Reyes v. Kutnerian

• Decision Date: 13 April 2023
• Docket Number: F083644
• Parties: ENRIQUE REYES et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. VEREZH KUTNERIAN et al., Defendants and Respondents
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

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ENRIQUE REYES et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. VEREZH KUTNERIAN et al., Defendants and Respondents

F083644

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

April 13, 2023

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County, No 20CECG03470 D. Tyler Tharpe, Judge.

James A. Michel for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Gregory L. Altounian; Michael Carrigan for Defendants and Respondents.

OPINION

LEVY Acting P. J.

Plaintiffs Enrique and Guadalupe Reyes and their attorney James Michel appeal from an October 12, 2021 order of the Fresno County Superior Court entered in favor of defendant Kutnerian Enterprises.^[1] In said order, the court dismissed as frivolous the Reyeses' action "to vacate void judgments" (capitalization omitted) and instructed the Reyeses and Michel to pay the $17,852.31 in attorney's fees incurred by Kutnerian Enterprises pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, subdivision (a).^[2] On appeal, the Reyeses and Michel challenge the dismissal and the attorney's fee award. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the order.^[3] Furthermore, we deny Kutnerian Enterprises' motion for sanctions pursuant to section 907.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Starting in or around March 2010, the Reyeses rented the upper portion of a land parcel from Kutnerian Enterprises under an oral lease. In May 2013, the parties entered into a one-year written lease. This lease expired on April 30, 2014 and became a month-to-month tenancy. In January 2015, Kutnerian Enterprises served the Reyeses with a 30-day notice of termination of tenancy. The Reyeses did not vacate the property.

I. Prior Litigation

a. Case No. 15CECL01766

On March 6, 2015, Kutnerian Enterprises filed an unlawful detainer complaint. Proceeding in propria persona, the Reyeses moved to quash service of summons. That motion was denied. In a subsequent demurrer, the Reyeses asserted that they should have received a 60-day notice because (1) pursuant to Civil Code section 1946.1, their tenancy exceeded one year; and (2) pursuant to Civil Code section 798.55, they were mobilehome park tenants. Trial was set for April 21, 2015 and the Reyeses' attempts to vacate this date were unsuccessful.

At the outset of trial, the superior court informed the Reyeses that it read their demurrer and would consider anything raised therein as a defense. During trial, there was no dispute that the Reyeses resided in a trailer. The testimony of David Bernel, who rented the lower portion of Kutnerian Enterprises' parcel, indicated that he lived in a "house" or "home." During closing arguments, the Reyeses reiterated that they were mobilehome park tenants and entitled to a 60-day notice. Kutnerian Enterprises countered that the property was not a mobilehome park.

In an oral statement of decision, the court ruled that the 30-day notice given was sufficient and the Reyeses were not entitled to a 60-day notice pursuant to Civil Code section 1946.1. It did not expressly resolve the mobilehome park argument. The court awarded possession of the property to Kutnerian Enterprises and entered judgment in favor thereof. As a result, a hearing on the Reyeses' demurrer scheduled for April 27, 2015 was taken off calendar as moot. On May 6, 2015, the Reyeses were evicted.

On May 15, 2015, the Reyeses appealed to the appellate division of the superior court. Among other things, they contended "that they should have been served with a 60-day notice of termination of the tenancy because the premises was a mobilehome in a mobilehome park." In an opinion filed December 2, 2015, the appellate division affirmed the judgment. It explained:

"Appellants have cited to no evidence in the record of proceedings supporting their contention that the lot they rented was in a mobilehome park entitling them to 60 days' notice of termination of the tenancy. If error on this point appeared anywhere in the record on appeal, it was incumbent on appellants to refer the appellate panel to the portion of the record supporting their contentions on appeal. [Citation.] Appellants had the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness and had the burden to provide an adequate record on the issue, requiring the appellate panel to resolve this issue against them. [Citation.] There is no error on the face of the complaint that would require the appellate panel to determine that the motion to quash was improperly denied because the premises was located in a mobilehome park. [Citation.]"

