankman & Associates Legal Center, P.A. , 2000 ME 214, ¶ 10, 763 A.2d 121.1
[¶2] We disagree and affirm the judgment. In doing so, we clarify that what we have termed the "modified" or "failure to plead" proximate cause standard in Niehoff and in two other cases2 is not an independent alternative test, but is rather a case-specific application of the proximate cause standard that we have always applied in legal malpractice cases.
[¶3] Attorney James Nadeau represented Wendy Reppucci in her 2008 divorce from Richard Reppucci. The divorce judgment, entered in the District Court (York, Janelle, J. ) following a trial, contained the following provisions that are at issue in this appeal:
Because Richard had served in the Air Force, a benefit providing income to the survivors of military members known as the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) was potentially available to Wendy. It was not addressed in a proposed judgment that Nadeau submitted or in the divorce judgment.
[¶5] The case was tried to a jury in June 2018. The jury found that Nadeau had breached the standard of care and awarded Reppucci a total of $91,172 in damages on her claims related to spousal support, attorney fees, the marital home, the SBP, military retirement benefits, and the TSP. The court entered a judgment in accordance with the verdict.
[¶6] Nadeau filed post-judgment motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, which the court denied following a hearing. Nadeau timely appealed. See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).
Brooks v. Lemieux , 2017 ME 55, ¶ 9, 157 A.3d 798 (quotation marks omitted). In order to satisfy the proximate cause prong of that test, "a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she would have achieved a more favorable result but for the defendant's alleged legal malpractice." Niehoff , 2000 ME 214, ¶ 9, 763 A.2d 121 ; see Garland v. Roy , 2009 ME 86, ¶ 20, 976 A.2d 940. Without such proof, the existence of a causal connection between the negligent conduct and any damages is speculative or conjectural, and cannot support a judgment favorable to the plaintiff. See Niehoff , 2000 ME 214, ¶ 8, 763 A.2d 121.
Id. ¶ 10 ; see MSR Recycling, LLC v. Weeks & Hutchins, LLC , 2019 ME 125, ¶ 6, 214 A.3d 1.
[¶9] This formulation has proved to be a source of confusion as parties and trial courts have thought it necessary to distinguish "failure to plead" cases from "garden-variety" malpractice claims so as to apply either the "modified test" or the "ordinary" proximate cause test. See Brooks , 2017 ME 55, ¶¶ 11-13 & n.5, 157 A.3d 798 ; Niehoff , 2000 ME 214, ¶¶ 9-10, 763 A.2d 121. We take this opportunity to clarify the nature of what we have sometimes referred to as the "modified malpractice standard," Brooks , 2017 ME 55, ¶ 12, 157 A.3d 798, which originated in Niehoff.
[¶10] To understand our opinion in Niehoff , it is critical to recognize that it addressed only what a plaintiff must show to defeat a defendant's motion for a summary judgment based on an assertion that no causal relationship exists between the alleged negligence and claimed damages. A moving party is not entitled to summary judgment when the opponent generates disputed issues of material fact, see M.R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; InfoBridge, LLC v. Chimani, Inc. , 2020 ME 41, ¶¶ 12-13, 228 A.3d 721, and so, as a summary judgment case, Niehoff does nothing more than identify the salient issues for a court to consider in that context. In essence, when adjudicating a summary judgment motion, the court must determine whether, based on the summary judgment record, the factfinder in the malpractice case could conclude that the claim that the attorney failed to assert in the underlying action would have yielded a favorable result for the plaintiff. See Johnson v. York Hosp. , 2019 ME 176, ¶ 29, 222 A.3d 624 ( ). Niehoff does not modify the nature of the plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion at trial to prove proximate cause, which, as we stated, remains the familiar standard that, absent the attorney's alleged negligence, the plaintiff would have enjoyed a more favorable outcome in the underlying action. 2000 ME 214, ¶ 9, 763 A.2d 121.
[¶11] Thus, Niehoff presents no more than a case-specific application of the proximate cause test that we have long employed. In other words, at trial, there are not two different legal malpractice tests requiring courts to elect one or the other, and a plaintiff does not enjoy a lesser burden of proof in a "failure to plead" case. The single test is the same as it was when we decided Niehoff : "In legal malpractice cases, the plaintiff must show (1) a breach by the defendant attorney of the duty owed to the plaintiff to conform to a certain standard of conduct; and (2) that the breach of the duty proximately caused an injury or loss to the plaintiff." Id. ¶ 7.
[¶12] In the usual case where an attorney's negligence involves "advice or tactics ... preced[ing] a final result on the merits of an underlying action," "a more favorable result" is measured against the result that was actually obtained, be it a judgment for the opposing party in the underlying case or—as here—a judgment in a party's favor that the party views as insufficient. Id. ¶ 9. In other...
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