Reyes v. Bd. of Educ. for Prince George's Cnty. Pub. Sch.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2022
• Docket Number: CIVIL 20-3565 PJM
• Parties: WENDY REYES Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

WENDY REYES Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 20-3565 PJM

United States District Court, D. Maryland

March 31, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PETER J. MESSITTE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In this Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) case pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Plaintiff Wendy Reyes, parent of a minor daughter A.C., challenges the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in a Due Process hearing to the extent that the ALJ held in favor of the Prince George's County Public Schools (PGCPS) system. Defendants are PGCPS; the Board of Education of PGCPS; Monica Goldson, Chief Executive Officer of PGCPS; and Trinell Bowman, Associate Superintendent for Special Education for PGCPS. See ECF No. 1.^[1] Plaintiff appeals the ALJ's conclusion that PGCPS did not fail to make an appropriate placement of services for A.C. from March 2018 through June 2020; did not fail to provide an appropriate placement of future services for A.C. in March 2020; did not fail to implement certain Individualized Education Programs (IEPs); and did not fail to provide accurate quarterly IEP reports. She also appeals the issue of whether the lack of direct occupational therapy services in certain of A.C.'s IEPs was inappropriate - on which the ALJ did not rule. The ALJ, however, ruled in favor of Plaintiff on her claim that PGCPS failed to provide appropriate other services in connection with certain of A.C.'s IEPs and her claim that PCGPS failed to convene certain IEP meetings to review and revise

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IEPs after A.C. failed to make sufficient progress. Plaintiff, for the most part, is satisfied with the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions that favored her and asks that the ALJ's decision be affirmed as to those claims. Defendants would have the Court sustain the ALJ in every respect.

Plaintiff and Defendants have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 26 and 32. No. hearing is necessary to resolve the motions. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the ALJ in all but two respects: The Court provides remedies for PGCPS's failure to convene certain IEP meetings for the benefit of A.C., and for its failure to include direct occupational therapy (OT) services for A.C. in the 2019 IEP. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26) will be DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART, and PGCPS' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 32) will correspondingly be DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.

I.STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Under the IDEA, children with disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-one are entitled to a free appropriate public education, commonly referred to as a “FAPE.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). “Maryland also has regulations governing the provisions of FAPEs to children with disabilities in accordance with the IDEA.” M.C. v. Starr, No. DKC-13-3617, 2014 WL 7404576, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 29, 2014) (citing Md. Code Regs. Tit. 13A, § 05.01). “A FAPE is an education that provides ‘meaningful access to the educational process' in ‘the least restrictive environment' and is ‘reasonably calculated to confer some educational benefit' on the child with the disability.” Id. quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192, 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982).

“A school provides a FAPE by developing an [Individualized Education Program (“IEP”)] for each disabled child.” J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Hanover Cty., Va., 516 F.3d 254, 257

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(4th Cir. 2008). “An appropriate IEP must contain statements concerning a disabled child's level of functioning, set forth measurable annual achievement goals, describe the services to be provided, and establish objective criteria for evaluating the child's progress.” MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty., 303 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)). An IEP is “prepared by an IEP Team, which consists of a representative of the school district, the child's teacher[s], the parents or guardian, and where appropriate, the child [him-or] herself.” Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)). “To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances.” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.Ct. 988, 999, 197 L.Ed.2d 335 (2017). While a FAPE must provide a benefit that amounts to “more than trivial progress, ” this does not require that a school district provide a disabled child with the “best possible education, ” or that the education “maximize” each disabled child's “potential.” M.C., 2014 WL 7404576, at *1 (citing 458 U.S. at 192; Hartmann by Hartmann v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 996, 1001 (4th Cir. 1997)).

