Reynolds v. Bank of America National T. & S. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 13 November 1959
• Citation: 73 A.L.R.2d 716,345 P.2d 926,53 Cal.2d 49
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 73 A.L.R.2d 716 Wesley REYNOLDS, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (a National Banking Association), as Executor, etc., Respondent. S. F. 20165.

Page 926

345 P.2d 926

53 Cal.2d 49, 73 A.L.R.2d 716

Wesley REYNOLDS, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (a National Banking Association), as Executor, etc., Respondent.

S. F. 20165.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Nov. 13, 1959.

Nagle & Vale and William Nagle, Jr., San Mateo, for appellant.

Dodd M. McRae, San Francisco, Kirkbride, Wilson, Harzfeld & Wallace and John E. Lynch, San Mateo, for respondent.

GIBSON, Chief Justice.

The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the owner of personal property which has been wrongfully destroyed is limited in damages to the value of the property at the time of destruction or may also recover for loss of use during the period reasonably required for replacement.

Plaintiff's airplane was abandoned at sea and destroyed as the result of its negligent operation by defendant's testator. In addition to general damages, plaintiff sought special damages for loss of use of the plane until it could be replaced, and he offered to prove that new or used equivalent aircraft were not immediately available, that it would require four or five months to replace the aircraft, that its reasonable rental value was $1,200 per month, and that the loss of business profits for the period reasonably required for replacement was $5,000. The offer of proof was rejected on the ground that such evidence was not admissible. A judgment was rendered for plaintiff in the amount of $30,000, representing the value of the airplane, and he has appealed, claiming that he should have been allowed to prove additional damages for loss of use.

Section 3333 of the Civil Code provides: 'For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not.' It is established, under this section, that where a vehicle is injured by the wrongful act of another, the owner is entitled to recover for the damage done to the vehicle and also for the loss sustained by being deprived of its use during the time reasonably required for the making of repairs. Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal.2d 840, 844, 147 P.2d 558; Johnson v. Central Aviation Corp., 103 Cal.App.2d 102, 107-108, 229 P.2d 114 (airplane); Tremeroli v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 464, 480, 482, 227 P.2d 923; Marshall v. Golden State Milk Products Co., 113 Cal.App. 43, 45, 297 P. 109. There appears to be no logical or practical reason why a distinction should be drawn between cases in which the property is totally destroyed and those in which it has been injured but is repairable, and we have concluded that when the owner of a negligently destroyed commercial vehicle has suffered injury by being deprived of the use of the vehicle during the period required for replacement, he is entitled, upon proper pleading and proof, to recover for loss of use in order to 'compensate for all the detriment proximately caused' by the wrongful destruction.

Our conclusion is supported by decisions in several jurisdictions and by the Restatement of Torts. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Blanton, 304 Ky. 127, 200 S.W.2d 133, 138; Louisville & I. R. Co. v. Schuester, 183 Ky. 504, 209 S.W. 542, 543-545, 4 A.L.R. 1344; Paguio v. Evening Journal Ass'n, 127 N.J.L. 144, 21 A.2d 667, 668; Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah, 339, 241 P.2d 914, 920-921, 40...