Reyna v. Garza
| Decision Date | 29 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:21-CV-067 |
| Citation | 569 F.Supp.3d 567 |
| Parties | Javier REYNA, Plaintiff, v. Eric GARZA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
David Patrick Willis, III, David Willis, P.C., Brownsville, TX, for Plaintiff Javier Reyna.
Edward Dale Robertson, Jr., OLMITO, TX, Joel Arnold Aguilar, Aguilar and Zabarte LLC, Brownsville, TX, for Defendant Eric Garza.
Captain Javier Reyna has served with the Cameron County Sheriff's Office for almost three decades. In 2020, he publicly supported Sheriff Omar Lucio's re-election campaign. Defendant Eric Garza won that election and became sheriff on January 1, 2021. Over the following weeks, Reyna was removed from all supervisory responsibilities and lost the privileges of his senior status. He now brings suit against Sheriff Garza, both in his individual and official capacities, alleging that in violation of Reyna's First Amendment rights, Sheriff Garza retaliated against him for supporting his opponent.
Sheriff Garza, both in his individual and official capacities, moves for dismissal of Reyna's claims. (Off. Cap. Motion, Doc. 6; Ind. Cap. Motion, Doc. 7) For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Reyna's causes of action are not subject to dismissal.
Reyna has served twenty-eight years with the Cameron County Sheriff's Office (CCSO). (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 6) Since about 1994 and through 2020, he served as the Captain of Operations and Critical Incident Commander under the leadership of former-Sheriff Lucio. (Id. ) In this position, he supervised various CCSO divisions, and also received many privileges, including having his own assigned office, driving a late-model, unmarked, take-home fleet unit, enjoying the preferred work schedule of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. with weekends off, and not being required to wear a uniform every day. (Id. )
In the 2020 election for Cameron County Sheriff, Reyna was a "public and vocal supporter" of former-Sheriff Lucio in his re-election campaign. (Id. at ¶ 7) Reyna expressed his support by "block walking, assisting at political events, and posting supportive messages on social media." (Id. )
Sheriff Garza ran against Lucio and ultimately won the election in November. (Id. at ¶ 8) On January 1, 2021, Sheriff Garza assumed his office. (Id. at ¶ 10) That same day, Sheriff Garza directed his Chief Deputy, Robert Gracia, to summon Reyna to his office and inform him that he was no longer assigned an unmarked, take-home fleet unit. (Id. ) Several days later, Sheriff Garza ordered Reyna to vacate his office, assigning him a significantly smaller office in another division. (Id. at ¶ 11) And by the tenth day of entering the position, Sheriff Garza stripped Reyna of all supervisory duties over the Civil Process Division, leaving Reyna with no supervisory duties or subordinates. (Id. at ¶ 13)
On January 21, Reyna told Sheriff Garza that he was ready, willing, and able to perform any supervisory role. (Id. at ¶ 16) Despite this expressed commitment, Sheriff Garza did not give any assignments to Reyna for weeks. During that period, Sheriff Garza told another CCSO employee that Reyna was a "veneno " (a poison) and that he would "[have] no authority, he will be doing shitty jobs, driving shitty cars from now on." (Id. at ¶ 14) In addition, Reyna was excluded from all supervisor meetings and trainings and had his access to the Law Enforcement Reporting System revoked. (Id. at ¶ 23)
In March 2021, Reyna began receiving orders to conduct long-distance prisoner transports in uniform. (Id. at ¶¶ 18–20) According to Reyna, "[i]t is unheard of to have a captain of the CCSO personally conducting prisoner transports." (Id. at ¶ 20) And likewise, CCSO had never sent deputies across state lines to pick up a prisoner. (Id. at ¶ 22) Nevertheless, in early May, Reyna was ordered to pick up a prisoner in Alabama on May 5, and to drive him to Cameron County by May 7. (Id. ) Reyna completed the 2,000-mile round-trip within the allotted two days. (Id. )
Based on these allegations, Reyna brings causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Garza in his individual and official capacities, alleging that Sheriff Garza violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically, Reyna alleges that Sheriff Garza "completely stripped [Reyna] of his supervisory duties and all employment benefits of the rank of captain" in retaliation for Reyna's political speech in support of re-election candidate Lucio. (Id. at ¶ 26) Sheriff Garza took these steps, alleges Reyna, not to serve CSSO's needs, but "to professionally humiliate [Reyna] to the point he would resign." (Id. at ¶ 24) He requests a declaratory judgment stating that Sheriff Garza violated his First Amendment right to freedom of expression, a permanent injunction against Sheriff Garza requiring him to assign Reyna to a position with supervisory authority and withhold from any future retaliatory action, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. (Id. at ¶¶ 32–36)
Sheriff Garza moves for dismissal in both his official and individual capacities. (Off. Cap. Motion, Doc. 6; Ind. Cap. Motion, Doc. 7) In both capacities, he argues that Reyna's allegations do not present a prima facie claim of a First Amendment violation. (Off. Cap. Motion, Doc. 6, ¶ 6.11; Ind. Cap. Motion, Doc. 7, 3) In addition, in his official capacity, Sheriff Garza argues that Reyna's allegations fail to support a viable claim against a county officer in his official capacity, and that in any event, he was authorized to transfer Reyna from a policymaking position that required loyalty. (Off. Cap. Motion, Doc. 6, ¶ 6.17) Additionally, he challenges as impermissible Reyna's request for declaratory and injunctive relief, and for the recovery of punitive damages. (Id. at ¶¶ 6.22–6.25) As an individual, Sheriff Garza contends that the doctrine of qualified immunity precludes Reyna's causes of action. (Ind. Cap. Motion, Doc. 7, 5) In addition, he argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that Texas state law grants the Cameron County Civil Service Commission exclusive jurisdiction over Reyna's claims. (Id. at 7–9)
A. Standard of Review
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A plaintiff satisfies the facial plausibility standard by pleading "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The allegations in the complaint are not required to be thoroughly detailed, but must be "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The Court considers only the allegations in the complaint and must accept them as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Spivey v. Robertson , 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). If the allegations are sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," the Court will not dismiss the cause of action. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
Sheriff Garza in his individual capacity also seeks dismissal on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is proper where "the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case". Home Builder's Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison , 143 F. 3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a district court has jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Ramming v. United States , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). "[I]f the defense merely files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the trial court is required merely to look to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint because they are presumed to be true." Paterson v. Weinberger , 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981).
B. First Amendment Claim
Reyna alleges that Sheriff Garza violated his First Amendment right to free speech by retaliating against him for supporting former-Sheriff Lucio in his re-election campaign. Reyna brings his causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a violation of which can be alleged against an official in both his individual and official capacities. In either case, the plaintiff must show that (1) a constitutional or federal statutory right was violated and that (2) the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. James v. Tex. Collin Cty. , 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008). With respect to the first element, Reyna must show, whether proceeding against Sheriff Garza in his individual or official capacity, that Sheriff Garza's actions violated Reyna's free speech rights under the First Amendment. As all of Reyna's claims fail if his allegations do not present a viable cause of action under the First Amendment, the Court considers this issue first.
A cause of action for political retaliation in violation of an individual's First Amendment rights requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that he (1) suffered an adverse employment action; (2) engaged in speech on a matter of public concern; (3) had an interest in commenting on matters of public concern that outweighed the defendant's interest in promoting workplace efficiency; and (4) the speech substantially motivated the defendant's action. Beattie v. Madison Cty. Sch. Dist. , 254 F.3d 595, 601 (5th Cir. 2001). In the present case, Sheriff Garza argues that Reyna's allegations fail to "identify any...
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