De Reus v. De Reus
Decision Date | 20 June 1931 |
Docket Number | No. 40907.,40907. |
Parties | DE REUS v. DE REUS. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; W. S. Cooper, Judge.
Action in equity by the plaintiff for a divorce. There was a general denial by the defendant and a cross-petition for separate maintenance only, with no prayer for a general equitable relief. The court found the equities for the defendant and granted her a divorce. The defendant appeals. The facts appear in the opinion.
Reversed.Curtis W. Gregory, of Adel, and Harry Wifvat, of Perry, for appellant.
White & Clarke, of Adel, for appellee.
On June 10, 1930, the plaintiff filed in the district court of Dallas county, Iowa, a petition in equity praying for a divorce from the defendant. An answer in the nature of a general denial was filed, and at the same time a cross-petition in which the defendant prayed “that this defendant be granted separate maintenance in the sum of two hundred dollars ($200.00) to be immediately paid in to the Clerk of this Court, and the sum of not less than sixty-five dollars ($65.00) per month to be paid on the first day of each month thereafter, together with sufficient allowance to compensate her attorneys * * * and for the costs of this action.”
The court found “that the equities are with the defendant and that she should be divorced from the plaintiff.” The plaintiff does not appeal. The defendant appeals.
It appears that the parties were married on or about the 22d day of October, 1924, in Des Moines, Iowa. On the 23d day of February, 1928, plaintiff brought an action for divorce, but it was never brought to a hearing and was dismissed by the court on its own motion on the 13th day of March, 1929.
On the 7th day of February, 1930, the defendant in this case brought an action for separate maintenance against the plaintiff herein, to which there was a cross-petition, and, after the hearing, both the petition and the cross-petition were dismissed at the March, 1930, term of court.
The petition in the case at bar is bottomed on cruel and inhuman treatment alleged to have been practiced upon the plaintiff by the defendant. This the defendant denies.
In the cross-petition of the defendant it is alleged, among other things: That a few days after their marriage the defendant fell into a deserted cave on the plaintiff's premises, by reason of which accident she was
There follows a long recitation of alleged misconduct on the part of the plaintiff towards the defendant. As a basis for the charge of cruel and inhuman treatment towards the defendant of such character as to endanger her health and life, it is claimed, among other things, that the plaintiff has refused to furnish the defendant with necessary and proper care and medical attendance necessary to her physical condition, that he has refused to purchase clothing for the defendant to wear, and that it has been necessary for her children to provide her with clothing. Parenthetically, it may be stated the defendant has grown children by a former marriage.
It is claimed that the plaintiff has refused to provide necessary assistance for the defendant in caring for her and assisting her in looking after her household duties; that he has refused to furnish her with necessary supplies of groceries, bedding, and personal clothing.
There is contained in said cross-petition a long recital of various acts of misconduct on the part of the plainitff towards the defendant, including vile, abusive, and blasphemous language and threats of bodily violence.
I. It is the contention of the defendant that the court, having found the equities with the defendant, erred in granting a divorce for which there was no prayer in defendant's cross-petition, and that the court should have granted the defendant separate maintenance. As was said by this court in Krotz v. Krotz, 209 Iowa, 433, 228 N. W. 30:
In the case at bar, the court, by granting a divorce to the defendant, must necessarily have found that the evidence on behalf of the defendant was sufficient to warrant the court in granting the defendant...
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