Resneck v. State
| Decision Date | 05 November 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 1085S438,1085S438 |
| Citation | 499 N.E.2d 230 |
| Parties | Robert F. RESNECK, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Jane Schliesman, Bloomington, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Richard Albert Alford, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-Appellant Robert F. Resneck was found guilty, but mentally ill, of attempted murder by a jury in the Monroe Circuit Court. He subsequently was sentenced by the trial judge to a term of twenty (20) years. Appellant now raises three issues for our consideration on this direct appeal:
1. permitting one of the expert medical witnesses to testify;
2. the finding of guilty but mentally ill; and
3. the finding that Appellant was competent to stand trial.
The facts show that Appellant Robert Resneck and the victim, Ron Hall, were friends. Both of them were homosexuals and had engaged in sexual acts. Hall admitted to being a practicing homosexual, but Resneck, who admitted to some homosexual activity, tended to deny that he was homosexual. He showed some resentment toward homosexuals and towards the homosexual alliance in Bloomington, an organization he viewed as being hostile to him. On March 12, 1983, Resneck went to Hall's residence to watch television with him for a while. He then left rather abruptly but returned in fifteen minutes and shot Hall in the face. Resneck had purchased the pistol he used in the shooting a few days before. Hall was hospitalized for a day and a half but recovered from the shooting. After the shooting, Resneck left the place quickly and went to the homes of several acquaintances, attempting to talk to them. Being unsuccessful in that regard, he went to a local bar and drank by himself for a period of time.
Resneck interposed the insanity defense and the court appointed three medical experts to examine him and testify as to his sanity at the time he committed this crime. Resneck now objects to the court's appointment of Dr. Jerry Neff, claiming that Dr. Neff was not a disinterested witness. No objection was made by anyone to Dr. Neff's testimony during the competency hearing. Resneck further claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel since his trial counsel belonged to the law firm which was counsel for the South Central Community Health Center in Bloomington, and Dr. Neff was employed by that Center. He claims his attorney therefore had a conflict of interest that rendered his representation ineffective.
Dr. Neff was the Medical Director of the Mental Health Center. He testified he was responsible for the treatment of patients in the inpatient psychiatric unit of the hospital. He was also the general supervisor of treatment for outpatient evaluation and prescriptions. Resneck had never been an inpatient at the Mental Health Center, had never been examined or evaluated by a doctor of the hospital, and had never received treatment of any kind from any of its personnel. Resneck did attend a voluntary group therapy program conducted by the Center for a period of up to a year, beginning in early 1982. These group sessions were conducted by a psychologist and social therapist. Although those conducting the sessions encouraged the participants to attend the sessions, attendance was purely voluntary. An attempt was made to induce the group to discuss their problems with each other in an effort to identify and resolve their particular problems. Testimony indicated that Resneck's attendance at the sessions was erratic in that he did not attend regularly and finally drifted away on his own.
Dr. Neff never treated Resneck until he was appointed in this case, along with other psychiatrists, to determine whether Resneck was competent to stand trial. At that time, he examined the records made by those conducting the group therapy sessions, as well as other records, and conducted his own personal examination of Resneck. His finding at that time was that Resneck was not competent to stand trial.
During the trial Neff was called again, along with other psychiatrists, to testify as to Resneck's sanity at the time he committed this crime. Although two other psychiatrists found that Resneck was insane when he committed this crime, it was Dr. Neff's opinion that Resneck was not insane. Resneck now claims Dr. Neff's testimony as to Resneck's sanity at the time of the commission of the crime is suspect and that Dr. Neff's appointment by the court was improper.
The only grounds given suggesting Dr. Neff's interest in the outcome of Resneck's trial, is Resneck's claim, made for the first time in his Motion to Correct Error, that Dr. Neff may have been concerned that the Mental Health Center would be subject to a malpractice suit as a result of Resneck's commission of this crime following his treatment at the Center. It is the State's position that Resneck's claim that Dr. Neff's testimony may have been influenced by his fear of a potential malpractice suit is highly speculative and totally born of Resneck's post-trial presumptions. There is nothing in the record to indicate or even suggest a malpractice action was considered by Dr. Neff or any of the officials at the treatment center. Resneck's only support for his contention is the fact that Dr. Neff found Resneck incompetent to stand trial in his initial examination, and later found Resneck was not insane at the time he committed the crime, even though two other psychiatrists found Resneck insane. Resneck further claims Dr. Neff's conclusions tended to disagree with findings of one of the psychologists who worked with Resneck in the voluntary group counseling program at the Mental Health Center. This psychologist noted that Resneck showed some tendencies toward suicide and homicide because of indications of violence in the past. Dr. Neff's analysis, however, in his testimony before the jury, was given in a forthright and analytical manner that distinguished the findings of those who disagreed with him. Dr. Neff also was able to show that his conclusions about Resneck's mental condition concerning sanity were not in conflict with those given earlier in which Dr. Neff found Resneck incompetent to stand trial. Resneck claims that his trial counsel and Dr. Neff sought to avoid questions about negligent treatment or other failures by downplaying the indicia that Resneck suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Since these factors indicated Resneck's lack of awareness and control of his contact with reality, they were highly relevant to Resneck's sanity, and also tended to show how he should have been treated by Dr. Neff and his staff at the Center. Resneck then states in his brief that whether this was done on advice of counsel is too speculative to explore. We agree.
Although we would not wish to attempt to make findings or decide the outcome of an alleged civil suit that might be filed, it does appear that such a prospect is nothing more than speculation at this point and could not be considered as a factor that might have entered anyone's mind at the time of Dr. Neff's selection and testimony. There is no showing that Resneck ever was a patient under the control, treatment, or supervision of the Center. He was never seen by one of the doctors and never received treatment by them. He was not committed to or confined in any way as an inpatient. His contact with the group therapy program was strictly voluntary and contemplated no treatment or confinement.
Further, the acts of violence shown by Resneck on previous occasions were generally known to others concerned, and therefore did not require or demonstrate a need to notify anyone. One of the subjects of Resneck's violence was also a participant in the voluntary treatment program. The incident involved a personal conflict between Resneck and the other participant at the participant's residence. The participant there called the police and when Resneck was taken into custody, the participant stated he did not wish to press charges, and asked that Resneck be released.
Another incident involved a professor at Indiana University with whom Resneck had some conflict. This also was reported to the police and was known generally by the police, and everyone else who might have an interest. The inference that the Center had knowledge of some violence demonstrated by Resneck that required their giving notice to potential victims, seems to have little merit, inasmuch as others had as much notice of Resneck's violent tendencies as the Center. Further, the Center had no relationship with Resneck that put them in a position to control him in any event.
Additionally, we know of no basis for finding that a doctor is disqualified from examining and testifying as to the sanity of a criminal defendant simply because that doctor is on the staff of an institution in which that defendant was at one time treated, even where that doctor had taken part in some of the treatment. It is not unusual to have staff members of such institutions testify as to their diagnosis and analysis of the mental condition of the defendant where knowledge has been gained in that manner. Dr. Neff was named by the court here and his appointment was mailed to him at his office at the Center. Dr. Neff testified at the competency hearing and openly stated his relationship with the...
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Darby v. State
...rational understanding and whether she has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against her. Resneck v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 230, 235; Mato v. State (1982), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 945, Darby claims her amnesia precluded the possibility of her conferring with co......
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