Lucero v. Parkinson Constr. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 18-515 (RC) |
| Parties | ELISEO LIMA LUCERO, Plaintiff, v. PARKINSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Defendants' Motion for Sanctions. See Supp. Mot. Atty's' Fees ("May 3 Mot."), ECF No. 71.; Mot. Sanctions, ECF No. 73.1 Plaintiff asks the Court for a supplemental award based on preparations to address an unprosecuted appeal and for collection efforts over the course of about eight months after this Court granted Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees. Defendants respond with a motion for sanctions and argue that Plaintiff's requests are unreasonable. Because the Court generally finds Plaintiff's request for fees to be reasonable, the Court grants in part Plaintiff's motion and denies Defendants' motion.
On July 1, 2019, this Court awarded Plaintiff's counsel attorneys' fees in the amount of $84,893.90 and costs in the amount of $1,193.92. See Order Mot. Att'ys' Fees, ECF No. 32. Inan effort to collect on the judgment, on August 5, 2019, Plaintiff sought a series of writs of attachment. See Application for Writ, ECF No. 37. This Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson for full case management of all post-judgment collection efforts, including post-judgment discovery, on October 3, 2019. See Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge, ECF No. 48. After experiencing continued difficulty securing the awarded fees, Plaintiff propounded post-judgment interrogatories on Defendants and eventually, after Defendants failed to respond, moved to compel answers to the discovery requests. See Mot. Compel at 2, ECF No. 53.
In a November 21, 2019 Minute Order, Magistrate Judge Robinson instructed Defendants to serve their answers to Plaintiff's interrogatories no later than December 9, 2019. See Min. Order, Nov. 21, 2019. However, on that day, Defendants tendered the full remaining balance to Plaintiff and filed a "Motion to Order Discovery as Moot." See Mot. for Order, ECF No. 60. Despite receiving payment, Plaintiff continued to pursue discovery and filed a motion seeking fees incurred due to Defendants' failure to cooperate in discovery for $6,824.90. See Mot. Att'ys' Fees ("Dec. 27 Mot."), ECF No. 66. But because Defendants had made payment on December 9, Magistrate Judge Robinson vacated the Court's November 21 Minute Order compelling discovery and denied Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees as moot. See Min. Order, Feb. 13, 2020. Additionally, Magistrate Judge Robinson stated that "all post-judgment collection efforts which were pending at the time of the referral of this action have been completed, the Clerk will terminate the referral." Id. As of the February 13 order, Plaintiff had not yet sought reimbursement for post-judgment collection efforts.
Alongside the collection efforts, Defendants filed a notice of appeal on July 23, 2019. See Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 34. Instead of prosecuting the appeal, Defendants left it pendingfor nearly six months, at which point, after failing to respond to an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the case for lack of prosecution. See USCA Mandate, ECF No. 67-1. Before the present motion, Plaintiff had not yet sought reimbursement for fees associated with the appeal.
On May 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed the present Motion for Attorneys' Fees, seeking an additional award of $40,365.50 in attorneys' fees and $431.83 in costs for effectuating judgment under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., ("FLSA"). See May 3 Mot. at 9. Plaintiff's counsel attributes the supplemental request to time spent locating and seizing Defendants' assets after Defendants failed to voluntarily pay the award; preparing for Defendants' unprosecuted appeal before the D.C. Circuit; and litigating post-judgment discovery before the Magistrate Judge. Id. at 5, 8. On May 29, 2020, in accordance with the Magistrate Judge's February 13 order, Plaintiff voluntarily reduced his fee petition by $6,069.00, which reflected the discovery-related fees incurred after Defendant had tendered payment on December 9, 2019. See Pl.'s Reply Mot. Att'ys' Fees and Opp'n Mot. Sanctions at 1 ("Pl.'s Reply"), ECF No. 74; Min. Order, Feb. 13, 2020. Plaintiff now requests that this Court reimburse him for attorneys' fees and costs in the total amount of $34,728.33. See Pl.'s Reply at 2. Defendants contend that this court should deny Plaintiff's motion because Plaintiff's fees are unreasonable. See May 22 Resp. at 1-2.
Also pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Sanctions filed on May 22, 2020. Defendants argue that sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel are appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 because Plaintiff overestimated unpaid wages in his complaint and sought discovery after Defendants tendered payment in full on December 9, 2019. See May 22 Resp. at1-2. Plaintiff opposes and argues that Plaintiff's counsel's conduct does not reach the threshold denoted by Section 1927. See Pl.'s Reply at 7. The Court addresses each motion in turn.
1. Attorneys' Fees
Under the FLSA, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see, e.g., Driscoll v. George Washington Univ., 55 F. Supp. 3d 106, 111-12 (D.D.C. 2014). This award may include attorneys' fees incurred as a result of post-judgment collection efforts. See Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Nat'l Indus. Pension Fund v. Jersey City Healthcare Providers, LLC, 358 F. Supp. 3d 12, 28 (D.D.C. 2019) (); Jackson v. Egira, LLC, No. 14-cv-3114, 2017 WL 4162128, at *4 (D. Md. July 28, 2017) (); Van Dyke v. BTS Container Serv., Inc., No. 08-cv-561, 2010 WL 56109, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 4, 2010) ( ).
A court is to determine a reasonable fee using the "lodestar" method, whereby the number of hours reasonably expended is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See DL v. District of Columbia, 924 F.3d 585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). Therefore, in assessing whether an attorneys' fees award is reasonable, a court is to (1) determine what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate, (2) assess whether the hours billedare reasonable, and (3) consider whether adjustments or multipliers to the lodestar are warranted. See Martini v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 977 F. Supp. 482, 484 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
The reasonableness of an attorney's hourly rate should be considered in light of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for lawyers with comparable skills, experience, and reputation. See Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 58, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107). "[A]ttorneys' fee matrices [are] one type of evidence that 'provide[] a useful starting point' in calculating the prevailing market rate." Ventura v. L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 139 F. Supp. 3d 462, 463-64 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Eley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). For example, the D.C. Circuit has established that courts may look to the Laffey Matrix, a schedule of appropriate fees for an attorney conducting litigation in Washington, D.C., that is based on years of experience. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109.2 Rather than merely declaring that the use of a particular matrix is appropriate in the instant case, a plaintiff should provide the court with evidence that the matrix enumerates the prevailing rate for attorneys in "this community for this type of litigation by attorneys with comparable experience." L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 139 F. Supp. 3d at 464.
A court must also consider whether the number of hours billed for work by counsel are reasonable. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the hours billed and sought for reimbursement are reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); Reyes v. Kimuell, 270 F. Supp. 3d 30, 37 (D.D.C 2017) (citing Herrera v. Mitch O'Hara LLC, 257 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2017)). The fee request "must be sufficiently detailed to permit the District Court to make an independent determination whether or not the hours claimed are justified." Herrera, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 47 (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
In determining whether billed hours are reasonable, courts should exclude hours that were not reasonably expended. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Productivity is the key factor that determines whether an attorney's time was reasonably expended. See Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 8, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). To this end, a court should exclude hours that are "duplicative, excessive, or otherwise unnecessary." Id.; see also Herrera, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 47; Serrano, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 198.
The lodestar calculation inherently encompasses most, if not all, of the factors constituting a reasonable attorney's fee. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley...
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