Reyes–Orta v. Highway & Transp. Auth.

• Citation: 843 F.Supp.2d 216
• Decision Date: 14 February 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. 11–1410(SEC).
• Parties: Sheila REYES–ORTA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HIGHWAY AND TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

843 F.Supp.2d 216

Sheila REYES–ORTA, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.HIGHWAY AND TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 11–1410(SEC).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Feb. 14, 2012.

Juan M. Frontera–Suau, Ufret & Frontera Law Firm, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Edna Hernandez–Arroyo, Avila, Martinez & Hernandez, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION and ORDER

SALVADOR E. CASELLAS, Senior District Judge.

Before the Court are co-defendants' motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Docket # 21), and plaintiffs' opposition thereto (Dockets # 31). After reviewing the filings and the applicable law, co-defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Factual and Procedural Background

Sheila Reyes–Orta and her husband (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this political discrimination suit pursuant to the U.S. Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Docket # 1. Defendants are Reyes–Orta's former employer, the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority (the “Highway Authority”), Ruben Hernandez–Gregorat, Puerto Rico's Secretary of Transportation and the Executive Director of the Highway Authority, Brenda Gomila–Santiago, the Director of Human Resources at the Highway Authority, and Cesar Maldonado–Vazquez, a Labor Relations Specialist at the Highway Authority. Id. The individual defendants (“Co-defendants”) are sued in their official and personal capacities.¹

In her complaint, Reyes–Orta claims having been fired from her career post due to her political affiliation with the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”). Id. She seeks monetary compensation for her alleged grievances as well as equitable relief in the form of full reinstatement to all her functions at the Highway Authority. Id. Co-defendants timely moved to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that (1) the complaint contains no facts to establish a constitutional violation; (2) the constitutional claims are time barred; and (3) Reyes–Orta is barred from asserting tort claims under Puerto Rico law. Docket # 21.² Plaintiffs oppose each of these contentions. Docket # 31. The relevant facts, as averred in the complaint, follow.

Reyes–Orta has been a public sector employee for almost three decades. She is an open and active member of the PDP and has participated in PDP meetings and election campaigns. At the Highway Authority, she was a member of the PDP employee association, and, during the 2004–2008 PDP Administration, she directed the Human Resources Program as a trust employee.

Co-defendant Hernandez–Gregorat, a member of the New Progressive Party (“NPP”), became the Director of the Highway Authority after the 2008 general elections. Upon taking office, he ordered an audit to examine the possible nullity of transfers, appointments, and promotions made during prior PDP administrations. In September 2009, the person hired to conduct the audit met with Reyes–Orta and fellow supervisors at the Highway Authority to explain the purpose of the audit. At the meeting, “[i]n no uncertain terms, [the auditor] specifically stated that she was going to find arguments to nullify as most transactions as possible, and that all affected ... had to defend themselves as best as they could.” Docket 1, ¶ 36. Hernandez–Gregorat later elaborated on the scope of the audit at another meeting, stating “that he had to dismiss close to 1,000 employees ... that it was a shame that they had to be of mixed political ideology, but that he was sure that the greater number of those to be affected were members of the PDP.” Docket # 1, ¶ 34.

In December 2009, Hernandez–Gregorat sent a letter to Reyes–Orta notifying her that the audit had shown her appointment to be invalid. Then, on May 5, 2010, after a failed administrative challenge, Reyes–Orta was terminated from her employment pursuant to the audit.

Plaintiffs present a second factual scenario as alternative grounds for their claims. In April 2009, El Nuevo Dia newspaper published an article divulging the salaries of all trust employees at the Highway Authority. Reyes–Orta was accused of having provided the information to the newspaper, and an investigation was launched against her. The investigation, however, failed to incriminate Reyes–Orta. And as a result, the person in charge of it, the former Executive Director of Human Resources at the Highway Authority, was forced to resign. According to Reyes–Orta, “he was not willing to be pressured into any type of biased conclusion in his investigation and ... as a result of this he was forced to resign from his position on May 26, 2009.” Docket # 1, ¶ 21. Moreover, Reyes–Orta alleges that this person can attest that Co-defendants knew about her affiliation with the PDP.

Hernandez–Gregorat appointed Gomila–Santiago as the new Executive Director of Human Resources. Gomila–Santiago in turn assigned Maldonado–Vazquez to conduct a second investigation against Reyes–Orta.³ Both Gomila–Santiago and Maldonado–Vazquez are members of the NPP.

On August 31, 2009, Maldonado–Vazquez interviewed Reyes–Orta in connection with the second investigation. During the interview, he admitted knowing Reyes–Orta's affiliation with the PDP and allegedly told her “that all employees that are going to be terminated from the PDP administration are going to lose any administrative and/or legal proceedings against the Highway Authority.” Docket # 1, ¶ 28. Moreover, by Maldonado–Vazquez's “own admissions, at all relevant times, defendants were fully aware of [Reyes–Orta's] political affiliation....” Id. at ¶ 4. Reyes–Orta informed her superiors about Maldonado–Vazquez's discriminatory remarks but no corrective action was ever taken.

While the investigation against Reyes–Orta proceeded, Gomila–Santiago took “away practically all functions and duties inherent to plaintiff's position, particularly those related to job position analysis.” Id. at ¶ 30. Among other things, Gomila–Santiago ordered “that [Reyes–Orta] be left without access to the computerized database of the Human Resources Office, therefore effectively impeding [the] performance of the duties and responsibilities pertaining to her career position.” Id. at ¶ 31. Then, on March 19, 2010, Gomila–Santiago moved Reyes–Orta “through an administrative transfer to another office not related to Human Resources.” Id. at ¶ 41. Less than two months thereafter Reyes–Orta's employment was officially terminated. The termination and the events leading up to it negatively impacted Reyes–Orta's husband.

Standard of Review

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs' “well-pleaded facts must possess enough heft to show that [they are] entitled to relief.” Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir.2008). In evaluating whether Plaintiffs are entitled to relief, the court must accept as true all “well-pleaded facts [and indulge] all reasonable inferences” in plaintiff's favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The First Circuit has held that “dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir.2008). Courts “may augment the facts in the complaint by reference to documents annexed to the complaint or fairly incorporated into it, and matters susceptible to judicial notice.” Id. at 305–306. Nevertheless, in judging the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must “differentiate between well-pleaded facts, on the one hand, and ‘bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocution,and the like,’ on the other hand; the former must be credited, but the latter can safely be ignored.” LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (1st Cir.1998) ( quoting Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996)); Buck v. American Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir.2007); see also Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1999). Thus, Plaintiffs must rely on more than unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law, as these will be rejected. Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir.1988)).

Moreover, “even under the liberal pleading standards of Fed R. Civ. P. 8, the Supreme Court has recently held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege ‘a plausible entitlement to relief.’ ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (cited in Rodriguez–Ortíz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92 (1st Cir.2007)). Although complaints do not need detailed factual allegations, the plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court reaffirmed Twombly and clarified that two underlying principles must guide a court's assessment of the adequacy of pleadings when evaluating whether a complaint can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, the court must identify any conclusory allegations in the complaint as such allegations are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Id., at 1949. Specifically, the court is not compelled to accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations in the complaint. Id. Further, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955);see also Peñalbert–Rosa v. Fortuño–Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir.2011) (“[S]ome allegations, while not stating ultimate legal conclusions, are nevertheless so threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross the line between the conclusory to the factual.”). In other words, “[a] plaintiff is not entitled to ‘proceed...