Revill v. Pettit
| Decision Date | 09 January 1860 |
| Citation | 60 Ky. 314 |
| Parties | REVILL v. PETTIT. STRIBLING v. PETTIT. FOSTER v. PETTIT. MARTIN v. PETTIT. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
One justice of the peace can not act as an examining court, and commit to jail, or hold to bail, a person charged with felony; another justice must be associated with him. (Crim Code, secs. 46, 66.)
A justice of the peace who shall, without associating him with another justice of the county, assume to exercise the functions of an examining court, by holding to bail or committing to jail a person charged with felony, trancends the clearly defined limits of his authority, and his acts are void, and he thereby renders himself liable in damages to the party injured by such unauthorized assumption of authority.
Where (1) a person, having a special or limited judicial authority does any act beyond the scope of his authority, or (2) where although acting within the limits of his jurisdiction, he is actuated by malicious or corrupt motives, he renders himself liable as a trespasser to the party injured. In the former case his motives have nothing to do with the question of his liability, except so far as the presence or absence of a malicious motive might operate to enhance or mitigate the damages.
The privileges of an attorney-at-law do not protect him from the consequences of procuring or advising a judicial officer to commit an injurious act beyond the limit of his authority however correct the intentions and motives of the attorney may be. When a person charged with felony is examined and committed to jail by a single justice of the peace, an attorney who advises the justice to assume such jurisdiction is responsible to the injured party in damages.
An instrument unsupported by the evidence is abstract and erroneous.
The mere fact that one testifies on behalf of the Commonwealth, before a single justice of the peace who assumes to act as an examining court in a prosecution for felony, and to commit the accused, does not render the witness liable to the party injured.
In an action of trespass for a personal injury, the character of either party is not involved in the issue, and evidence of the good or bad character of the plaintiff is not, therefore, admissible. So, where a justice of the peace, and others advising him, are sued for the wrongful act of the justice in acting alone as an examining court, and committing to jail one charged with felony, evidence relating to the character of the latter is inadmissible.
The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction of an appeal prosecuted by the defendant, in an action for money or personal property, where the judgment against such defendant is for less than $50, and not reduced below that sum by set-off or counter-claim.
Appeals from Henry circuit court.
T. N. & D. W. LINDSEY and A. J. JAMES, for appellants, cited 4 Pr. Rep. 226; 6 Dana, 323; 1 J. J. Mar. 361; 3 Mon. 209; 7 Mon. 371; 1 Mar. 224; sec. 66, Crim. Code; 5 Phillips on Evidence, 258; 2 Bibb, 286.
JNO. RODMAN and T. A. BERRYMAN, for appellee, cited 2 Starkie's Evidence, 810; 1 B. Mon. 96.
These cases arise upon the same record, present substantially the same questions, and will therefore be considered together.
Stribling, a justice of the peace for Owen county, upon the information of Martin, issued a warrant against Pettit, charging him with having committed the crime of incest. Pettit was arrested by the sheriff and brought before Stribling, the justice, for examination. Stribling, instead of proceeding with the defendant to another justice of the county, to be associated with him in the examination of the charge, assumed the right to try the case himself, heard the evidence, and thereupon committed the accused to jail in default of the bail required. The accused was delivered to Foster, the jailer, under the order of commitment, and after having been confined in jail about forty-eight hours, he was released by giving bail in the sum fixed by the justice. What further steps, if any, were taken in the prosecution of this charge does not appear.
This action was then instituted by Pettit against Stribling, Revill, Foster, and Martin. The petition charges that defendants assaulted the plaintiff, forcibly took him into their possession, and, against his will, and without any authority of law, detained him in their custody, and falsely imprisoned him in the county jail, and kept him there for forty-eight hours; for which injuries he claims damages.
The defendants answered severally, relying upon the following matters of defense:
Stribling alleges that he was an acting justice of the peace for Owen county; that at the instance of his co-defendant, Martin, and upon the facts stated by him, he, in good faith, issued a warrant causing the plaintiff to be brought before him and some other justice of the county for examination, and when the plaintiff appeared he requested the defendant to hear and determine the charge without sending for another justice; wherefore the defendant, in good faith, heard the evidence, and being of opinion that there were probable grounds for holding the plaintiff for further trial, he fixed the bail at $500, which the plaintiff failed to give, and the defendant thereupon committed him to jail, in all of which he acted officially, in good faith, and without malice, and that the matters stated constitute the assault and imprisonment complained of.
Revill alleges that being a practicing attorney, he was employed to conduct the examination of the witnesses on the examination of the charge against the plaintiff, who waived the presence of another justice, and agreed to enter into bond for his appearance at court to answer the charge, but failing to give security, he was committed to jail by the justice, which is the assault and imprisonment complained of; that the defendant acted in the matter as an attorney, and did not exceed his authority.
Martin states substantially the same matters of defense. He details the facts upon which the charge against the plaintiff was founded, and says that he in good faith procured the warrant, and as a witness gave his testimony on the examination, in which he stated the facts of which he had knowledge touching the guilt of the plaintiff.
Foster justified as jailer under the mittimus which had been made out in due form and delivered to him, and by the authority of which he placed the prisoner in jail and detained him until legally discharged.
Upon these issues the parties went to trial, the result of which was a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against Martin for $400 in damages; against Stribling and Revill each for $300, and against Foster for one cent. The motion of the defendants for a new trial was overruled, and they have severally appealed to this court.
The appellee proved on the trial, in addition to the facts already stated, that while the examination was progressing his counsel moved a postponement, in order that another justice might be sent for, insisting that Stribling had no right to try the case by himself; that Revill told Stribling he had such right, and the motion to postpone the hearing was overruled. There was other evidence before the jury conducing to show that the counsel merely asked to have the trial postponed until he could procure the attendance of the appellee's daughter as a witness, and that the appellee objected, saying he would rather go to jail than have his daughter brought into court.
The principal questions in the case arise upon the first and second instructions given by the court, at the instance of the appellee. The two...
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