Reyes v. Kimuell

• Decision Date: 01 September 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 16–0852 (RC)
• Citation: 270 F.Supp.3d 30
• Parties: Ana Maria Sarceno REYES, Plaintiff, v. Kimmoti KIMUELL, doing business as Burrito Brothers, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

270 F.Supp.3d 30

Ana Maria Sarceno REYES, Plaintiff,

v.Kimmoti KIMUELL, doing business as Burrito Brothers, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 16–0852 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 1, 2017

Mary Craine Lombardo, Stein Sperling Bennett De Jong Driscoll PC, Rockville, MD, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Ms. Ana Maria Sarceno Reyes sued Mr. Kimmoti Kimuell, doing business as Burrito Brothers, alleging that he failed to pay her statutorily required overtime wages. After Mr. Kimuell failed to appear, file an answer, or otherwise respond to the complaint, the Clerk's office entered a default against him. Ms. Sarceno Reyes now moves for a default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) in the amount of $117,031.24 in damages, $3647 in attorneys' fees, and $500.94 in costs. Because Ms. Sarceno Reyes has met her evidentiary burden, the Court grants Ms. Sarceno Reyes's motion but reduces the damages award to correct several errors.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Ms. Sarceno Reyes worked for Mr. Kimuell as a cook and food preparer² from June 15, 2010, through March 29, 2016.

Pl.'s Rule 55(b)(2) Mot. Entry Default J. (Pl.'s Mot.) at 2, ECF No. 14. According to Ms. Sarceno Reyes, her hourly wage during the applicable period was:

Time Period Hourly Wage
                March 16, 2013 to July 4, 2014   $ 9.00
                July 5, 2014 to July 3, 2015     $ 9.50
                July 4, 2015 to March 29, 2016   $ 10.50
                

Sarceno Reyes Decl. at ¶ 2, ECF No. 14–1. According to Ms. Sarceno Reyes, she worked "an average of sixty (60) and seventy-five (75) hours per week" but was never paid overtime for hours worked in excess of forty hours each week. Sarceno Reyes Decl. at ¶ 3. According to Ms. Sarceno Reyes's counsel, Ms. Sarceno Reyes worked "approximately 81.25 hours in one week and 78.50 hours in the next week" from March 16, 2013 to February 27, 2015, and "approximately 66.50 hours in one week and 64 hours in the next week" from February 28, 2015 to March 29, 2017. 2d Lombardo Aff. ¶ 1, ECF No. 15–1. Based upon these figures, Ms. Sarceno Reyes claims she is owed "approximately $29,257.81" in unpaid overtime wages. Sarceno Reyes Decl. at ¶ 4.

Ms. Sarceno Reyes's Complaint sought damages under three different statutes: the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (FLSA); the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law, D.C. Code § 32–1301, et seq. (DCWPCL), and the D.C. Wage Revision Act, D.C. Code § 32–1003, et seq. (DCMWRA). Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. Mr. Kimuell did not appear or answer within the first 21 days after being served with the complaint, or thereafter. See Proof of Service, ECF No. 11; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(1)(A)(i) (requiring a defendant to "serve an answer within 21 days of being served with a summons"). The Clerk of Court therefore entered a default against Mr. Kimuell. Default, ECF No. 13. Ms. Sarceno Reyes now requests that this Court enter a default judgment against Mr. Kimuell in the amount of $29,257.81 in unpaid wages and treble damages of $87,773.43 under the DCWPCL (for a total of $117,031.24 in damages), as well as $3647 in attorneys' fees and $500.94 in costs. Pl.'s Mot. at 6, ECF No. 14; Pl.'s Supp'l Sub., ECF No. 15.³

III. ANALYSIS

Ms. Sarceno Reyes seeks a default judgment based on Mr. Kimuell's failure to respond. The Court may enter a default judgment in accordance with Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Default judgment is appropriate when the defendant is an "essentially unresponsive party" whose default is "plainly willful, reflected by its failure to respond to the summons or complaint, the entry of default, or the motion for default judgment." Carazani v. Zegarra , 972 F.Supp.2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal citations omitted). The Court may enter a default judgment when a defendant "makes no request to set aside the default" and "gives no indication of a meritorious defense."

Ventura v. L.A. Howard Constr. Co. , 134 F.Supp.3d 99, 104 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Int'l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Auxier Drywall, LLC , 531 F.Supp.2d 56, 57 (D.D.C. 2008) ).

Here, Mr. Kimuell has not responded to the summons, complaint, entry of default, or motion for default judgment, and entering a default judgment against him is therefore appropriate. See Serv. Employees Int'l Union Nat. Indus. Pension Fund v. Artharee , 942 F.Supp.2d 27, 29–30 (D.D.C. 2013) ("Where, as here, there is a complete 'absence of any request to set aside the default or suggestion by the defendant that it has a meritorious defense, it is clear that the standard for default judgment has been satisfied.' " (quoting Int'l Painters & Allied Trades , 531 F.Supp.2d at 57 )). The Court therefore finds that entry of a default judgment is appropriate.

