De Reus v. Peck
| Decision Date | 01 October 1945 |
| Docket Number | 15307. |
| Citation | 114 Colo. 107,162 P.2d 404 |
| Parties | DE REUS et al. v. PECK et al. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Error to District Court, Jefferson County; Osmer E. Smith, Judge.
Action by Frederick S. Peck and another against Victor G. De Reus and another to quiet title to and to enjoin interference with an easement over defendants' land. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error.
Affirmed and cause remanded with directions.
Bernard J. Seeman and James D. Doyle, both of Denver, for plaintiffs in error.
E Clifford Heald, of Denver, for defendants in error.
Frederick S. Peck and Edith R. Phillips, defendants in error hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs, were successful in obtaining a judgment and decree quieting title to, and an injunction against interference with, an easement over the lands of Victor G. DeRues and William DeReus, plaintiffs in error, hereinafter referred to as defendants, to review which judgment defendants prosecute this writ of error.
The complaint alleges that plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest acquired title to certain lands in Jefferson county Colorado, in 1908, and thereafter and continuously 'openly and notoriously used, traveled over and occupied and claimed the right to use, travel over and occupy, for the purpose of reaching their said lands, a certain lane, way or road extending from a point at or near Bear Creek to the said lands of the plaintiffs and through and across the lands of the defendants, * * * with the assent, acquiescence, knowledge, and agreement of the then owners of the defendants' said lands and of the defendants' predecessors in the title thereof. * * *'; that the defendants acquired title to the land over which the easement is claimed in 1935 and thereafter and until November 1, 1941, the easement was enjoyed by plaintiffs and their agents and tenants without objection on the part of the defendants; 'that about the month of November, 1941, the defendants barred said lane, road or way by means of a lock placed upon a gate across the same,' and 'now refuse to allow plaintiffs, their agents or tenants to enter upon the part of said lane running through and across their said lands.' Plaintiffs prayed that their title be quieted to the easement and that defendants be enjoined from interfering with their use thereof.
Defendants in their first answer and defense admitted their ownership of the premises over which the easement was claimed; admitted that the lands over which the easement was claimed was acquired by them as set forth in the complaint; admitted that they refused plaintiffs the right or privilege to travel or enter upon any part of the lane running across their land, and will continue so to do unless enjoined; and denied each and every other allegation in said complaint. In their 'first and further defense' defendants allege that the use of the way across their lands was permissive only; in the second they aver that a way of necessity did not exist; in the third, fourth and fifth defenses they plead the bar of the statute of limitations as set forth in sections 136, 143, and 144, chapter 40, '35 C.S.A., and by the sixth defense they move to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that 'it fails to state a claim against defendants,' a ground for a general demurrer under our original Code.
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, defendants moved for nonsuit, which motion was denied, and thereupon, defendants electing to stand on their motion, the court entered its judgment and decree in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants, by the provisions of which the easement was quieted in plaintiffs and a permanent injunction granted against defendants' interference with the use thereof. The decree contained, inter alia, the following:
'3. That the defendants, and each of them, and their, and each of their, agents, servants, and attorneys, be and they are, hereby, strictly and perpetually enjoined and restrained from hindering or interfering in any manner with the plaintiffs, their heirs, executors, and administrators, agents, lessees, invitees, and tenants, in the use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs' said right and easement, hereinabove described. * * *'
The specification of points upon which defendants rely for a reversal are presented in their brief under the following titles: We shall treat these in inverse order.
2 and 3. The court found the issues generally in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. There was competent evidence Before the court to justify its finding that plaintiffs were in the open, notorious, adverse, and visible use and occupation of the easement under claim of right from 1908 to November 1, 1941. This finding of fact fully warranted the determination of the court that plaintiffs had acquired title to an easement appurtenant to their lands and fully justified the court's order enjoining defendants from any interference with plaintiffs in the use thereof.
1. An easement is a right conferred by grant or acquired by prescription authorizing one to do or maintain something on the land of another which, although a benefit to the land of the former, may be a burden on the land of the latter. It is a privilege existing distinct from the ownership of the land itself, nevertheless it is an interest in land. A right-of-way over the lands of another may be an easement. The complaint in the instant case contains no legal description of the easement, and no evidence whatever was introduced from which the court might determine it. The decree quieted plaintiffs' right to an easement over a quarter section of land without in any way describing its length, width, or termini. It will be observed that the description of the easement in the decree contains no boundaries, no monuments, no directions, or other information that identifies the indefinite strip of land across defendants' forty acre tract. Where did it begin and where did it end? In what direction does it extend? The answers to these questions should be contained in the decree for otherwise one examining the title to defendants' land would be at loss to determine what portion of the forty acres was affected. It is apparent from...
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