Reyes v. Bridgwater, No. 09-10076 (5th. Cir. 1/22/2010)
| Decision Date | 22 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-10076.,09-10076. |
| Parties | LUZ M. REYES, Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of JOSE PACHECO CEBALLOS, Deceased, and as the Representative of the Estate of Carmen Ceballos, Deceased, and as Guardian of A R, Minor Child, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIAM BRIDGWATER; JOSE PORRAS; WILLIAM MULL, Chief of Police, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, USDC No. 5:08-CV-56.
Before: KING, GARZA, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
Jose Ceballos, Jr., was shot and killed by Officer William Bridgwater of the City of Plainview's police department during an incident at Ceballos's home. His family (the "Ceballos Family")1 sued Bridgwater; his supervisor, Jose Porras; the Chief of Police; and the City of Plainview 2 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and certain state law theories. The district court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants, and the Ceballos Family appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the summary judgment as to Bridgwater on the § 1983 claim and REMAND that portion and otherwise AFFIRM the district court's judgment.
On September 11, 2006, Luz Maria Reyes telephoned 911 and reported that her brothers, Andres Pacheco and Ceballos, were fighting at the apartment in Plainview, Texas, where their mother, Carmen Ceballos ("Mrs. Ceballos"), lived, and then hung up on the operator. Responding to that call, Bridgwater arrived at the apartment and found Reyes and Pacheco outside the door to the apartment and the door closed. Reyes and Pacheco told Bridgwater that there was not a fight in the apartment and that Ceballos and their mother were inside.
Bridgwater then knocked on the door, announced the presence of police, and asked that the door be opened. The door remained closed. Bridgwater then requested the assistance of Porras. Ceballos looked through a window adjacent to the door, and Bridgwater signaled for him to open the door. Ceballos retreated into the apartment and did not open the door. Someone screamed from inside the apartment,3 and Bridgwater then instructed Pacheco and Reyes to step back from the door and kicked the door open. Porras arrived moments afterward, and both officers drew their weapons as they looked into the entryway.
Ceballos moved into the entryway holding a kitchen knife in one hand and a cigarette in the other. Mrs. Ceballos was also inside the apartment. Bridgwater ordered Ceballos to get down and to put down the knife in English; Porras repeated the command in Spanish. Both officers repeated the instruction, in both languages, multiple times. Ceballos did not comply and told the officers to leave.
It is undisputed that Ceballos next threw down his cigarette, that Bridgwater twice said, "Don't do it," and that Bridgwater fired one shot at Ceballos, which struck him in the chest and ultimately killed him. As to the further details of the event, the testimony of Reyes and Mrs. Ceballos conflicts with that given by the police officers. The import of those conflicts is the central issue presented by this appeal.
Bridgwater testified that, just before the shooting, Ceballos suddenly appeared more aggressive, threw his cigarette butt at the officers, stepped forward toward the officers, and raised the knife he was holding. Reyes and Mrs. Ceballos, on the other hand, testified that Ceballos flicked his cigarette butt nonaggressively, did not step forward towards the officers (instead, that he was swaying side to side), and did not raise the knife. Bridgwater testified that, but for Ceballos's action of stepping forward and raising the knife—actions Ceballos's family members say did not occur—he would not have shot Ceballos.
The Ceballos Family sued for violation of Ceballos' constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserted a number of additional state tort claims—gross negligence, assault, wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, failure to adequately supervise, failure to discipline, and failure to train. The individual defendants asserted, among other defenses, a defense of qualified immunity as to the federal claims and moved for summary judgment on that basis. The individual defendants also asserted a statutory basis for dismissal for failure to state a claim as to the state law causes of action. The district court granted the individual defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissal and entered a Rule 54(b) final judgment as to the individual defendants only. This appeal followed.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 541 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); that is, "[a]n issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., 297 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2002). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hixson Bros., 453 F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2006). In doing so, we "refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lake Caroline, Inc., 515 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
The doctrine of qualified immunity provides immunity from suit under § 1983 to government officials provided that "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional law of which a reasonable person would have known." Goodman v. Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wallace v. County of Comal, 400 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (). At the summary judgment stage, therefore, "[w]hen a defendant pleads qualified immunity as an affirmative defense . . ., a court must decide (1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff ma[k]e out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was `clearly established' at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct." Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009). The absence of a genuine issue of material fact on either element means that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.4 "To negate a defense of qualified immunity and avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff need not present `absolute proof,' but must offer more than `mere allegations.'" Id. (quoting Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1991)).
As noted above, several facts are disputed. The first question, therefore, is whether any of those facts are material, that is, whether they change the outcome of the qualified immunity analysis. As this court in Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi framed the inquiry, "summary judgment is inappropriate unless plaintiff's version of the violations does not implicate clearly established law." 202 F.3d 730, 739 (5th Cir. 2000).
If Bridgwater is entitled to qualified immunity even under Reyes's version of events, then summary judgment was appropriate because the dispute of facts would be immaterial; otherwise, summary judgment was improperly granted. See, e.g., Goodson, 202 F.3d at 739. Thus, this issue turns on whether there is a material issue of fact.
Bridgwater is entitled to qualified immunity at this procedural stage if, under Reyes's version of events, his use of deadly force was not "clearly excessive or clearly unreasonable." See Ramirez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal punctuation omitted). Unlike some areas of constitutional law, the question of when deadly force is appropriate — and the concomitant conclusion that deadly force is or is not excessive — is well-established. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12, 21 (1985) (). We recently explained that the focus of the inquiry is "the act that led [the officer] to discharge his weapon." Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 2009). Here, the summary judgment standard requires that the court conclude that there was, in essence, no such act, i.e., that the raised knife and threatening step forward did not occur.
Bridgwater argues that Ramirez supports his defense of qualified immunity. Ramirez, however, is distinguishable in critical respects. In Ramirez, police stopped a car driven by a suspect whom they knew to be armed. The suspect refused to comply with the officers' instructions and displayed a gun, but never raised it or aimed it at the officers. Ten seconds after the suspect exited the car, one officer fired at and seriously injured the man. 542 F.3d at 127. The reversed a magistrate judge's conclusion that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity, pointing out that the suspect Id. at 131.
There are two major distinctions between Ramirez and the present case. First, under the facts presented by the Ceballos Family, Ceballos did not make "a threatening gesture" (or motion) as did the suspect in Ramirez. Second, Ceballos was armed with a knife, not a gun. The latter distinction limits the...
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