Resnek v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York

• Decision Date: 26 May 1934
• Parties: RESNEK v. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK. SAME v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

286 Mass. 305

190 N.E. 603

RESNEK

v.MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK.

SAME

v.METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

May 26, 1934.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Norfolk County; Hammond, Judge.

Actions by Verna Resnek, administratrix, against the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, and against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company wherein defendants filed petitions of interpleader and wherein Esther Resnek and another were claimants in the first action and Dorothy Resnek was claimant in the second action. Verdicts for claimants in the first action in the sum of $1,344.22, and verdict for claimant in the second action in the sum of $8,720.10, and plaintiff brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

R. L. Sisk, of Lynn, for plaintiff.

J. E. Hannigan and J. J. Tutun, both of Boston, for defendants.

DONAHUE, Justice.

The plaintiff brought actions at law against two insurance companies on policies of insurance issued by them some time prior to 1929 on the life of her husband who married the plaintiff in January and died on August seventh of that year. She described herself in the writs as administratrix of the estate of her husband, but as bringing the actions for her own benefit. One policy designates the insured's sister and mother and the other policy his sister as beneficiaries. Each company filed a petition of interpleader, the beneficiaries appeared as parties and filed answers, the companies paid into court the amounts due as proceeds of the policies and their liabilities thereunder were declared terminated in one case by stipulation of the parties and in the other by an order of court. The actions were tried together in the superior court and at the close of the evidence the judge, subject to the exceptions of the plaintiff, directed a verdict for the beneficiaries. Each bill of exceptions states that the only question at issue was whether there had been a valid change of beneficiary or beneficiaries under the policy whereby the plaintiff was substituted as beneficiary for those designated as such in the policies.

The plaintiff testified that early in May, 1929, her husband delivered to her the two insurance policies on which the present suits are brought and another policy with which we are not here concerned, saying that he wished her to have and receive their proceeds, and that she thereafterward retained the two policies here in question except for a short time when they were mislaid. Other testimony applicable in the action against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, taken in its aspect most favorable to the plaintiff, is here summarized. The insured entered a hospital in the latter part of July and on August third he had a talk with the plaintiff about a change in the beneficiaries in the policies and on the same day at his request she went to a branch office of that company in Boston and told the supervisor that she had been sent by her husband to get blank forms for a change of beneficiary. She was given such a printed form and took it to her husband who filled it out and signed it on August 5. It stated above the place of signature: ‘I understand that this designation of beneficiary will take effect when endorsed on the Policy by the Company and not before, and that if an examination of the records of this Policy at the Home Office of the Company discloses any reason why the designation cannot be made, this beneficiary designation form shall be returned to me by the Company without endorsement of designation of beneficiary on the Policy. I understand that legal process or action between the parties to the contract, insanity or minority of any of the interested parties, or an order of a Court may serve to prevent the proposed designation of beneficiary.’ On the same day, August 5, the plaintiff took the form signed by the insured and the policies to the office of the company and handed them to the supervisor. He signed the form, then apparently went and conferred with some one else in the office, and returning told her that the insured's father had been in and “gummed' up the works,' tore up the form and handed the policies back to her. She then reported what had taken place to the insured and he said he would see his father.

Each of the policies here in suit provides that the insured may ‘designate a new beneficiary * * * by filing written notice thereof at the Home Office of the Company accompanied by this Policy for suitable endorsement’ and that ‘Such change shall take effect upon the endorsement of the same’ on the policy by the company. In the present case neither written notice of a change of beneficiary nor the policy was sent to the home office of either company and no indorsement of any change was made thereon. The claimants assert the rights of beneficiaries who are so designated in insurance policies as those policies stood at the time of the death of the insured. Such beneficiaries have an interest which may be asserted in actions based upon the policies and brought in their own names G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 175, § 125; Tyler v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 226 Mass. 306, 308, 115 N. E. 300, L. R. A. 1917D, 633.

The interest of a beneficiary, designated in a life insurance policy containing a reservation to the insured of the right to change the beneficiary named, has been described as ‘a qualified vested interest, which is subject to be divested and defeated should the assured in his lifetime exercise the power given him to change a beneficiary in the manner prescribed by the contract between the insurer and the...