Reynolds v. Brigham

• Decision Date: 20 September 1940
• Citation: 197 So. 840,144 Fla. 253
• Parties: REYNOLDS, City Director of Public Safety v. BRIGHAM et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

197 So. 840

144 Fla. 253

REYNOLDS, City Director of Public Safety v. BRIGHAM et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

September 20, 1940

Rehearing Denied Oct. 14, 1940.

Proceeding by E. F. P. Brigham and another against Daniel G. Reynolds as Director of Public Safety of the City of Miami, for a rule to show cause why plaintiffs should not be permitted to attend an investigation of charges preferred against members of the police department and represent the accused. From an adverse decree, defendant appeals.

Reversed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; Ross Williams, Judge.

COUNSEL

J. W Watson, Jr., and Abe Aronovitz, both of Miami, for appellant.

E. F P. Brigham and R. A. Hendricks, both of Miami, for appellee.

OPINION

TERRELL Chief Justice.

The City Commission of the City of Miami directed the appellant to make an investigation of charges preferred against certain members of the police department. The public was excluded from the investigation. Counsel for the accused filed a petition in the Circuit Court for a rule to show cause why they should not be permitted to attend the investigation and represent them (the accused). On final hearing, the trial court entered an order requiring Appellant to admit counsel, the public, and the press to the investigation. This appeal is from that decree.

The question to be answered is whether or not the Director of Public Safety of the City of Miami may deny an officer or employee of the City the benefit of counsel when making an investigation of charges preferred against him to determine whether such charges warrant suspension or removal as provided by Section 65 (a) of the City Charter.

Section 65 (a) of the City Charter is as follows:

'Any officer or employee in the classified service may be removed, suspended, laid off, or reduced in grade by the City Manager, or by the head of the department in which he is employed, for any cause which will promote the efficiency of the service; but he must first be furnished with a written statement of the reasons therefor and be allowed a reasonable time for answering such reasons in writing, which answer, if he so requests, shall (so far as the same is relevant and pertinent) be made a part of the records of the Board; and he may be suspended from the date when such written statement of reason is furnished him. No trial or examination of witnesses shall be required in such case except in the discretion of the officer making the removal; in all cases provided for in this paragraph the action of the City Manager or head of the department shall be final.'

In State ex rel. Bauder v. Markle, 107 Fla. 742, 142 So. 822, we construed this provision of the City Charter and what we said in that opinion is conclusive of the question raised in the instant case. It is quite true that the City Charter gives the head of the department a strong hand in dealing with officers and employees of the City but it also affords them ample protection. Even if he were given absolute power that would be a question of policy vested exclusively in the legislature.

The investigation complained of was for the purpose of determining whether or not the charges against certain members of the police force were well grounded or in the judgment of the Director of Public Safety warranted removal suspension, or reduced in grade as provided by the Charter. The investigation was in other words, one in the nature of a grand jury inquisition or one made by the...