Reynolds v. Brandon
| Decision Date | 31 December 1870 |
| Citation | 50 Tenn. 593 |
| Parties | Jos. Reynolds et als. v. Mary Brandon et als. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
FROM MONTGOMERY.
Chancery Court at Clarksville, Decree at June Term, 1868, THOS. BARRY, Ch.
J. E. BAILEY, for Complainants.
R. W. HUMPHREYS and JOHN A. CAMPBELL, for Respondents.
James B. Reynolds died intestate, owning a large real estate near Clarksville, where he had lived, and leaving his brother Joseph and his sister Elizabeth, his only heirs. His property was partitioned between them, and in the division, Elizabeth became the owner of about 300 acres of the land. She was soon afterwards married to John D. Dolan, with whom, before the marriage, she entered into a contract, by which she retained the absolute title to all her property, reserving the same to her own sole and separate use, with all the powers of a feme sole. She expressly retained the right of selling or disposing of her property in any way she might choose. Shortly before her death, in May, 1859, she and her husband entered into a contract with W. N. Bilbo, for the sale of her land near Clarksville, at $250 per acre. Their contract was reduced to writing and signed by the parties.
Soon after the death of Elizabeth Dolan, her brother Joseph, assuming to be the owner of her real estate as her sole heir, conveyed the same to two trustees, for the benefit of his daughter, Mary J. Brandon, and his stepdaughter, Ellen Gorrill, with remainder interests to their children, and providing an annuity of $180 for a needy Mr. Thompson.
Some months after the death of Elizabeth Dolan, a bill was filed by Bilbo, against Dolan and the heirs of Mrs. Dolan, to set up and have enforced the contract of sale between Mrs. Dolan and himself, in relation to the land. His bill was demurred to, because he had not made the administrator of Mrs. Dolan, a party, and because he had not deposited in court with his bill, $5,000, which, by the contract, he was to have paid in cash. The demurrer was sustained, but leave given to amend the bill, in order that the administrator of Mrs. Dolan might be made a party; and time was given to Bilbo to make a deposit of the money. The bill was amended, and John D. Dolan, as administrator of his wife, was made a party.
It was the interest of Dolan that Bilbo's contract for the sale of the land should be set up, and enforced. In that event he would become entitled, as husband, to the entire proceeds of the land. But if the contract should be defeated, the land would descend to the heirs of his wife, and he would get nothing.
Bilbo was insolvent and unable to raise the $5,000, but Dolan had the means and undertook to furnish the money. Upon this fact becoming known to Joseph Reynolds and the trusteee??s, and adult beneficiaries under his deed, they all entered into a contract of compromise and family settlement with Dolan, by which he agreed to abandon his claim to the proceeds of the land as husband, upon the agreement to pay him $10,000, out of the proceeds of the sale of the land. This contract and settlement was executed by Joseph Reynolds, the acting trustee T. W. King, and all the adult beneficiaries, under the advice and approval of the solicitors of the minor beneficiaries, as well as of the other parties. When this contract was made, Dolan withdrew from Bilbo's suit, and it was dismissed on account of his inability to deposit the $5,000.
It was understood that the contract of compromise would not be binding on the minors, unless it was ratified by the Chancery Court. For this purpose, and in order to have the sanction of that court to a sale of the land in pursuance of the terms of the trust deed, and to raise the $10,000, for Dolan, and for carrying out the other provisions of the trust deed, the bill in this case was filed by Joseph Reynolds, the maker of the deed, King the acting trustee, and Brandon one of the adult beneficiaries; against David Gorrill, the married women and minors, as defendants.
The Chancellor was appealed to for a decree of ratification of the contract of compromise and settlement, and for sale of the lands.
Proof was taken, and a decree was made, ratifying the settlement as being to the interest of all parties, complainants and defendants, and an order for the sale of the land in pursuance of the trust deed. The Clerk and Master was ordered to take proof and report as to the indebtedness of the trust estate, and as to the separate interests of the several beneficiaries under the trust deed. Upon the final decree, in November, 1866, exceptions were taken to the Master's report by three of the adult beneficiaries, who were not satisfied with the ruling of the Chancellor, and two of them, viz: Mrs. Gorrill and Mrs. Brandon, appealed to the Supreme Court. At December Term, 1867, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Chancellor, with a slight modification as to the interest of Mrs. Thompson, one of the adult beneficiaries who had not appealed.
At the December Term, 1868, Brandon, the husband of Mary J. Brandon, for the benefit of the infant beneficiaries, filed the transcript for writ of error, which brings the cause back to this court for a scond time.
The first question which presents itself, is, whether the decree made by this court, at its December Term, 1867, upon the appeal taken by Brandon and wife and by Ellen Gorrill, is conclusive upon the infant beneficiaries, who bring the cause here now by writ of error? We find, that when this cause was before the court in December, 1867, an opinion was filed by Judge Milligan, in which some doubt on this question was intimated by the court; but, notwithstanding, they proceeded to confirm the decree of the Chancery Court, without any saving clause as to the minor parties, for whose benefit the suit is now prosecuted. Judge Milligan said: Accordingly a decree was entered confirming the decree of the Chancllor, with the exception as to Mrs. Thompson's interest.
It is obvious that Judge Milligan had no doubt as to the propriety of confirming the decree ratifying the Bilbo compromise, except that he doubted whether the appeal by the two adult beneficiaries, brought the cause up as to the minors. The decree was made, however, over his doubts, and probably under the belief that the compromise was a proper one, and it was properly made, so far as the effect of the appeal by two of the parties, is concerned, as we have had more than one occasion to hold, during the present term.
But, as we infer from the opinion of Judge Milligan, and from the manner in which the record was presented to the court, that the question as to the propriety or validity of the compromise and settlement, was not intended by the parties to be passed upon by the court on the appeal, we feel that we are not precluded from examining now, the grounds on which the compromise is sought to be sustained on the one side, and set aside on the other.
In this view of the case, we shall state the conclusions at which we have arrived, after a careful examination of the record, without elaborating the various questions discussed at the bar.
The controversy arose out of the question, whether Mrs. Dolan, at the time of her death, was seized of the land in controversy, as realty; or whether by her contract with Bilbo, it was converted into personalty. The solution of this question depended upon two other questions; first, whether under the marriage agreement she had the power to sell the land; and next, whether the contract with Bilbo was subsisting and valid, at the time of her death.
By reference to the marriage contract, it appears, that “all the real property which she had inherited from her brother, Jas. B. Reynolds,” and all her personal property, “shall remain and enure to the sole use and benefit of the said Elizabeth Reynolds, subject to her uncontrolled disposition and pleasure, as much so as if she remained an unmarried woman,” as well as all property, real, personal, and mixed, which may hereafter accrue to her,” “with the further right of selling and disposing of it by her last will and testament.”
We see no...
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Jennings v. Dargan, 1820
...rights. (emphasis added) Peoples Nat. Bank of Rock Hill v. Rogers, 218 S.C. 11, 20, 61 S.E.2d 391, 396 (1950) (quoting from Reynolds v. Brandon, 50 Tenn. 593 (1871)). While S.C.Code Ann. § 14-21-850 (1976) would have permitted the parties in the 1978 paternity action to have entered into th......
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Peoples Nat. Bank of Rock Hill, S. C. v. Rogers
...and that it would have been better for them to have retained rather than compromise their claims.' It was said in the case of Reynolds v. Brandon, 50 Tenn. 593, by Supreme Court of Tennessee, this: 'Whenever a court of chancery is called upon to sanction and enforce a contract of compromise......
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