Reyes v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 30 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5:17-cv-231-Oc-39PRL |
| Parties | DIONICIO DELAROSA REYES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner, Dionicio Delarosa Reyes, through his attorney, is proceeding on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1; Petition). Petitioner challenges his 2010 state court (Marion County) conviction for attempted first-degree murder with a firearm. See Petition at 1. He asserts four grounds: (1) trial court error in prohibiting him from calling a rebuttal/impeachment witness; (2) trial court error in instructing the jury on the elements of attempted voluntary manslaughter; (3) trial court error in denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion) as to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to move to dismiss the charges under Florida's "Stand Your Ground" (SYG) law; and (4) trial court error in denying his postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to object to a flawed jury instruction. Id. at 5-10.
Respondents assert both procedural and merits-based defenses (Doc. 6; Resp.). The Court afforded Petitioner an opportunity to reply, see Order (Doc. 2), but Petitioner's counsel chose not to do so, see Docket. Thus, the Petition is ripe for review.
Respondents concede Petitioner timely filed his Petition. See Resp. at 4. Accordingly, the Court accepts as undisputed that the Petition is timely.
Petitioner does not request an evidentiary hearing. Even if he had, upon review, the Court can "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development." See Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). As such, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus and "prescribes a deferential framework for evaluating issues previously decided in state court," Sealey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 954 F.3d 1338, 1354 (11th Cir. 2020), limitinga federal court's authority to award habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See also Shoop v. Hill, 139 S. Ct. 504, 506 (2019) (per curiam) ().
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner's claim on the merits, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication of that claim was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Nance v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-6918, 2020 WL 1325907 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2020). To obtain habeas relief, the state court decision must unquestionably conflict with Supreme Court precedent, not dicta. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
A federal district court must give appropriate deference to a state court decision on the merits. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). To qualify as an adjudication on the merits, the state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale. Id. Where the state court's adjudication is unaccompanied by anexplanation, the district court should presume the unexplained decision adopted the reasoning of the lower court:
[T]he federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.
Id. Under the federal habeas statute, a state court's factual findings are "presumed to be correct" unless rebutted "by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The AEDPA standard is intended to be difficult for a petitioner to meet. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. A showing of "clear error will not suffice." Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S. Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017). If some fair-minded jurists could agree with the state court's decision, habeas relief must be denied. Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 911 F.3d 1335, 1351 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 394 (2019). Therefore, unless the petitioner shows "the state court's ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement," there is no entitlement to habeas relief. Id. at 1349 (alteration in original). A district court's obligation is to "train its attention" on the legal and factual basis for the state court's ruling, not to "flyspeck the state court order or grade it." Id. (citing Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1191-92).
Before bringing a § 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must fairly present every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). To properly exhaust federal habeas claims, "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). See also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner's failure to properly exhaust available state remedies results in a procedural default, which raises a potential bar to federal habeas review.
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner's conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism.
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012).
Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496). "'This exception is exceedingly narrow in scope,' however, and requires proof of actual innocence, not just legal innocence." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001)).
To demonstrate trial counsel was ineffective, a habeas petitioner must satisfy a rigorous two-prong test by showing (1) counsel's performance was deficient, meaning it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984). See also Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). There is no "iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test before the other." Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Thus, "a court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa." Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)).
The performance prong is highly deferential, requiring a "strong presumption that counsel's representation was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Daniel v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Accordingly, "to show that counsel's performance was unreasonable, the petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take." Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1216 (11th Cir. 2001). (emphasis in original). The prejudice prong requires a showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel'sdeficiencies, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
When the "strong presumption" standard of Strickland is applied "in tandem" with the highly deferential AEDPA standard, a review of the state court's determination as to the "performance" prong is afforded double deference. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, the question for a federal court is not whether trial counsel's performance was reasonable, but "whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard." Id. If there is "any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard," a federal court may not...
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