On January 21, 2016, the Reyeses petitioned the Fifth District Court of Appeal for "a writ of certiorari to overturn a ruling on appeal which sustained an unlawful detainer judgment against [them]." On February 8, 2016, we summarily denied the petition.

b. Case No. 15CECG00659

Before the unlawful detainer complaint was filed, the Reyeses-proceeding in propria persona-sued Kutnerian Enterprises. They alleged elder abuse, utility cutoff in violation of Civil Code section 789.3, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, negligence, nuisance, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and retaliatory eviction. The superior court sustained Kutnerian Enterprises' general demurrer to the elder abuse and breach of the implied warranty of habitability causes of action without leave to amend. Kutnerian Enterprises then moved for summary judgment on the remaining causes of action, which were based on claims that it "cut off and refused to restore electricity to [the Reyeses'] travel trailer," it "failed to give [the Reyeses] proper notice of the termination of their tenancy," and its "eviction of [the Reyeses] was retaliatory." Kutnerian Enterprises relied upon "the preclusive effect of the final judgment and findings in the [earlier] unlawful detainer action," which concluded that Kutnerian Enterprises "had no obligation to provide electrical service to [the Reyeses] and was not responsible for termination of electrical service to [the Reyeses]," it "gave [the Reyeses] proper notice of termination of tenancy," and the "eviction was not retaliatory." The court granted the motion on collateral estoppel grounds and dismissed the Reyeses' complaint.

On appeal to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, the Reyeses-represented by Michel-argued that "the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because . there exist triable issues of fact." In an opinion filed November 22, 2017, we affirmed the judgment. We stated:

"Appellants base their theories of liability on three alleged wrongs committed by Kutnerian [Enterprises]. According to appellants, Kutnerian [Enterprises] wrongly cut off and refused to restore the electricity to their trailer, failed to give appellants proper notice of termination of the tenancy, and evicted appellants in retaliation for appellants' small claims action.

"Appellants assert the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because disputed factual issues related to the alleged wrongs still exist. Appellants argue it still must be determined whether Kutnerian [Enterprises] was responsible for the electricity cut off; whether Kutnerian [Enterprises] was obligated to provide or restore electricity to appellants; and whether Kutnerian [Enterprises'] eviction of appellants was retaliatory.

"However, appellants raised these alleged wrongs as defenses in the unlawful detainer action and the issues were decided against them. The trial court in the unlawful detainer action ruled that Kutnerian [Enterprises] gave proper notice of termination of the tenancy to appellants. The court further found that Kutnerian [Enterprises] was not the one who cut off the electricity and, under the lease, Kutnerian [Enterprises] was not obligated to provide electricity to appellants. Rather, appellants were responsible for providing their own water and electricity. Finally, the court ruled that the eviction was not retaliatory. The appellate department of the superior court affirmed this decision on appeal.

"Therefore, the parties litigated, and the trial court decided, the issues supporting appellants' theories of liability. Thus, appellants cannot relitigate those issues. Rather, the unlawful detainer judgment conclusively resolved those issues against appellants. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment based on issue preclusion."

c. Bankruptcy proceedings

On April 8, 2018, the Reyeses-represented by Michel-filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. In federal bankruptcy court, they moved to vacate the unlawful detainer judgment, arguing said judgment was void because Kutnerian Enterprises knew that they had to give a 60-day notice of termination of tenancy pursuant to Civil Code section 798.55 but defrauded them as well as the state superior court. Kutnerian Enterprises opposed the motion on the basis that the notice issue had already been decided by the state courts. Citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,^[4] the bankruptcy court denied the motion.

In a memorandum filed April 19, 2019, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order dismissing the Reyeses' vacation motion. It reasoned:

"- [T]he Reyeses argue: (1) they were never served with the 30-day Notice as Kutnerian [Enterprises] told the [unlawful detainer] court; (2) they should have received a 60-day notice from Kutnerian [Enterprises] under California law; and (3) because they did not receive proper notice of the [unlawful detainer] summons and complaint, the [unlawful detainer] court was without jurisdiction to hear the action or award relief.... [¶] - [¶]

" [C]ontrary to their argument, all of these issues were litigated before, and rejected by, the California courts. Since the [unlawful detainer] court entered the judgment, it...