Resnik v. Michaels
| Decision Date | 17 September 1964 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 49442 |
| Citation | 52 Ill.App.2d 107,201 N.E.2d 769 |
| Parties | George RESNIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald MICHAELS, Robert Parker and the Village of Park Forest, a municipal corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Jules S. Gershon, Chicago, for appellant.
Davis, Dietch & Ryan, Chicago, for appellees.
The plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision which occurred on October 24, 1958, at the intersection of Tampa and Talala Streets in the Village of Park Forest, Illinois. He was a passenger in an automobile driven by the defendant, Donald Michaels, eastbound on Tampa. The other automobile was being driven by the defendant, Robert Parker, southbound on Talala. The plaintiff's complaint charged Michaels with willful and wanton misconduct and charged Parker and the Village of Park Forest with negligence. The court granted the Village's motion for summary judgment, from which judgment the plaintiff prosecutes the present appeal, the court having found that there was no just reason for delaying the appeal.
The gist of the complaint against the Village is its failure to provide two-way stop signs on Tampa Street at the intersection with Talala. The Village trustees had approved the installation of the signs in a resolution passed at their meeting on August 26, 1958, because 'there is heavy traffic at this corner,' and had instructed the Village Manager to proceed with the installation, but at the time of the accident the stop signs had not yet been put up. The plaintiff contends that once the municipality passed the resolution or ordinance directing the installation of stop signs, it then assumed an obligation to act with reasonable diligence to complete its undertaking, and that the failure to do so constituted negligence in the performance of a ministerial duty. The position of the Village is that it was exercising a governmental function when it authorized the erection of the stop signs and that it was not subject to liability until it began to carry out the ministerial function of putting up the signs and maintaining them.
It has been uniformly held that municipal corporations are not subject to liability for governmental functions but are liable for torts arising from ministerial or proprietary functions. Ludwig v. Board of Education, 35 Ill.App.2d 401, 183 N.E.2d 32. The classification of the activities of municipal corporations into governmental and ministerial or proprietary functions has been criticized as arbitrary, incapable of uniform application and productive of incongruities. (See Molitor v. Kaneland Com. Unit Dist., 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, and the legal articles cited therein at page 17, 163 N.E.2d 89). The criticism is well taken; the distinctions made between these functions are not always clear and the attempt to categorize them has resulted in incongruities. However, the fact remains that, 'The difference between proprietary and governmental functions is of importance in determining the liability of municipal corporations for the tortious conduct of their officers, agents and employees.' Ludwig v. Board of Education, supra. The importance is illustrated in the present case where, 'The Plaintiff's claim against the Village is that it negligently failed to perform a ministerial act and that this negligence was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff.'
There have been numerous cases in Illinois involving the liability of municipal corporations for injuries resulting from the development, maintenance and improvement of streets, sidewalks, bridges and sewers. A municipality is responsible for the negligent construction of public works and for its failure to maintain them, but it is not obligated, and it not liable for its neglect or refusal, to undertake such projects. The difficulty involved in subjecting a city, town or village to such an obligation, for example keeping sidewalks well was pointed out in City of Freeport v. Isbell, 83 Ill. 440 (1876):
'It might be a matter of great convenience to have all our cities or incorporated towns well lighted, in the neghttime, with gas, and it might add to the security of pedestrians whose business or tastes might require them to travel at late hours of the night; but to hold that a city or incorporated town was under a legal obligation to thus provide the streets with light, might well be regarded as an act of usurpation, on the part of the courts, of the legislative power, which has been exclusively delegated to the legislative department of the municipality.'
There are several decisions which delineate the extent of a city's liability. In Buckley v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill.App.2d 39, 120 N.E.2d 375, the City was held liable for an accident caused by its failure to maintain stop signs at an...
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Thorsen v. City of Chicago, s. 77-753
...and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 85, par. 3-104(a); See, e. g., Resnik v. Michaels (1964), 52 Ill.App.2d 107, 110, 201 N.E.2d 769), once having adopted and embarked upon a plan of public improvements, a city has a duty to maintain those improvements in a ......
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WARNER/ELEKTRA/ATLANTIC v. County of DuPage, Ill., 83 C 8230.
...Support of the County's Objection to Paragraph D of Revised Jury Instruction Number 39 at 1-2. See also Resnik v. Michaels, 52 Ill.App.2d 107, 110, 201 N.E.2d 769, 770 (1st Dist. 1964) ("A municipality is responsible for the negligent construction of public works and for its failure to main......
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Jensen v. Hutchinson County
...539; Brown v. State Highway Commission, Kan., 444 P.2d 882; Wagshal v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 216 A.2d 172; Resnik v. Michaels, 52 Ill.App.2d 107, 201 N.E.2d 769; Johnston v. City of East Moline, 405 Ill. 460, 91 N.E.2d 401; Dudum v. City of San Mateo, 167 Cal.App.2d 593, 334 P.2d ......
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Driscoll v. U.S., 74-3072
...Tort Claims Act. Cases such as Urow provide analogies useful, but not controlling, in interpreting the Act. Resnik v. Michaels, 52 Ill.App.2d 107, 201 N.E.2d 769 (1964); Locigno v. Chicago, 32 Ill.App.2d 412, 178 N.E.2d 124 (1961); Martin v. Winchester, 278 Ky. 200, 128 S.W.2d 543 (1939), r......