Reyes v. Kelly, 37021
Decision Date | 11 June 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 37021,37021 |
Citation | 224 So.2d 303 |
Parties | Gonzalo R. REYES, Appellant, v. Honorable Richard KELLY, as Judge of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pasco County, Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
This appeal is from a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in an original prohibition proceeding. It is clear that the decision is one initially construing a controlling section of the Florida Constitution, 1 hence jurisdiction of this appeal is vested in this Court. 2
The facts, as hereafter supplemented to emphasize the voluntary and conclusive nature of the plea of guilty, are fully set forth in the District Court opinion denying prohibition on the ground that former jeopardy was not shown by a plea of guilty to a former charge on direct indictment for murder in the second degree. It is clear from that opinion that the District Court found the unqualified plea of guilty to have been made freely and voluntarily by the defendant, that he was competent to know the consequences of such plea, and that the same was not induced by fear, misapprehension, persuasion, promise, inadvertence or ignorance. 3 The record convinces us, as it did the District Court, that the able trial judge entertained no doubts about the conclusions above stated but based his refusal to accept such plea upon his belief, after an extensive and exhaustive examination of the defendant concerning the events out of which the homicide arose, that the defendant may have been acting in self-defense.
The record is conclusive that the defendant knew the court's belief in the matter and of the court's decision not to accept such plea solely because of his belief that the defendant may have acted in self-defense. Because the defendant was unable to speak and understand the English language, he was examined through two interpreters. After the court had concluded that it would not accept the plea of guilty for the reasons quoted in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal and emphasized here, the interpreter inquired of the court: 'I wonder if we should relay this to him, whether the court has questioned whether to accept his plea of guilty.' The court replied: Thereupon the interpreter spoke in Spanish to the defendant, then replied to the court: 'He understands that.' The court then inquired 'What did he say?' The interpreter answered: 'He asked me: 'What do you think about that? " The court then replied: The interpreter then spoke to the defendant and told the court: 'No, that is all right--he said he understands what you said, but he did that because he thought that she ws coming to him to kill him with the knife.' Father Samuel, the other interpreter, then stated to the court: The court then stated: The interpreter then said after inquiry to the defendant, 'He understands that very well,' whereupon the court again told the interpreter, 'Now, ask him does he want to have this trial by Jury, or does he want to plead guilty.' The interpreter made such inquiry and then related to the court: 'He said that he pleads guilty right now.' (Emphasis added to the above two quotations.)
A trial court has the undoubted power to reject a plea of guilty where the same is not 'entirely voluntary by one competent to know the consequence,' or is 'induced by fear, misapprehension, persuasion, promises, inadvertence, or ignorance,' 4 and the trial court is allowed great latitude with respect to making this determination. The law is equally clear that where a plea of guilty possessing the attributes above mentioned is accepted by the court, the court may refuse to permit such plea to be withdrawn for the purpose of pleading not guilty. 5 Such discretion, of course, is subject to review by an appellate court but this court many years ago said: 6
But, when, as in this case, a defendant deliberately pleads guilty to a criminal charge under circumstances that should reasonably have prompted him and his counsel to be prepared to meet the charge, and no motion is made for leave to withdraw the plea of guilty till after the state witnesses have been discharged, and there is no direct allegation or proof that the plea was entered under mental weakness, mistake, surprise, misapprehension, fear, promise, or other circumstances that put the defendant at a disadvantage in protecting his rights, the discretion of the trial court is not shown to have been abused (in rejecting such request).
It is, therefore, abundantly clear from the disclosures of this record, construed in the light of the decisions holding that '(i)n a criminal prosecution a defendant has a right to plead guilty; and (that) the effect of such a plea is to authorize the imposition of the sentence prescribed by law,' 7 that the acceptance of such a plea by the court places the defendant in jeopardy. The major question then, is whether...
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Brown v. State, 48229
...question to the person (judge) or persons (jury) with authority to make that determination constitutes jeopardy. See Reyes v. Kelly, 224 So.2d 303 (Fla.1969), Cert. denied, 397 U.S. 958, 90 S.Ct. 961, 25 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).9 Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35......
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...See State ex rel. Wilhoit v. Wells, 356 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 1222 (Fla.1978). See also Reyes v. Kelly, 224 So.2d 303 (Fla.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 958, 90 S.Ct. 961, 25 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). As to Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d......
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...focuses on whether the trial court had authority to vacate the defendant's earlier plea to accessory after the fact. See Reyes v. Kelly, 224 So.2d 303 (Fla.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 958, 90 S.Ct. 961, 25 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), which illustrated and held that jeopardy attaches when a trial ......
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