Reynolds v. Blaisdell

• Citation: 23 R.I. 16,49 A. 42
• Parties: REYNOLDS v. BLAISDELL.
• Decision Date: 17 May 1901
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

49 A. 42

23 R.I. 16

REYNOLDS

v. BLAISDELL.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 17, 1901.

Bill by Thomas W. D. Reynolds, as administrator of the estate of James W. Braman, deceased, against Hattie E. Blaisdell. Bill dismissed.

Edmund S. Hopkins, for complainant.

Thomas P. I. McDonnell, for respondent.

DOUGLAS, J. The complainant brings this bill as administrator of the estate of James W. Braman, who died May 9, 1899, alleging that the defendant who was the granddaughter of said intestate, held certain property as trustee for said Braman in his lifetime, and now holds the same and the proceeds thereof as trustee for his estate, and prays that she may be ordered to account for and transfer and pay over such property to the complainant The bill, as amended, specifically alleges that Braman made loans of money to various persons, taking the security in the name of the respondent, as follows: (a) A loan of $300 to Joseph Cheatham, secured by mortgage on lot No. 56 on Camp White estate, in East Providence; (b) a loan of $300 to Joseph Cheatham, secured by mortgage of a house on lot No. 50 on plat of Camp White estate; (c) a loan of $250 to James B. and Madeline Munroe, secured by mortgage on lots Nos. 49 and 49 1/2 on the John W. Babcock plat, in the town of Cranston; (d) a loan of $1,020 to Albert C. Greene, secured by mortgage on lot No. 10 on John D. Cranston plat, in Providence; (e) a loan of $250 to A. B. Rounds, secured by mortgage of W. C. Burton on personal property; (f) a loan of $101, secured by mortgage of personal property of Thomas Chatham; (g) a loan of $1,500 to W. H. Richmond, secured by mortgage on lot No. 409 on the Miller & Ellerbeck plat, Providence; (h) a loan of $1,200 to Elcy D. Lynch, secured by mortgage on land in East Providence, Book 19, p. 471; (1) a loan of $400 to Elcy D. Lynch, secured by mortgage of land in East Providence, Book 21, p. 189. Also that Braman was the owner of certain real estate, the title to which was held by the respondent as trustee for said Braman, as follows: Lot 24 and lot 29 on the Plain Farm plat, in Cranston, conveyed by T. W. Reynolds to the respondent; also lots Nos. 353, 361, 302, and 372 on Assessors' plat No. 10, in Pawtucket; also lots Nos. 11, 12, and 13 on the River View plat, in East Providence. The bill does not allege in what manner the respondent became trustee of the real estate referred to, nor whether the trust was express or constructive, or what were its terms. The answer denies that Braman had any interest in the loans and mortgages and real estate aforesaid, and claims them as the respondent's own property. With respect to the Lynch loan of $1,200, it alleges that the sum secured consisted partly of money of the respondent, and partly of a debt due from John S. Lynch to Braman, which he gave the respondent as a present.

The complainant having joined issue upon the allegations of the answer, three issues of fact arise in the case, which are stated by the parties as follows: (1) Did the money loaned upon the mortgages mentioned in paragraph 5 of the bill of complaint belong to James W. Braman? (2) Did the real estate mentioned in paragraph 6 of the bill of complaint belong to James W. Braman at the time title to the same was taken in the name of Hattie E. Blaisdell? (3) Has any money belonging to James W. Braman come into the possession of Hattie E. Blaisdell since the death of said James W. Braman?

In considering the evidence upon these issues, it must be borne in mind that a resulting trust of the character here sought to be established depends upon the proof of two facts: First, that the money or consideration paid for the conveyance to the nominal purchaser was the money or property of the claimant; and, secondly, that the claimant while directing or permitting the conveyance of the legal title to the nominal purchaser, intended to retain the beneficial interest in himself. In determining the question of intention the courts are aided by certain well-established presumptions. Thus, if the consideration moves from a parent or one who stands in loco parentis to the nominal purchaser, the purchase money or the estate purchased is presumed to be a gift if the parties concerned are strangers in blood to each other, a trust is presumed to be intended. These presumptions, however, are not conclusive, but may be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence. Hudson v. White, 17 R. I. 519-522, 23 Atl. 57; Hill, Trustees, 150-165 et seq.; Lewin, Trusts, pp. 222,235, —the latter quoting Chief Baron Eyre in Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, Ch. 94. Upon the question of ownership of the purchase money or origin of the consideration, the burden of proof is upon the complainant it is said In 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 1174, as a statement of the principles gathered from many cases cited: "As the person who undertakes to establish a resulting trust by parol evidence claims an estate not only without deed, but in opposition to the written title, and as records and deeds are not to be easily overthrown, it is a well-stated rule not only that the burden of proof to prove the payment of the purchase money is upon him, but also that the evidence introduced in support of his claim must be clear, full, and satisfactory; and this is especially true when there has been great delay in asserting the claim. It has been held that by the terms 'clearness and certainty,' as applied to the degree of proof required, was meant generally that there must be sufficient positive facts proved to take the matter out of the realm of conjecture and presumption." In 1 Lewin, Trusts, p. 231, we find: "Parol evidence, where admitted, must prove the fact very clearly;" and on page 232: "Should the nominal purchaser deny the trust by his answer, the solemnity of the defendant's oath will, of course, require a considerable weight of evidence to overcome his impression." Under our practice, where the answer, not being sworn to, has the effect of a plea only, the sworn deposition of the nominal owner should be given the same effect Hill, Trustees, p. 152, says: "For this purpose the payment of the money must be clearly proved, and this may be done by any evidence going directly to the fact of payment * * * In every case the evidence adduced must be such as goes distinctly to the fact of payment;" and page 155: "It is to be observed that where the evidence is merely parol it will be received with great caution, and the court will look anxiously for some corroborating circumstances in support of it"—citing Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 517, 518; Carey v. Callan's Ex'r, 6 B. Mon. 44. The testimony adduced by the complainant in respect to the mortgages does not, in our opinion, satisfy the requirements of the law....