Beattie v. Madison County School Dist.

• Citation: 254 F.3d 595
• Decision Date: 05 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-60545,00-60545
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2001) Joy Beattie, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MADISON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; Madison County Board of Education; Bert Jackson, in His Official Capacity; Ken McCoy, in His Official Capacity; Shirley Simmons, in Her Official Capacity; Mary McDonald, in Her Official Capacity; Lee Miller, in His Official Capacity; Ken Acton, in His Individual and Official Capacities; Maria A. Jones, in Her Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants-Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 595

254 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2001)

Joy Beattie, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MADISON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; Madison County Board of Education; Bert Jackson, in His Official Capacity; Ken McCoy, in His Official Capacity; Shirley Simmons, in Her Official Capacity; Mary McDonald, in Her Official Capacity; Lee Miller, in His Official Capacity; Ken Acton, in His Individual and Official Capacities; Maria A. Jones, in Her Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 00-60545

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT

July 5, 2001

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[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Joy Beattie, an at-will employee, was fired as a secretary for Madison County Schools, allegedly in retaliation for her support of Michael Kent's candidacy for school superintendent in opposition to the incumbent, Maria Jones. Beattie sued the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the school board members for First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-871, which prohibits certain actions by employers regarding employee's voting rights. Beattie asked for a permanent injunction, reinstatement, punitive damages, and compensatory damages for lost past and future wages, mental anguish, emotional stress, and loss of reputation. The district court dismissed the state law claim without prejudice and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the § 1983 claim on the basis that Beattie had failed to establish a causal connection between her political activity and her discharge, an essential element of her § 1983 claim.¹

Beattie appeals, contending that the district court erred in concluding that she failed to prove causation and erred in denying her motion to conduct additional discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). We affirm.

I.

From 1994-96, Beattie worked as secretary to Mike Kent, principal of Rosa Scott Middle School. From 1996 until her termination, she worked for Ken Acton, the principal of Olde Towne Middle School. Beattie claims she had no history of disciplinary problems, but school board members indicated that parents had complained about her rudeness. On April 6, 1999, Acton wrote a letter recommending her for annual re-employment.

Later that month, Larry Roberts, a city alderman and parent, came into the office and discussed the upcoming election for school superintendent. Acton suggested a reason that Roberts should not vote for Kent, and Beattie interjected her opinion to the contrary. Acton orally reprimanded Beattie and instructed her that as a school employee, she owed the current superintendent her loyalty. Beattie testified in her deposition that Acton instructed her not to express her opinions about Kent's candidacy "out of the office or anywhere because it was perceived . . . as coming from me [Acton]." Acton supported Jones in the election.

In June 1999, Jones visited the school and informed Beattie that she had heard that Beattie had made negative comments about her position on a proposed bond issue to build a new high school. Shortly thereafter, Jones asked Beattie to stuff envelopes for her campaign at work, which Beattie did. Jones never delivered the envelopes. A few days later, Acton drafted a letter recommending that Beattie be transferred "not based on Joy's ability to do the job but on philosophical differences on how a middle school should operate," such as her support of Who's Who Among American High School Students, her opposition to Acton's proposals on cheerleaders and the dance team, and her support of membership in the Little Six Conference for the football team.

Beattie put up signs in her yard to show her support for Kent. When Jones was campaigning in the neighborhood, she allegedly commented to one of Beattie's neighbors that "Joy Beattie has two signs in her yard [supporting Kent] and I'm going to her house to find out why." Jones did not confront Beattie about the signs.

The next Monday, Acton revised his letter recommending Beattie's transfer, proposing instead that she be removed. Acton sent the memo to Jones. Beattie claims that all the reasons cited in the memo for her removal occurred before the April 6 letter. Beattie believes that four days later, Acton met with a school district attorney, James Keith, and revised the letter to include additional reasons for her termination, most notably an allegation of a breach of confidence.

Jones presented Acton's recommendation to the board, which on July 19, 1999, voted unanimously to terminate Beattie. The board previously had discussed complaints that Beattie was rude to teachers, parents, and students. All board members testified in affidavits that they were not aware of Beattie's political activities or any alleged misconduct by Jones and Acton and that they were neutral in the campaign for superintendent. Further, they stated that they would have terminated Beattie without Acton's recommendation.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as did the district court. E.g., Bos Dairy, L.C. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 209 F.3d 785, 786 (5th Cir. 2000). "Summary judgment should be used 'most sparingly in . . . First Amendment case[s] . . . involving delicate constitutional rights, complex fact situations, disputed testimony, and questionable credibilities.'" Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 377 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 1979)). Summary judgment should be granted, however, "when the nonmoving party fails to meet its burden to come forward with facts and law demonstrating a basis for recovery that would support a jury verdict." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1071 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

III.

Beattie contends that the district court erred in deciding that she failed to present summary judgment evidence that her political speech and activities motivated her termination and therefore that the school district was not liable. She also argues that the court erred in concluding that Acton and Jones did not cause her adverse employment action. To prevail on her First Amendment retaliation claim, Beattie must show either that the school board acted in retaliation or that the improper motives of another actor can be imputed to it.²

To prove a First Amendment retaliation claim, Beattie must show that (1) she suffered an "adverse employment decision"; (2) her speech involved "a matter of public concern"; (3) her "interest in commenting on matters of public concern . . . outweigh[s] the Defendant's interest in promoting efficiency"; and (4) her speech motivated the adverse employment decision. Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1022 (1999).³ The only contested issue is causation.

To prevail, Beattie must show that she engaged in protected conduct and that it was a motivating factor in her discharge. Then, the burden shifts to defendants to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have come to the same conclusion in the absence of the protected conduct. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Beattie has not met her initial burden of demonstrating that her speech motivated her discharge.

A.

The parties do not contest that the board is a policymaker for the school district or that the board fired Beattie. They appear to agree that the district may be liable for the board's actions because the board is a policymaker for the school district in its capacity to terminate employees.⁴ If the board acted in retaliation against Beattie for her support of Kent, the school district may be liable.

Beattie's evidence that the board violated her rights is based on her assertion that she had an excellent record with no reprimands. She believes the conversation with Roberts about the upcoming election precipitated her difficulties at work and that the court should infer improper motive from the timing of the firing. Moreover, she asserts that the stated reasons for her firing--insubordination, disclosure of confidential information, undermining Acton, rudeness to parents and teachers, violating school policy, and being disloyal to Acton--occurred before Acton's initial recommendation of re-employment. She states, without corroborating evidence, that the allegations of breach of confidence and rudeness have no basis in fact. Thus, she contends, Acton's real motive in changing the recommendation from a transfer to a removal (and Jones's real motive in accepting it) was retaliation.

Even if Beattie is correct, her reasoning bears no relation to the school board's liability unless either the board acted in retaliation independently or the improper motives (if proven) of Jones and Acton can be imputed to the board. Acton and Jones cannot be liable independently if they did not make the final decision.⁵ If, however, the board adopted the allegedly impermissible motives of Acton and Jones through acting on the recommendation or delegated its policymaking authority in the area of at-will employment to Jones, it may be liable.

1.

Municipal liability for constitutional torts arises when the execution of an official policy causes the injury. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). "[A] single action by a municipal official possessing final policymaking authority regarding the action in question constitutes the official policy of the municipality and . . . the determination of whether a municipal official wields final policymaking authority regarding a particular action constitutes a question of state law." Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691, 698 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing McMillan v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997))...