However, although "[a] default judgment establishes the defaulting party's liability for every well-plead allegation in the complaint," it does not "automatically establish liability in the amount claimed by the plaintiff." PT (Persero) Merpati Nusantara Airlines v. Thirdstone Aircraft Leasing Grp., Inc. , 246 F.R.D. 17, 18 (D.D.C. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Adkins v. Teseo , 180 F.Supp.2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2001) and Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos. , 862 F.Supp. 486, 491 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated on other grounds , 62 F.3d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Instead, "the Court is required to make an independent determination of the amount of damages to be awarded, unless the amount of damages is certain." Serv. Employees Int'l Union , 942 F.Supp.2d at 30 (citing Int'l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Davanc Contracting, Inc. , 808 F.Supp.2d 89, 94 (D.D.C. 2011) ). In doing so, a court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing if it can establish a basis for the amount of damages through detailed affidavits or other documentary evidence. Flynn v. Mastro Masonry Contractors , 237 F.Supp.2d 66, 69 (D.D.C. 2002) ; see also Embassy of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye , 945 F.Supp.2d 81, 85 (D.D.C. 2013). With these principles in mind, the Court turns to determining the appropriate measure of damages and concludes that a basis for the damages can be established without a hearing.

A. Award of Damages

Ms. Sarceno Reyes's claim for damages encompasses both a claim for unpaid wages and a claim for liquidated damages. The Court addresses each in turn. Ms. Sarceno Reyes claims that she is entitled to $29,257.81 in unpaid wages. Pl.'s Mot. at 2. Ms. Sarceno Reyes's counsel provided an Excel spreadsheet demonstrating how that figure was calculated. Excel Spreadsheet, ECF No. 15–1, Ex. A. According to Ms. Sarceno Reyes's counsel, Ms. Sarceno Reyes worked 159.75 hours in each two-week period from March 16, 2013 to February 27, 2015, and 130.5 hours in each two-week period thereafter. 2d Lombardo Aff. ¶ 1, ECF No. 15–1 (stating that Ms. Sarceno Reyes estimated that she worked "approximately 81.25 hours in one week and 78.50 hours in the next week" from March 16, 2013 to February 27, 2015, and "approximately 66.50 hours in one week and 64 hours in the next week" from February 28, 2015 to March 29, 2016).

Ms. Sarceno Reyes does not provide documentary evidence such as pay stubs or other records to support the hours she claims to have worked. However, because the employer is responsible for maintaining such records, courts are reluctant to penalize plaintiffs without documentation in cases where the employers have defaulted. See Martinez v. China Boy, Inc. , 229 F.Supp.3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2016)("In this case, where the plaintiff has not produced timesheets and the defendant has failed to respond, the Court will accept [the plaintiff's] declaration, submitted under the penalty of perjury, as to the hours she worked and wages she received ...."); Encinas v. J.J. Drywall Corp. , 840 F.Supp.2d 6, 8 (D.D.C. 2012) ("[W]here the employer's records are inaccurate or inadequate ... an employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference ." (quoting Arias v. U.S. Serv. Indus., Inc. , 80 F.3d 509, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1996) )); see also Arias , 80 F.3d at 512 ("The employer cannot be heard to complain that the damages lack the exactness and precision of measurement that would be possible had [it] kept records in accordance with the requirements of ... the [FLSA]." (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. , 328 U.S. 680, 688, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946) )). The Court therefore proceeds based on Ms. Sarceno Reyes's recollection of the hours she worked.

The Court has examined Ms. Sarceno Reyes's spreadsheet, and agrees with its calculation of unpaid wages, except for what appears to be one computational error.⁴ In addition, the Court notes that the applicable statute of limitations is three years, and thus has updated its calculations to ensure Ms. Sarceno Reyes does not recover for overtime worked more than three years before her complaint was filed on May 5, 2016. See Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc. , 738 F.Supp.2d 8, 30 (D.D.C. 2010) ("The statute of limitations under both the DCWPCL and FLSA, however, is only three years. Because plaintiffs filed their complaint on April 11, 2008, [plaintiff] may only recover for FLSA and DCWPCL violations that occurred on or after April 11, 2005 ...." (citing 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2006) and D.C. Code § 32–1013 )). For reasons concerning the calculation of liquidated damages, the Court divides its analysis of unpaid wages based on whether the work occurred before or after October 1, 2014, and calculates unpaid wages as follows:

                              ---Prior to October 1, 2014---
                Time Period Hourly Unpaid
                Rate Wages
                May 11, 20135 to December 20, 2013       $9.00      $5742.08
                December 21, 2014 to July 4, 2013        $9.00

...