Rey v. Rey

• Decision Date: 14 March 2019
• Docket Number: D073506
• Parties: CLIFFORD F. REY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MARGARET REY, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

CLIFFORD F. REY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MARGARET REY, Defendant and Respondent.

D073506

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

March 14, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2017-00029969-CU-NP-CTL)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John S. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.

Clifford F. Rey, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Anderson Reynard and William D. Carey for Defendant and Respondent.

I.INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Clifford F. Rey, appearing in propria persona in this court, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing claims against his sister, Margaret Rey, arising from Clifford's¹ allegations that Margaret unduly influenced their mother, Ida Rey, to change the distribution of her assets in her trust and will in a manner that benefited Margaret, to the detriment of Ida's other children, including Clifford. The trial court sustained Margaret's demurrer to Clifford's complaint on res judicata grounds, concluding that Clifford was barred from bringing his claims against Margaret because he had previously agreed to dismiss, with prejudice, a probate action in which he raised other claims based on the same set of operative facts, and in which the court had granted him leave to amend to pursue the same claims that he asserts in this civil action.

On appeal, Clifford argues that his claims are exempt from the application of res judicata and that the probate petition that he dismissed with prejudice did not include the causes of action that he alleges in the complaint in this case—financial elder abuse and intentional interference with expected inheritance. Clifford also raises a number of issues that pertain to the merits of his claims against Margaret.

We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that Clifford's civil claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because his claims were either litigated in the prior probate proceeding or could have been litigated in that proceeding, which was brought to a final judgment as a result of Clifford's dismissal of the probate action with prejudice. We reach this result recognizing that there may be circumstances where the result of the application of res judicata may seem " 'harsh and unjust' "; however, a judgment is " 'binding and conclusive against collateral attack.' " (Beverly Hills Nat.Bank v. Glynn (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 274, 286.) We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

II.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 8, 2016, Clifford, who was represented by counsel, filed a probate petition (No. 37-2016-00011452-PR-TR-CTL) seeking to have Margaret removed as trustee of Ida's trust and to invalidate amendments to the trust and the codicil to the will that benefited Margaret to the detriment of other beneficiaries. Clifford alleged that Margaret had exerted undue influence over Ida, and that Ida lacked sufficient mental capacity at the time she executed the amendments and codicil. Specifically, Clifford contended that Margaret had manipulated Ida into changing the distribution of her assets that would occur upon her death in a manner that favored Margaret over Ida's other children.

On June 2, 2017, more than a year after filing the probate petition, Clifford filed a "Motion for Leave to File First Amended Petition." According to statements made in the documentation supporting that motion in the intervening months, the parties participated in a settlement conference but had been unable to reach an agreement. The parties had also apparently participated in a mediation that had failed to result in a settlement. A trial readiness conference was set for June 5, 2017, but Clifford noted that he was not ready for trial and was seeking leave to amend the underlying petition. The proposed "First Amended Verified Petition" included a number of alterations from the original petition,including the addition of causes of action for financial elder abuse and intentional interference with expected inheritance.

After a hearing on the matter on July 21, 2017, the trial court granted Clifford leave to amend his petition to include the new claims and set a new trial date.²

The following month, on July 31, 2017, Clifford filed with the court a document titled "Stipulation Re Dismissal with Prejudice." (Some capitalization omitted.) In that document, Clifford noted that the parties had agreed to "dismiss with prejudice" the action that was initiated by his filing of the probate petition. The parties sought to vacate the trial date and all other court dates. That same day, Clifford also filed a "Request for Dismissal," noting that he was dismissing the "Petition" "[w]ith prejudice."

On August 15, 2017, approximately two weeks after dismissing the petition in the probate action, Clifford filed a civil complaint against Margaret (No. 37-2017-00029969-CU-NP-CTL).³ In the civil complaint, Clifford asserted causes of action for financial elder abuse, intentional interference with expected inheritance, and inheritance forfeiture,pursuant to Probate Code section 259,⁴ based on the same essential facts underlying his probate petition.

In the civil action, Margaret filed a notice of related case regarding case No. 37-2016-00011452-PR-TR-CTL. Margaret then demurred to the complaint, contending that the claims in the newly-filed civil case involved identical causes of action to claims that were brought or could have been brought in the probate action, which had been dismissed with prejudice.

After taking judicial notice of the documents filed in case No. 37-2016-00011452-PR-TR-CTL, the trial court sustained Margaret's demurrer without permitting Clifford leave to amend the pleading. The court concluded that "[t]he two proceedings involve[] identical causes of action based on the same primary right," and that because "[e]ach of the causes of action were either actually litigated in the Probate case, or could have been raised and litigated in the Probate case," res judicata operated as a bar to Clifford's civil action and required that Margaret's demurrer to the complaint be sustained, without leave to amend.

The court entered a judgment dismissing the case on April 12, 2018. Clifford appeals from the judgment.

III.DISCUSSION

A. Standard of review from the sustaining of a demurrer

Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, we review the complaint de novo to determine whether it contains sufficient facts to state a cause of action: "In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we assume well-pleaded factual allegations to be true and examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action on any legal theory. [Citation.]" (Kyablue v. Watkins (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1292.)

When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in doing so. "It is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the pleading can be cured by amendment." (Lee v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 848, 854.) The burden falls on the plaintiff, however, to "show what facts he or she could plead to cure the existing defects in the complaint." (Boyd v. Freeman (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 847, 853-854 (Boyd).)

B. Clifford's claims in the current action are barred by principles of res judicata

The Supreme Court has used the term "res judicata" to encompass both claim preclusion and issue preclusion—primary and secondary aspects of res judicata—but has recently endorsed the use of the terms " 'res judicata' " to refer to claim preclusion, and " 'collateral estoppel' " to refer to issue preclusion. (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 (DKN Holdings).) We focus on res judicata, or claimpreclusion, which is the theory that Margaret advanced in the trial court and raises on appeal, and the theory on which the trial court relied in sustaining the demurrer.

"Claim preclusion 'prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.' [Citation.] Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties [or those in privity with them] (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit. [Citations.] If claim preclusion is established, it operates to bar relitigation of the claim altogether." (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824, italics omitted.) "[R]es judicata benefits both the parties and the courts because it 'seeks to curtail multiple litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in judicial administration.' " (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 897 (Mycogen Corp.), italics omitted.)

"Under the doctrine of res judicata, 'all claims based on the same cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a later date.' [Citation.]" (Estate of Dito (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 791, 801; Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 797 (Boeken).) " ' "Res judicata precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same cause of action on a different legal theory or for different relief." ' " (Mycogen Corp., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 897, quoting Weikel v. TCW Realty Fund II Holding Co. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1245.) Importantly, res judicata bars the litigation of issues that were actually litigated in the prior proceeding, as well as issues that could have been litigated in the prior proceeding. (In re...