Reynolds v. Davis

• Decision Date: 02 April 1908
• Citation: 84 N.E. 457,198 Mass. 294
• Parties: REYNOLDS et al. v. DAVIS et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

198 Mass. 294

84 N.E. 457

REYNOLDS et al. v. DAVIS et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

April 2, 1908

COUNSEL

J. J. Feely and Roger Clapp, for complainants.

Frederick W. Mansfield, for respondents.

OPINION

LORING J.

This is a bill brought apparently by the members of 9 firms and 35 individuals, and purports to be brought against 7 unincorporated associations (a building trades council and six local trade unions) and 28 individuals. The relief sought is an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the business respectively carried on by the several plaintiffs. The place of each and all the plaintiffs and defendants is in the city of Lynn.

The case was sent to a master and came on for hearing in the superior court on the master's report to which no exceptions had been taken. A final decree was entered directing that the bill be dismissed as to three of the plaintiffs named on a motion to that effect made by them, and as to one defendant on the merits, and restraining the remaining defendants in certain particulars therein set forth. From this decree the defendants who were enjoined took an appeal which is now before us.

The principal contention of the defendants is that on the facts set forth in the master's report the bill should have been dismissed.

It appears from the master's report that prior to May 1 1906, 'although some of them [the plaintiffs] had been running what was practically an 'open shop,' yet many of the complainants had at least some sort of verbal understanding, if not an actual agreement, with the various unions respecting hours, wages, apprentices, and the employment of nonunion help, which would expire on that date.'

At some time not fixed by the master the plaintiffs (with the exception of Keyes, Eastman and Swan), acting with others, signed and issued the following advertisement which was headed 'Lynn Open Shops':

'The following firms propose in the future to do a free and unrestricted business under the following Open Shop Rules, which will enable us to pay our employés according to their merits, and insure to the public a fair and honest return for their money, which cannot be done under the Closed Shop.

'Open Shop Rules.

'1. There shall be no discrimination for or against any workman on account of membership or nonmembership in any organization.

'2. There shall be no restriction as to the number of apprentices to be employed when of proper age, or as to the nature of the work which workmen of any class shall do.

'3. That eight (8) hours shall constitute a day's work.

'4. Overtime shall not be permitted except when absolutely necessary, and under no circumstances to be continued, all overtime to be paid for as regular time. Sundays and legal holidays, or the days on which the same are celebrated, are to be paid for as double time.

'5. Grievances arising among the workmen will be settled in conference between the employer and the workmen already involved.'

This advertisement was signed by 29 master carpenters and builders, 8 master painters and paper hangers, 1 machinist and millwright, 6 plumbers, steamfitters and tinsmiths, 4 stairbuilders and dealers in building supplies, 1 dealer in lumber and 'builders' finish,' and 3 carrying on the business of 'gas and electrical construction.'

The six trade unions named as defendants are unions of (1) carpenters, (2) lathers, (3) painters, decorators and paper hangers, (4) plumbers, (5) sheet metal workers, and (6) steam fitters and helpers.

On May 1, 1906, these 'Open Shop Rules' were posted by the plaintiffs in their several shops, and thereupon the union men members of the unions named as defendants left work with 'some' exceptions; in these instances the union men 'remained at work after the open shop rules were posted and until a nonunion man was put at work on the same job with themselves, when they immediately left. In one or two cases the union men returned when the nonunion men ceased working.'

Without going into details it is manifest that the strike here in question was a strike against the open shop, as the plaintiffs proposed to carry on an open shop, and for the closed shop as it had previously been carried on by many of the plaintiffs and by the defendants.

It is settled in this commonwealth that the legality of a combination not to work for an employer, that is to say, of a strike, depends (in case the strikers are not under contract to work for him) upon the purpose for which the combination is formed--the purpose for which the employés strike.

We have excluded all cases where the employés are under contract to work for their employer, because it is now settled in this commonwealth at least that competition and similar defenses are not a justification for inducing an employé or other person to commit a breach of a contract and thereby interfering with the business of the employer. Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N.E. 817, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 201. From that it would seem to follow necessarily that, in case of persons under a contract to work a strike or combination not to work, in violation of that contract, to secure something not due to them under that contract, would be a combination interfering without justification with the employer's business. See in this connecttion Aberthaw Construction Co. v. Cameron, 194 Mass. 208, 80 N.E. 478.

Instances of strikes where the purpose sought to be obtained by the strike has been held to make the combination not to work an illegal one, are to be found in Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 8 Am. Rep. 287; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011, 51 L. R. A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330; Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1067, 116 Am. St. Rep. 272; Aberthaw Construction Co. v. Cameron, 194 Mass. 208, 80 N.E. 478.

What, then, on the facts found in the master's report, was the purpose of the strike here in question?

The question of the purpose of the strike does not seem to have been directly in the master's mind in framing his report, and for that reason his findings of fact bearing on the point are not directed to this issue. But in our opinion the facts were abundantly proved which made the strike here in question an illegal combination, that is to say, an interference with the business which each plaintiff was conducting, for which interference there was not a justification.

The occasion of the strike, as we have said, was the posting of the open shop rules. The strike was manifestly a strike against working under those rules. To understand the significance of the defendants' combination not to work under these open shop rules it is necessary to state what was proved to have been the condition under which many of the plaintiffs had been conducting their business before these rules were posted.

They had as a rule been conducting their business under a verbal understanding, if not an actual agreement, with the defendant local unions.

It appears that the defendant local unions were affiliated with the Building Trades Council of Lynn and Vicinity, also named as a party defendant. The Building Trades Council of Lynn and Vicinity appears to be an unincorporated association made up of delegates from the local unions with which it is 'affiliated,' including the six local unions named here as defendants.

By the working and trade rules of this council every grievance which a member of a local union affiliated with the council has against his employer is to be investigated by the executive board of the council, and if the employer does not comply with the decision of the executive board he is reported to the council as 'unfair,' and upon being declared 'unfair' by the council the executive board is 'to again interview' the employer, and if the employer continues in his refusal to comply with the demands of the council the board 'shall at once remove all union men' from his employ, and 'no union man shall be allowed to go to work' for him until he is 'again placed upon the fair list by the * * * council.'

In other words, the members of the defendant unions, by the terms of their own rules undertook to decide each case of an individual grievance between a single employé and his employer, to decree what should be done by the employer as well as by the employé and to enforce compliance with its decision by threatening and instituting a strike in which all members were bound to join. What we mean by an individual grievance is (for example) the discharge by his employer of a member of the union for drunkenness or inefficiency.

This statement of the make-up of the defendant unions and the trades council with which they are affiliated makes plain what the plaintiffs were aiming at in the open shop rules. And it also makes plain what was the main or one of the main purposes for which the strike in question was instituted by the individual defendants.

The strike in question was a combination for the purpose of making the trades council, composed of delegates from the unions of which the individual defendants are members, the arbiter of all questions between individual employés and their employers.

It purports to include questions arising under contracts still in existence between the two. To force the employer to submit to a delegate body of employés his rights under an existing contract by a combination for that purpose is not a justifiable interference with their employer's business.

And in cases arising outside existing contracts it is an attempt to force compliance on the part of employers with the decision of this delegate body of employés as to whether a single employé is or is not to work for the employer, which decision is to be enforced by a strike. Such a...