Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Pelosi
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-659 (TJK) |
| Decision Date | 20 May 2022 |
| Parties | REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, Plaintiff, v. NANCY PELOSI et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
The Republican National Committee sued to challenge a subpoena issued to the RNC's third-party digital vendor by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol. The Court entered judgment against the RNC but enjoined the defendants from acting on the subpoena until the Court resolved any motion for injunction pending appeal the RNC might file post-judgment. The RNC now moves for an injunction pending appeal or, in the alternative, for a brief administrative injunction during which it can petition the Circuit for an injunction pending appeal. Even assuming that the RNC has shown its appeal raises a “serious legal question, ” and acknowledging that it has shown that it will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction pending appeal, it has not shown that the balance of the equities and the public interest tip sharply in its favor. Thus, the Court will deny the RNC's motion insofar as it requests an injunction pending appeal. But the Court will grant it insofar as it requests another brief administrative injunction so the RNC may request the same relief from the Circuit.
The Court assumes familiarity with the background of this case. See Republican Nat'l Comm. (RNC) v. Pelosi, No 22-cv-659 (TJK), 2022 WL 1294509 (RNC).
To summarize briefly, the U.S. House of Representatives' Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol issued a subpoena to Salesforce.com, Inc.-a third-party digital vendor for the RNC-demanding that it produce to the Select Committee some of the RNC's confidential information relating to emails and other communications sent around the time of the November 2020 presidential election and January 2021 certification of the Electoral College vote. Id. at *1-5. The RNC then sued Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, the Select Committee, and each member of the Select Committee (“House Defendants”), to challenge the subpoena. Id. at *5. The RNC later amended its complaint to add Salesforce as a defendant. Id. The RNC challenged the subpoena on six grounds, arguing that (1) the subpoena violates the First Amendment; (2) it violates the Fourth Amendment; (3) it does not advance a valid legislative purpose; (4) the Select Committee lacks the necessary congressional authorization to issue the subpoena; (5) the subpoena is excessively broad and unduly burdensome; and (6) it violates the Stored Communications Act. Id. The RNC sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Id.
The Court dismissed the RNC's claims against House Defendants because of their immunity from suit under the Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause; found that the RNC had standing to press its claims against only Salesforce; dismissed as moot the RNC's Stored Communications Act claim against Salesforce; assumed in the RNC's favor two potential, non-jurisdictional hurdles to the merits of the RNC's other claims against Salesforce; and entered judgment against the RNC on those other claims. RNC, 2022 WL 1294509, at *7-26; ECF No. 32. The Court also temporarily enjoined all the defendants from acting on the subpoena until, as relevant here, the Court resolved a motion for injunction pending appeal filed by the RNC before May 5, 2022. See RNC, 2022 WL 1294509, at *25-26; ECF No. 32.
On May 4, 2022, the RNC filed a notice of appeal and moved for an injunction pending appeal or, in the alternative, a brief administrative injunction taking effect upon denial of the motion to permit the RNC time to obtain an injunction pending appeal from the Circuit. See ECF Nos. 35-36. Salesforce takes no position on the motion. See ECF No. 36 at 1. House Defendants oppose the motion for an injunction pending appeal but do not oppose entry of a brief administrative injunction upon denial of the motion to give the RNC time to move for an injunction pending appeal with the Circuit. See ECF No. 36 at 1; ECF No. 39 at 4.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d), the Court “may . . . grant an injunction” while “an appeal is pending” from a “final judgment that . . . refuses . . . an injunction.”[1] An injunction pending appeal is an “extraordinary remedy.” Alcresta Therapeutics, Inc. v. Azar, 318 F.Supp.3d 321, 324 (D.D.C. 2018); see also John Doe Co. v. CFPB, 849 F.3d 1129, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Because it is “an intrusion into the ordinary process[es] of administration and judicial review, ” it is “not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result to the appellant.” Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 11-cv-1629 (ABJ), 2012 WL 1929889, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2012) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009)); see also MediNatura, Inc. v. FDA, No. 20-cv-2066 (RDM), 2021 WL 1025835, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2021). Rather, the moving party bears the burden of showing that this remedy is warranted. See McCammon v. United States, 588 F.Supp.2d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2008).
The standards for evaluating a motion for an injunction pending appeal are “substantially the same as those for issuing a preliminary injunction, ” meaning that the movant generally “must establish” that (1) “they are likely to succeed on the merits, ” (2) “they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, ” (3) “the balance of equities tips in their favor, ” and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Alcresta Therapeutics, 318 F.Supp.3d at 324 (cleaned up). These are “stringent requirements.” Archdiocese of Wash. v. WMATA, 877 F.3d 1066, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The first two “prongs” typically are the “most critical.” See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 904 F.3d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The last two prongs, however, are by no means an afterthought. See, e.g., Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. City of Los Angeles, 607 F.Supp.2d 192, 203 (D.D.C. 2009) (). Also, where, as here, a government entity such as a congressional committee is the opposing party, the last two factors merge. See, e.g., Trump v. Comm. on Oversight & Reform of U.S. House of Reps., 380 F.Supp.3d 76, 105 (D.D.C. 2019), vacated on other grounds by Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 832 Fed.Appx. 6 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
Of course, by its own terms Rule 62(d) envisions situations in which a district court that has just denied an injunction still grants an injunction pending appeal. See MediNatura, 2021 WL 1025835, at *6. Thus, in “at least some circumstances” an injunction pending appeal “may be appropriate” even if the court that just denied injunctive relief “believe[s] its analysis” in denying that relief “is correct” such that the movant cannot show a likelihood of success. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Accordingly, “in rare cases, the threat of irreparable harm may be so grave and the balance of equities may favor” the movant “so decisively that an injunction pending appeal . . . may be proper, ” even without a likelihood of success on the merits, so long as the movant establishes a “serious legal question” on the merits and shows that “the other three factors tip sharply” in its favor. See MediNatura, 2021 WL 1025835, at *6 (cleaned up); see also Cigar Ass'n of Am. v. U.S. FDA, 317 F.Supp.3d 555, 560-61 & n.4 (D.D.C. 2018). That said, where the “relief sought is an injunction on the coordinate branches of government . . . it is even more important that the three remaining factors outweigh the lack of likelihood of success on the merits.” See Trump v. Thompson, No. 21-cv-2769 (TSC) (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2021), ECF No. 43 at 4-5. After all, “courts must take care not to unnecessarily ‘halt the functions of a coordinate branch.'” Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 511 n.17 (1975)).
The Court assumes that the RNC has shown that its appeal presents a “serious legal question.” And without doubt, the RNC has shown that it will suffer one sort of irreparable harm absent an injunction pending appeal. But it has not shown that the merged balance-of-equities and publicinterest factors tip sharply in its favor. Thus, the Court will deny the RNC's motion insofar as it requests an injunction pending appeal. Even so, the Court will grant the RNC's request for another brief administrative injunction so that it may seek an injunction pending appeal from the Circuit.
In its motion, the RNC argues that there are five issues the Court resolved against it either on which it is likely to succeed on appeal or about which there is at least a “serious legal question, ” thus satisfying the first Rule 62(d) criterion. See ECF No. 37-1 at 10-14. The RNC points to its arguments that (1) the subpoena violates its First Amendment associational rights, (2) it was “improper” for the Court to credit House Defendants' “narrowing” of the subpoena, (3) the Select Committee is not properly composed under its authorizing resolution because it contains only nine members, (4) the subpoena violates the RNC's Fourth Amendment rights, and (5) the subpoena was not issued in...
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