Reyes v. Board of Supervisors

• Decision Date: 19 November 1987
• Docket Number: No. D005383,D005383
• Citation: 242 Cal.Rptr. 339,196 Cal.App.3d 1263
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Blas REYES, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 339

242 Cal.Rptr. 339

196 Cal.App.3d 1263

Blas REYES, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. D005383.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Nov. 19, 1987.

Review Denied March 3, 1988.

Peter M. Liss and Charles Wolfinger, San Diego, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Lloyd M. Harmon, Barbara Baird and Arlene Prater, San Diego, for defendants and respondents.

WORK, Associate Justice.

Blas Reyes and the Welfare Rights Organization of San Diego, Inc. (Plaintiffs), brought this class action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the San Diego County Board of Supervisors and Department of Social Services (County) to stop the practice of depriving general relief recipients of benefits for failing to comply with work project rules without distinguishing between willful and nonwillful violators and to recover past benefits lost from such illegal terminations. They appeal that portion of the trial court's order denying its motion for class certification as to retroactive relief. They contend the class for retroactive benefits is ascertainable and meets all proper community of interest requirements necessary for certification, asserting the trial court improperly relied on the County's potential administrative burdens at the remedy stage of determining class identity and individual claimant entitlements. For the reasons which follow, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' motion for class certification as to retroactive relief. Accordingly, we reverse its order in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE SECTION 17000¹, requires every county to provide general relief to all incompetent, poor, indigent and incapacitated individuals who are not supported by relatives, friends or state or private relief. Financed entirely out of County general funds, this program was designed to be the residual financial "safety net" for indigents who cannot obtain relief from any private sources and cannot qualify for aid under any specialized state or private program. (Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 681, 94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231.) ²

Pursuant to this mandate, the County established a general relief program divided into two essential parts, providing assistance to those employable and eligible for benefits under section 17000 and those who are incapacitated and unemployable by reason of age, disease, or accident. Those recipients who are employable must participate in work projects as a condition of obtaining relief. ³ Employable recipients work up to 72 hours per month on a county work project at the federal minimum wage to repay any grant. During their off-hours, these employable recipients must seek employment and accept any job paying the minimum wage. They are required to submit job applications to different employers each month and provide proof of such job contact to the County. Consequently, the following conditions must be met by an employable recipient before relief will be continued: (1) attendance and participation in the assigned work project; (2) submission of four written job applications per month; and (3) filing a monthly status report and interview. Failure to comply with any welfare program requirement without good cause results in a recipient being "sanctioned" by a period of ineligibility or denial of relief for three months on the first noncompliance and six months for a second within a twelve-month period. Failure to timely return a job-search verification results in the loss of aid for one month. ⁴

Relying on Jennings v. Jones, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at pages 1092-1093, 212 Cal.Rptr. 134, Plaintiffs' lawsuit essentially contends the sanctioning process of the County's program fails to distinguish between the competent healthy recipients who willfully fail to comply with the underlying requirements of the program and those whose failure is the result of mere negligence, inadvertence, or mental or physical disability. The class action complaint seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming the County's practice of terminating general relief benefits without distinguishing between willful and nonwillful violations of its work project rules violate substantive due process. The action further asks the court to require the County to provide advance notice of terminations for alleged work project violations so recipients can request continued benefits pending an administrative hearing consistent with the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process. Petitioners also seek a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the County to provide timely and adequate notice of actions to sanction individuals, to provide full discovery of evidence for and during hearings, to cease enforcement of its sanctioning process, to implement regulations requiring County to sanction only healthy, competent individuals who willfully fail to comply with the program requirements, and to identify and set aside all actions sanctioning class members since April 10, 1983, restoring prospective benefit to currently sanctioned individuals, providing notice of eligibility to apply for retroactive benefits to class members, and providing hearings for such individuals to determine eligibility for benefits.

Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was granted insofar as it sought to certify a class of all individuals who will be sanctioned by the County and deprived general relief benefits on or after the date of entry of final judgment. ⁵ However, with regard to retroactive relief to all individuals who have been sanctioned by the County's relief program since April 10, 1983, to the date of entry of the final judgment, certification was denied. The trial court rationalized its denial of retroactive benefits to a class estimated to be comprised of 15,000 individuals, because determination of class identity and entitlement to relief at the remedy stage rendered the class unascertainable and unmanageable. The court explained:

"I think that in this instance the class does not fit into the traditional class where it is a mechanical calculation ... to determine the entitlements of the class, but merely requires individual hearings as to the willful nature of the violations and the determination of liability on a case-by-case basis.

"That really does not suit class certification as far as retroactive benefits are concerned. It seems to me that those parties who still have rights may pursue them, if they wish, certainly, individually. But this is all we're doing, if we order the class certification, would be to just renotice people that they had a right to assert their individual actions and have administrative hearings on each one. I don't think that suits the standard of the class litigation. It certainly becomes unmanageable from the county view and I think the Metcalf vs. Edelman [ (N.D.Ill.1974) 64 F.R.D. 407] case is on point in this matter, which would prohibit the determination of the class.

"Certainly, the county has indicated their willingness to have this order made without prejudice to renewal of a more determinable, manageable class that didn't require the individual determinations of, really, a mini trial as to each party to determine whether or not they are indeed entitled to the benefits or the rights of which they were alleged to be deprived...."

GOVERNING LAW

Class actions serve an important role by establishing a judicial process within which claims of many individuals can be resolved simultaneously, eliminating repetitive litigation and providing claimants with a practical method of securing redress for claims which because of their size do not warrant individual litigation. Consequently, courts and legislatures have developed and transformed this former, limited equity device to a contemporary tool designed to meet the needs of modern society. (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 469, 174 Cal.Rptr. 515, 629 P.2d 23.) The class action has now become "a 'peculiarly appropriate' vehicle for providing effective relief when, as here, a large number of applicants or recipients have been improperly denied governmental benefits on the basis of an invalid regulation, statute or administrative practice. [Citations.]" (Employment Development Dept. v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 256, 265, 178 Cal.Rptr. 612, 636 P.2d 575.) ⁶

In California, Code of Civil Procedure section 382 authorizes class action suits "when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court...." (See Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470, 174 Cal.Rptr. 515, 629 P.2d 23; Miller v. Woods (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 872, 196 Cal.Rptr. 69.) This provision has been construed to require the showing of an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest in questions of law and fact among the members of that class. (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470, 174 Cal.Rptr. 515, 629 P.2d 23; Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 355, 360, 134 Cal.Rptr. 388, 556 P.2d 750; Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704, 63 Cal.Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732; Stephens v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 411, 417, 238 Cal.Rptr. 602.) However, in light of the general character of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 which fails to define a procedural framework for class certification, the courts have sought guidance from both Civil Code section 1781 regarding consumer class actions and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23, in the absence of state precedent. (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 469-470, fn. 7, 174 Cal.Rptr. 515, 629 P.2d 23; Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 145-146, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256; Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) ...