The IDEA “establishes a series of elaborate procedural safeguards ‘designed to ensure that the parents or guardian of a child with a disability are both notified of a decision affecting their child and given an opportunity to object to these decisions.'” MM ex rel. DM, 303 F.3d at 527 (quoting Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 956 (4^th Cir.1997)). The IDEA, for example, “requires that the parents or guardian of a disabled child be notified by the school district of any proposed change to their child's IEP.” Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)). In Maryland, parents have the right to “voice disagreement with their children's proposed IEPs and request due process hearings before the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings [OAH] to address their concerns.”

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M.L. ex rel. Leiman v. Starr, 121 F.Supp.3d 466, 470 (D. Md. 2015), aff'd sub nom. M.L. by Leiman v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Following the administrative due process hearing before the ALJ, an aggrieved party, be it the parent or the school district, may appeal the ALJ's decision to the United States District Court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)-(3).

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

In considering motions for summary judgment in an IDEA case, the “reviewing court is obliged to conduct a modified de novo review of the administrative record, giving due weight to the underlying administrative proceedings.” M.L. ex rel. Leiman, 121 F.Supp.3d at 474 (citing M.C., 2014 WL 7404576, at *6) (internal quotations omitted). This standard means that a reviewing court must consider an ALJ's findings of fact “prima facie correct” when they are made “in a regular manner and with evidentiary support.” Doyle v. Arlington Cty. Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1991). If a district court “is not going to follow them, [it] is required to explain why it does not.” Id. In determining whether such factual findings were “regularly made, ” a reviewing court “should examine the way in which the state administrative authorities have arrived at their administrative decisions and the methods employed.” Id. A reviewing court should hesitate to disturb the “ALJ's determinations of the credibility of witnesses” since “the fact-finder, who has the advantage of hearing the witnesses, is in the best position to assess credibility.” Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cty., Maryland, 340 F.Supp.2d 603, 611 (D. Md. 2004) (quotation omitted).

“The [c]ourt then reaches its decision based on the preponderance of the evidence.” M.L. ex rel. Leiman, 121 F.Supp.3d at 474 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192, 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982)). In

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IDEA cases in which plaintiffs are appealing the administrative decision, plaintiffs “face an uphill battle for several reasons, ” not only because they must bear the burden of proof with respect to the evidence both in the administrative hearing and on appeal, but also because deference is owed to the administrative proceedings. Wagner, 340 F.Supp.2d at 611. In weighing the evidence before it, the reviewing court must not “substitute [its] own notions of sound educational policy for those of local school authorities.” M.C., 2014 WL 7404576, at *6 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

“A motion for summary judgment in an IDEA case . . . ‘may be more aptly described . . . as a motion for summary adjudication, wherein the district court is required to conduct a de novo review of the administrative record while giving ‘due weight' to the administrative findings made below.'” Alexis v. Board of Educ. for Baltimore County Public Schools, 286 F.Supp.2d 551, 556 (D. Md. 2003), quoting Hanson ex rel. Hanson v. Smith, 212 F.Supp.2d 474, 480 (D. Md. 2002).

“Thus, as one court has noted, in reviewing the administrative record in an IDEA case, the district court is placed in the paradoxical position of having to be an independent finder of fact, while concomitantly giving deference to the administrative findings.” King v. Board of Educ. of Allegany County, Maryland, 999 F.Supp. 750, 766 (D. Md. 1998), citing Wall v. Mattituck- Cutchogue Sch. Dist., 945 F.Supp. 501, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). “It is clear, therefore, that the starting point for the district court is to review the administrative record to determine whether the local and state decision-makers complied with the requirements of the IDEA, and to evaluate whether there is evidentiary support for the conclusions which were reached. Following this review, the district court must then determine whether it will follow the administrative fact findings, and if not, must clearly state why.” Id.

III.FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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The critical facts are as follows.^[2]

A.C., now fourteen years old, but as of December 2017 nine years old, was assessed as having an intellectual disability (ID) qualifying her for special education.^[3] ALJ Decision ¶ 38. During the 2017-2018 school year,...